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 While several studies have suggested the importance of maternal schooling to 
children's outcomes during childhood, less is known about the role when the child is 
older. In the first chapter, I estimate the relationship between maternal education and 
children's college attendance. After developing a theoretical model to consider the 
transmission of education across generations, I use the NLSY79 Child and Young Adult 
Surveys for empirical analysis. College proximity is used as an instrument for mother's 
schooling. All else equal, results suggest that maternal schooling significantly increases a 
child's probability of attending college by about 2 to 3 percentage points. The impact is 
greater for a child whose mother has lower cognitive ability, but does not seem to differ 
between sons and daughters. There is little evidence of endogeneity bias for mother's 
education as long as family income is included in the controls. Later cognitive 
stimulation (between 10-14) and early emotional support (under 3) are found to have a 
positive and significant effect on the child's college attendance decision. 
Then the relationship between maternal schooling and children’s high school 
outcomes is investigated in the second chapter. Three outcomes are high school 
completion, high school diploma receipt and high school graduation grades. Using 
changes of compulsory attendance laws as instruments for mother’s high school 
completion, the results suggest that mother’s education is exogenous in the estimation of 
high school completion. Having a mother with at least a high school education will 
increase her child’s probability of completing high school by 8 percentage points. While 
vi 
mother’s schooling and family income have significant effects for all three outcomes, 
mother’s cognitive ability is only meaningful to the outcome of grades. The effect of 
mother’s high school completion is similar for sons and daughters, wealthy and poor 
families, and mothers with different cognitive abilities.   
Besides intergenerational transmission of education, I also work with Prof. Ozturk 
on occupational promotion. We found that, in models with no controls for individual 
unobserved factors, females are less likely to be promoted in highly female jobs. Males 
on the other hand are more likely to be promoted in these jobs compared to their male 
counterparts in jobs with lower percentage of females. However, the role of occupational 
feminization is no longer significant once unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for 
along with the skills/ task measures of an occupation.  We do find overall wages to be 
lower for everyone in jobs with a female majority. However, there are no significant 
differences in the return to promotion by gender once occupational measures are 
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The Relationship between Maternal Schooling and Children’s College Attendance 
1.1. Introduction 
Education is important both to individuals and society. Better-educated individuals tend 
to earn higher wages (e.g., Card 1999), commit less crime (e.g., Lochner and Moretti 
2004), and live longer and healthier lives (e.g. Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2006). But can 
children also enjoy benefits from better-educated parents? And, if there is such a 
relationship, how are these benefits transmitted?  
It has been widely recognized that parents have an impact on the outcomes of 
their children. In principle, the attainments of the child are products of three primary 
choices: the choices of society (or government) that determine the available opportunities, 
the choices of the parents to invest in the child, and the choices of the child given their 
opportunities and investments (Haveman and Wolfe 1995). In the study of 
intergenerational patterns, the most discussed outcomes are earnings and education.  
The correlation of socioeconomic status between parents and children was first 
discussed in sociology, but later was examined by economists with particular emphasis 
on the intergenerational elasticity of earnings (IGE). Early estimates were generally 
obtained from cross-sectional data, measuring “one-year window snapshots” (see reviews 
by Becker and Tomes 1986 and Becker 1988). Behrman and Taubman (1990), Solon 
(1992), and Zimmerman (1992) pointed out this measurement could cause biases and 




years, efforts have been made to find better ways to better measure permanent earnings. 
One method is to average over several years to reduce the importance of transitory shocks 
(Mazumder 2005). Another approach is to carefully choose the ages when earnings are 
measured. Several papers have considered if there is any one-period earnings measure 
that can be used as a good proxy for life-time earnings (Baker and Solon 2003, Haider 
and Solon 2006, Bohlmark and Lindquist 2006). Both Baker and Solon (2003) and 
Mazumder (2005) pointed out the variance of one-period and life-time earnings reaches 
its minimum at around age 40. Haider and Solon (2006) found the highest average 
deviation from permanent earnings in one's twenties, with this deviation dropping once 
one reaches thirties until late forties, with it slowly widening again in one's fifties.  
Besides the estimates of IGE, many studies go further to look at the mechanisms 
behind intergenerational transmission. As one of the most important determinants of 
earnings, the intergenerational transmission of education has been studied since the 1990s. 
Not surprisingly, most literature shows parental education is transmitted to their children, 
as surveyed by Haveman and Wolf (1995), but the mechanism of transmission and 
persistence of such correlation remains undetermined in research. Higher educated 
parents will also have higher family income, which will increase children's education 
(Hill and Duncan 1987). They may also spend higher quality time with their children in 
child-enhancing activities (Guryan et al. 2008). Some find the correlation of 
intergenerational education is not persistent, and has declined over time as younger 
cohorts tend to obtain more educational attainment (Hertz et al. 2007, Checchi et al. 




This paper will contribute to this literature and a better understanding of the 
intergenerational transmission of human capital. Instead of focusing on the correlation of 
education across cohorts, I examine the channels for the transmission. How is parental 
education transmitted to the next generation? The answer does not only depend on 
educational attainment, but also on income and cognitive ability. Three transmission 
channels are proposed and I use the National Longitudinal Surveys to examine the 
evidence for these proposed channels.  
1.2. Recent Related Literature  
Several recent papers show the importance of the mother's investment on children's 
human capital accumulation. Cunha and Heckman (2007) constructed a model of skills 
formation assuming that skills acquired at one stage will be reinforced at later stages 
(self-productivity) and will increase the productivity of investments made in the 
following stages (complementary). According to their model, childhood cannot be treated 
as one single stage, so investments made at later stages should be distinguished from 
early ones in producing human capital. Early investment not only directly affects early 
skills, but also leads to an increase in the productivity of later investments. Therefore, 
early childhood investment is crucial to one's human capital accumulation: it will not 
only affect outcomes in later childhood, but will also have a lasting relationship at the 
adult stage.
1
 Human capital accumulation can start in childhood as early as in utero when 
the mothers' influence begins to set in. Anger and Heineck (2010) use a German data set 
to study whether cognitive abilities are intergenerationally transmissible. After 
controlling for educational attainment and family background, they find a positive 
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correlation between children's cognitive skills and their parents' abilities. Unlike a purely 
genetic model, they point out the importance of parental investments, and their results 
show mothers play a more important role than fathers in this transmission process. 
Consistent with Cunha and Heckman's model, they find a strong inter-generational 
transmission in cognitive skills based on past learning.  
In this paper, I study impacts of maternal schooling. There are two reasons for this 
focus. First, education is one of the most important factors determining maternal 
behaviors. Currie and Moretti (2003) found that an increase in mother's education level 
can induce healthier behavior and significantly affect their choice of prenatal care, 
smoking, marriage and fertility. Second, I consider the potential externalities of education 
for women. As shown in hundreds of studies, education can increase one's earnings from 
the labor market (Card 1999). It also has intergenerational externalities on a child's 
quality of cognitive development and health and fertility (Lazear 1983). Higher parental 
education can help children get better scores on cognitive skills tests. However, most 
early research focused on the correlation between the father and son, ignoring the 
mother's education effect. In the 1990s, more and more literature studied mother's 
education, and found that maternal education can also be important to measures of 
children's health. This is one factor underlying the World Bank's drive to promote 
maternal education in developing countries (surveyed by Behrman 1997). However, most 
of this literature is restricted to data from developing countries, focused on improving 
relatively low levels of female education.  
One problem in disentangling education's impact is causality. Higher educated 




increasing their educational attainment and earnings. Estimates ignoring this may suffer 
from an upward bias for the effects of maternal education. Another possible causality 
problem is from assortative mating, that is, higher educated women may marry higher 
educated men, and the return to maternal education may actually reflect paternal 
influence. Research on this problem did not begin until recently, and has not reached 
consensus. Berhman and Rosenzweig (2002) used data from the Minnesota Twin 
Registry (MTR), sending out mail surveys to collect schooling attainment from MZ-twins, 
their spouses, and the four oldest children of the twins. They found that after controlling 
for the mother's characteristics, an increase in mother's schooling did not have beneficial 
effects in terms of children's schooling, while the paternal effect is significant and robust. 
Their surprising finding casts doubt on policies being enacted in a number of countries to 
improve women's schooling. Their suggested explanation lies in the reduced childrearing 
time for better educated mothers, who tend to spend more time working in the labor 
market. For other relatively information-intensive outcomes, such as health, mother's 
education may still bring a positive effect. However, Antonovics and Goldberger (2005) 
reexamined their analysis and found their result is sensitive to sample selection and the 
measure of schooling used. The results in Antonovics and Goldberger (2005) suggest that 
the maternal impact is stronger, and that the difference between maternal and paternal 
effects is smaller. In a reply, Berhman and Rosenzweig (2005) argue that the measure of 
schooling used in Antonovics and Goldberger (2005) is biased upward relative to the 





Besides using twin samples, another approach to identifying the causal effect of 
parental education is to use a sample of adoptees. One advantage of such a sample is that 
it can control for some genetic effects from parents. Plug (2004) used the Wisconsin 
Longitudinal Survey (WLS) and found a similar result to Berhman and Rosenzweig 
(2002) - a positive effect of the father's education but not of mother's. However, this 
study may suffer from omitted controls for adoptive parental characteristics, and from 
non-randomness of the placement of the children with adoptive parents.  
A third method often used in previous studies of the returns to education is to 
handle endogeneity biases by using instrumental variables (IV). This analysis requires the 
use of measures that induce variation in parent's schooling but do not directly affect their 
children's later outcomes. For example, Card (1993) used college proximity as an 
instrument for schooling and Kling (2001) further studied the validity of this instrument 
and demonstrated that it has its greatest impact on the transition from high school to 
college. Although IV was initially used to study the direct returns to individual's 
schooling, they have also been used in intergenerational studies to isolate the parental 
education effect. Currie and Moretti (2003) used college proximity instruments and 
examined maternal education's effect on birth outcomes. They found that higher maternal 
education improves infant health, as measured by birth weight and gestation age: an 
additional year of education reduces the incidence of low birth weight by 0.5 percentage 
points, and reduces the incidence of preterm birth by 0.44 percentage points on average. 
Carneiro, Meghir and Parey (2007) also used college proximity as an instrument in their 
study of maternal education's effect on children's later outcomes (at ages 7-8 and 12-14), 




repetition and obesity. Their results showed that mother's education is influential to 
children's performance in both math and reading, although the effects tend to be smaller 
when at older ages for children. Maternal education also helps reduce the incidence of 
behavioral problems and reduce grade repetition, but does not affect obesity. The 
relatively high return can be explained by higher investment from better-educated 
mothers: although they might work more, they do not accordingly cut time breastfeeding, 
reading to children, or going out with children.  
Research using instruments usually studies children's outcomes happening during 
early stages of childhood. Young adult outcomes are rarely examined. Although it is true 
that when a child grows up he/she will be likely less influenced by parents and more 
exposed to other exogenous environments, it is still possible that effects at early ages can 
extend to young adult outcomes, as suggested by Cunha and Heckman (2007). In this 
paper, I study this particular question: to see whether mother's education affects their 
children's college attendance, an outcome for young adults and a decision likely made 
jointly by both the parents and the child. I'll also look at the home environment in one's 
childhood to examine its effect on the outcome of attending a college. In the next section 
I describe the data construction and the empirical strategy. Then I present the results and 
conclude the paper with a discussion of potential extensions. 
1.3. Data Description 
To accomplish this study's goal, I constructed a merged dataset containing information on 
both parents and their children. The parental data I use here is from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohort (NLSY79), which is a nationally 




were first surveyed in 1979. Out of 12,686 respondents in the NLSY79, 6283 are women. 
Beginning in 1986, follow-up surveys were conducted biennially for the children born to 
these female NLSY79 respondents. Through 2008, 11,495 children born to 4,929 mothers 
have been interviewed, with 7,100 of those children participating in interviews as young 
adults (ages 15 and over) starting in 1994. Children's outcomes such as early childhood 
investment and later college attendance are obtained from the NLSY79 child and young 
adult survey. The youngest children-those born later than 1990- are dropped in the 
sample because they are still too young (15-17) in 2008 to make a college decision before 
that date. Like in Carneiro, Meghir and Parey (2010), I also exclude the oversampled 
poor whites and members of military in the data set.
2
 
Children's college attendance is a dummy measured from information on their 
highest completed grade and current grade attendance. From 1994 to 2008, young adults 
who have attended school since the last interview are asked to report “What is the highest 
grade of regular school you have ever attended?” and “What is the highest grade of 
regular school that you have completed and gotten credit for?” In years when the sample 
members do not report their highest grade completed, I take the maximum number of 
completed years up to the missing year as the schooling in that year. The NLSY also 
provides “Highest grade of school completed” for all respondents interviewed in 2004, 
2006, and 2008 regardless of their last schooling report, and I use that to update their 
schooling information. The college attendance dummy is then based on this more 
consistent schooling measurement. If the highest grade completed is lower than 13, the 
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 441 women from the military oversample are dropped from the interview process after 
1985. The poor white oversample is dropped after 1990(CHRR 2002). The exclusion of 




child is not considered as having been to college; if the highest grade completed is at least 
13, the child is said to attend college and the first year with an observation at least 13 will 
be marked as the college attendance year. For a few respondents who report the highest 
grade as 12 but 13 in the attending grade, I also include them in the college educated 
group because they finished high school but have not been updated in the completed 
grade records. I then use the college attendance year (or the highest grade year for those 
who never reported college attendance) to obtain the other independent variable. For 
convenience, this year will be called the “target year” in the following text.  
We also want to control for the ages of the respondents. Using the age in the 
target year, however, cannot solve the potential problem of differing observation spans. 
The design of the NLSY79 child and young adult questionnaire allows children to be 
surveyed at the time when they are 15 or older starting in 1994, so they may have 
different periods over which college attendance might be observed. Instead of simply 
using one's age in 2008 or age in the target year, I use the age in the last round in which 
schooling is observed to capture the length of the period over which college attendance 
could be observed.  
Maternal schooling is measured as the highest completed years of schooling of the 
mother in the target year (for missing observations in some cases, I use the highest 
reported grade completed up to that point in the survey). Besides mother's schooling, I 
construct a corrected measure of cognitive ability from her scores in the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The ASVAB was administered in the summer of 
1980 and consists of ten subtests in the following areas: general science, arithmetic 




speed, auto and shop information, mathematics knowledge, mechanical comprehension, 
and electronics information. Instead of using the widely known Armed Forces 
Qualifications Test scores (AFQT), which are calculated based on selected subtests 
scores and biased by schooling and age differences (Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen 2004, 
Blackburn 2004), I take the total raw scores for all ten subtests and regress on the ages 
and schooling achieved in the middle of 1980. The residuals are then standardized to 
have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one and used as the corrected ASVAB 
score. In the remainder of the paper, the corrected ASVAB score mentioned will be this 
adjusted measurement. Number of children born to the mother in the target year is 
calculated to control for family size. Net family income is used as a measure of the 
family resources available to the child. To avoid potential endogeneity, I use the averaged 
net family income (in 2008 dollars) when the child is 12 to 15.
3
 
To understand the possible channels of the maternal schooling transmission, I also 
use the home observation measurements in the environment-short form (HOME-SF) in 
the NLSY79 Child and Young Adults Survey to assess the quality of a child's home 
environment. For each child, the family is asked a set of questions such as: “How many 
books does the child have?” “Is there a musical instrument that child can use here at 
home?” or “Does your family get a daily newspaper?” The questions vary across 
different age periods (under 3 years, 3-5 years, 6-9 years, and 10-14 years) and can be 
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 Total net family income is a variable created by the NLS. Net family income provides a 
combined income from the following sources: wages, net business, net farm, 
unemployment compensation and etc. The whole list of income sources is available at: 
http://www.nlsinfo.org/nlsy79/docs/79html/79text/income.htm. The net family income is 
collected from all household members (defined by blood or marriage), so may include 




categorized as cognitive stimulation and emotional support activities by the NLSY.
4
 The 
answers can then be recoded as dummies and summed up as scores measuring childhood 
environment. If the scores differ from year to year in the defined period, I use the 
maximum as the measure for the environment during the time.
5
 
Besides mother's cognitive ability measured by her corrected ASVAB score, I 
also use the child's Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT) scores to measure his 
or her cognitive ability. Since 1986, PIAT has been biannually administered to children 
aged 5 until 14, consisting of math and reading (reading recognition and reading 
comprehension) assessments. As in this paper I focus on the initial endowment, I only use 
scores assessed before any schooling, that is, recorded when the child is 5 to 6 years old. 
Due to response recording difficulties,
6
 the reading comprehension assessment has a 
lower completion rates and less valid observations. Therefore, I will only use the scores 
of math and reading recognition scores, as seen in other studies such as Carlson and 
Corcoran (2001) and Han, Waldfogel and Brooks-Gunn (2001). The raw scores of PIAT-
math and PIAT-reading recognition are totaled and then standardized to a measure with 
mean 0 and standard deviation 1.  
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 The maximum instead of the average is used to measure the best environment the 
family provides to the child in each period. Moreover, most children report one single 
score for each age, so the maximum is highly correlated with the average.    
6
 According to the user's guide page 110-111, reading comprehension assessment in prior 
years typically had lower completion rates because, sometimes they were skipped over 
without a reason, sometimes were ignored by the interviewer when a valid reading 
recognition was available, and sometimes were not completed and not all responses were 




Like previous studies, this paper uses an IV approach to identify the effect of 
maternal schooling. These instruments include mothers' family background, costs 
variables that can affect mother's educational choice and local labor market conditions, as 
suggested by Carneiro, Meghir and Parey (2007). The family background measures 
consist of the highest grade completed by the grandparents (which is asked of the mother 
in 1979) and a “two-parent home” dummy variable, which is an indicator asked in 1988 
for whether the mother lived with both biological parents until age 18. Besides family 
background, education can also be constrained by local educational costs. These costs can 
be measured in different forms, one of which is the distance to a college. A person who 
grows up in a place near to a college will be faced with lower costs of moving (Card 1995, 
Kling 2001) and thus have a more direct access to opportunities (Turley 2009). To avoid 
potential re-location around age 17, the location is chosen when the mother is 14 but the 
variables are measured in the year when she is 17. College proximity is created by an 
indicator for whether there is a public college (four-year or two-year) in the county of 
residence at age 14 in the year at age 17.
7
 The county of the mother's residence at age 14 
is obtained from the mapped NLSY79 geocode data, which is asked in the first round and 
collects the geographic locations for all respondents in NLSY79.
8
 College data are 
mainly obtained from the integrated postsecondary education data system (IPEDS), 
which collects yearly higher education general information surveys (HEGIS) conducted 
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 Public college, instead of private college, is chosen here because public colleges 
account for most collegiate enrollment: 95% of students attending a two-year college and 
67% of students attending a four-year college are enrolled at a public institution, 
according to census statistics (Higher Education-Institutions and Enrollment 1980 to 
2009). 
8
 To map with domestic colleges, I do not include areas American Samoa, Canal Zone, 




by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). In order to get college 
availability, I constructed a dataset of founding years for public colleges, using the 
founding years from HEGIS 1985 and colleges' home pages.
9
 Besides college availability, 
tuition is another form of education costs. Since the earliest survey year in IPEDS is 1980, 
I also use HEGIS in International Data Resource Center (IDDRC) to get tuition and 
undergraduate enrollment from 1972 to 1979.
10
Like college proximity, the tuition (in 
2008 dollars) is also measured in the county of residence where the mother turns 14 but 
in the year when she turns 17. Averages at the state level - weighted by the undergraduate 
enrollment of all four-year public colleges - is used if there is no four-year public college 
in the county. The other set of instruments are local labor market conditions, which 
reflect the opportunity cost of attending school. The measures include the state 
unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and personal income (in 




Since this paper aims to study maternal schooling effect on their childen's college 
attendance using IV, I will mainly focus on the estimate of the effects of maternal 
schooling years. However, as shown in Behrman and Rosenzwig (2002) and Plug (2004), 
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 Out of  1788 public colleges in the Unites States, 702 are  four-year and 1086 are two-
year (HEGIS 2008). HEGIS   provides founding years for 1440 colleges, and I find this 
information for the other 315 colleges from their histories on their webpages.   
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 Mothers are 17 years old between 1972 to 1981, but tuition is not available in all these 
years. In years when the tuition is missing (1975, 1976, 1979, 1981), I use the tuition 
level in the closest year. 
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 The earliest state unemployment can be found in the BLS is 1976, and I use the 
“Manpower [or Economic] Report of the President” unemployment rates in 1972-1975. 
Although these unemployment rates may not be comparable with those from the BLS 





the casual effect from maternal schooling may be biased upward without controlling for 
father's education. To correct this bias and capture a potential assortative mating effect, I 
will use the schooling years of the father as an additional control. Since children are only 
asked to report their father's schooling if the father is not living with the mother in the 
NLSY Child and Young Adult Survey, I will instead use mother's spousal schooling 
years as the closest measure of father's schooling years to focus on the effect from the 
maternal household. The schooling of the mother's spouse will be used both as an 
exogenous variable and an endogenous variable instrumented by the same maternal 
schooling instruments.  
The descriptive statistics of the main variables are reported in Table 1.1. From 
1994 to 2008, out of 3,768 children 42% have attended a college. On average, both 
mother and mother's spouse have attained schooling above 12 years and there are about 3 
children in the family in the target year.  
1.4. Theoretical Model 
The theoretical model is an extension of Solon (1999), which follows Becker and Tomes 
(1979). The family is assumed to maximizes the utility function  
  (   )                                                            (1) 
where the subscript 1 refers to the child, 0 refers to the parent,   refers to consumption, 
  is a measure of permanent earnings, and   is the altruism parameter for which     
 . For each family, parents are dividing their income between current consumption and 
investment on children. The objective for the allocation is to maximize the log utility 




The utility function is maximized subject to a budget constraint where the family 
must allocate earnings to either parental consumption    or investment in the child   :  
                                                                  (2) 
The earning equations for the parent and child are:  
                                                                (3) 
                                                                 (4) 
where   is the stock of human capital, and   is the return to a unit of human capital; 
Human capital of the child is produced by the following production function: 
        (  ) +                                                      (5) 
where    is the initial endowment the child acquires regardless of the investment choice. 
I assume     here so there is a positive marginal product for investment.    is assumed 
to have the following transmission pattern:  
                                                               (6) 
where the child's initial endowment is affected by the parent's endowment and human 
capital level, and    is a random component.  Equation (6) implies that the child's initial 
endowment can only be affected by parental education and endowment, but not by the 
investment. Such initial endowments, according to Becker and Tomes (1979), can include 
both the cognitive ability a child receives from the genetic constitution of the parent, and 
other “family commodities” belonging to a particular family culture. 
The full solution and discussion can be found in the Appendix A. The 
optimization gives us the following result: 
   
     
       
     (   )
                                                                    (7) 
  




          
     
       
     (   )
                                  (8) 
or    
      
    
     (   )
                            (9)  
where  
   
 
   
        .                                                               (10) 
In this case, the marginal effect of an additional unit of parental human capital can only 
be transmitted through income (   ) and the initial endowment ( ). Higher parental 
education should increase the child's education attainment.  
If parental education has an effect through the efficiency of investment besides 
the initial endowment, (5) and (6) can be written as:  
    (  )   (  )                                                            (11) 
                                                                     (12) 
where   is a function of   , with   (  )    and    (  )   . Better educated parents 
are assumed to make more efficient investments but at a decreasing marginal rate. With 
the same level of investment, parents with higher education are assumed to have better 
knowledge of how to allocate the resources that contribute to the child's human capital.  
With these two new conditions, one obtains: 
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]   (  )                                            (17) 
In this case, parental education is transmitted to the child through three channels: income, 
the initial endowment, and investment efficiency. Since   (  )   , greater parental 
human capital will also make  (  ) higher, indicating a more efficient way of investing 
and leading to more accumulation of human capital by the child.  
Comparing the two marginal effects of    on    in equations (10) and (17), the 
first term in equation (17) shows up as a result of allowing for an investment efficiency 
channel. If there's no efficiency term,    will be zero and equation (17) is the same as 
equation (10). To study the efficiency component, I simulate the process assuming that 
 (  )      (  )  for which  
 (  )    and    (  )   . Assuming     ,      , 
      and     , the marginal effect of     on    from the efficiency channel can be 
drawn as in Figure 1.1, which is positive and approaches a upper level as increases.  
1.5. Empirical Analysis 
In the initial empirical analysis, I use the child's college attendance    as a measure of   , 
and maternal schooling    as a measure of   . Other exogenous variables are denoted by 
  and one can write:  
                                                                 (18) 
Where   is an error term. 
A direct regression of    on   , however, may be biased. First, some variables 
may be omitted in the specification, such as child's unobservable ability and preference to 
go to college, and these variables may be correlated with .Second, maternal schooling    
may include measurement errors. Generally, the reliability of self-reported schooling is 




discussed earlier, my instrumental variables are related to the mother's family background, 
her costs of schooling, and her local labor market conditions when college age. The first 
stage regression will be:  
                                                                   (19) 
where   are the instruments that determine mother' schooling, and   is the error term in 
equation (19).  
As discussed in the section III,   consists of the following variables that can 
affect mother's measured schooling: parental educational attainment, an indicator of 
“ two-parent home” status, college proximity, tuition, unemployment rates, and local 
income in the county (or state) of residence. I would expect that a mother obtains more 
schooling if she also has more highly educated parents and is brought up in a two-parent 
home; The presence of a college likely increases maternal schooling, while higher tuition 
has a negative effect. Local unemployment rates and income measure the opportunity 
costs of going to school.  
To be valid instruments,   should also be uncorrelated with  . The relative costs 
based on the mother's location are reasonably assumed not directly related to the child's 
current schooling choice, especially college attendance, which is a decision made when 
they are young adults. Even for those who have the same location as their mother, the 
costs may have varied considerably over time and not directly affect the current choice by 
the child.  
Two potential problems may affect the validity of the instruments. Local 
characteristics may also be correlated with mothers' unobserved ability and schooling, 




the child's educational choice. Another potential problem raised by Carneiro, Meghir and 
Parey (2007), is college quality. If higher college quality is correlated with high tuition, 
and high college quality leads to an improved child rearing environment as the child 
grows up, higher tuition costs will exert some positive effect on mother's educational 
attainment. To solve this problem (like in Carneiro, Meghir and Parey 2007), tuition is 
measured by four-year public colleges, which have a smaller correlation to quality 
compared to private colleges. An inclusion of mother's family background will help 
capture some of these effects too. Mother's ASVAB score will not be used as an 
instrument because, as in equations (6), (9) and (14), measured ability is potentially 
transmitted to the child directly and not just through schooling.  
1.6. Results 
Estimates of equation (18) are reported in Table 1.2 for various specifications in which 
the child's college attendance is the dependent variable. Children born to the same mother 
are often observed in my data set, so the standard errors are obtained by assuming 
clustering with respect to the birth mother. In all linear probability estimates, mother's 
education is statistically significant in increasing the child's probability of attending 
college, at a significance level of 1%. Without control for mother's corrected ASVAB 
scores, one additional year of mother's schooling increases the child's college attendance 
probability by 2.9 percentage points in the linear probability estimation of model (1). 
When mother's corrected ASVAB score is included, the coefficient of mother's education 
decreases slightly - an additional year of maternal schooling increases the child's college 




see the estimated maternal schooling effect falls to 2.1 percentage points, still significant 
but lower than previous estimates.  
When mother's education is interacted with the family income deviation from its 
mean in specification (4),
12
 the maternal schooling effect stays at 2.1 percentage points 
when the family income is at its average level. The coefficient estimate for the interaction 
term is negative, implying that as income increases, the marginal effect of maternal 
schooling becomes smaller- mother's education plays a bigger role in lower income 
families. On the other hand, the marginal effect of family income decreases with a 
increase of mother's education. However, the interaction is only significant at the 10 
percent level in the linear probability model, so the evidence is not strong. The results for 
the other independent variables suggest that mothers with higher cognitive ability will be 
more likely to have a child attend college, girls are more likely to attend college than 
boys, and larger families significantly decrease the probability of attending college. 
An alternative functional form to the linear probability model is the probit, where  
 (    )   ( 
  )                                                      (20) 
where  ( )  is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the standard normal 
distribution and   is the vector of     . I reestimate specifications (1) to (4) as probits, 
with the results shown in the last 4 columns of Table 1.2. Marginal effects in a probit 
model (  (    )      (  )  ) depend on the choice of  , and I report the 
marginal effects at the mean of   in Table 1.2. The estimate for the maternal schooling is 
still positive and significant at the 1 percent level in all models. Without controls for 
                                                          
12
 Instead of an interaction between mother’s education and family income, such 
interaction is used to directly estimate the marginal effect of mother’s education at the 




income and mother's corrected ASVAB scores, an additional year of mother's schooling 
year will increase the child's probability of attending college by 4 percentage points, 
holding all else constant. The magnitude, as in the case of the linear probability estimates, 
drops with additional controls for mother's cognitive ability and income in (2) and (3), to 
3.7 and 2.8 points receptively. The coefficient estimate for the interaction term in (4) 
remains negative but becomes significant at the 5 percent level. 
Because of possible endogeneity mentioned earlier, I also estimated the models 
using instrumental variables. As with previous estimates, the standard errors are clustered 
with respect to the birth mother. Table 1.3 reports instrumental variables estimates from 
the first-stage for specification (2) in Table 1.4. The family background variables are all 
significantly correlated to maternal schooling, while the location-related variables are not. 
The schooling years of the grandmother have a greater impact on mother's schooling than 
that of the grandfather, while living with both parents also significantly increase mother's 
schooling. The partial R-squared, however, is 9% and indicates the instruments might be 
“weak”. Although only 3 instrumental variables are significant in this model, a joint test 
of the identifying instruments gives an F-statistic of 13.84, suggesting they are jointly 
significant.  
The second stage results are reported in Table 1.4.Without a control for mother's 
corrected ASVAB score and income, an additional year of mother's schooling increases 
the probability of attending college by 5.8 percentage points. The test for endogeneity has 
a p-value of 0.002 and shows evidence that maternal schooling is endogenous. The 
finding that IV provides a higher estimate of schooling is consistent with most studies 




Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens (2003), which all find higher schooling effects with IV 
estimations. In model (2) where mother's ASVAB score is also controlled for, this impact 
decreases to 5.2 points. When family income is introduced, however, there is no longer 
evidence of maternal schooling being endogenous. The suggestion of endogeneity in 
specifications (1) and (2) then seems to come from omitted family income. When income 
is introduced, IV Estimation no longer seems necessary (though the estimated 
coefficients are still higher). 
On the other hand, the larger IV estimate is an unexpected result when we 
consider endogeneity in maternal schooling caused by assortative mating and transmitted 
innate ability, which should lead to an upward bias in OLS. This result is also found in 
other studies using compulsory schooling or the accessibility to college as instruments of 
education (Card 1999, Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens 2003, Currie and Moretti 2003, 
and Carneiro, Meghir and Parey 2007). One explanation offered for larger IV estimates is 
that measurement error may be causing downward bias in the OLS estimates (Angrist and 
Krueger 1991). There is also the potential for “publication bias” (Ashenfelter and 
Harmon 1999), where researchers select specifications that yield significant IV estimates, 
so the IV-OLS gap is biased upward. There is also a concern about heterogeneity in the 
transmission process, as certain groups may be more likely to be affected by the 
instruments (for example, those who have lower ability and would have lower schooling 
if vthe instrument changes), so the IV estimates are higher than the average OLS 








I next estimate the nonlinear equation (20) with instrumental variables. As I do 
not assume normality of the error terms, the probit is estimated using Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) method using the same set of identifying instruments as in 
the linear probability IV results.
14
 The marginal effects are calculated at the means. The 
pattern of significance is similar to the linear probability IV estimates. As shown in 
models (5) to (8) in the Table 1.4, mother's education is still significantly positive, even 
after the inclusion of mother's corrected ASVAB score and family income. The average 
effect is slightly higher than for the linear probability IV estimates. In specification (7), 
an additional year of schooling increases child's probability of attending college by 5.1 
percentage points, compared on 4 points in linear IV estimates. The coefficient estimate 
for the interaction term of mother's schooling with the deviation from average family 
income is negative at the 5 percent level, indicating that the maternal schooling impact is 
different in families with different income levels.  
The above results show that mother's education significantly increases a child's 
probability of going to college, and the endogeneity of maternal schooling is attenuated 
by including the income variable. I am also interested in evaluating the hypothesis that 
this impact is equal between daughters and sons. By generating an additional maternal 
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sensitivity analysis.   
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 Stata provides Newey's two-step MLE estimator for the probit model. However, it does 
not calculate marginal effects after it, while Wooldridge (2002, p. 475) provides a two 
step procedure to obtain the average partial effects. However, he also points out the 
complication of computing the robust standard error and suggests not using them. To 





schooling interaction with the child's gender and holding income constant, specification 
(1) in Table 1.5 shows that an additional year of mother's schooling increases the 
probability for male children by 2 percentage points, a result similar to the linear 
probability estimates in Table 1.2. The coefficient estimate for the interaction term is not 
significant, however, suggesting that the effect of mother's education is quite similar for 
daughters and sons. Similar results are found with the probit specification (3) in the table. 
Another interaction I used is with mother's corrected ASVAB score, to see whether the 
mother's educational impact on child's college attendance varies with mother's cognitive 
ability. When the mother has an average cognitive ability, maternal schooling tends to 
increase child's college attendance by 2.4 percentage points in model (2) (where income 
is controlled). Unlike the interaction term with gender, the coefficient estimate for the 
interaction with mother's corrected ASVAB score is negative and significant, suggesting 
that the marginal maternal schooling effect is lower for smarter mothers, and mother's 
cognitive ability will play a bigger role for less educated mothers. 
A natural concern arises when I estimate maternal-schooling effects without 
paternal controls, as the maternal schooling impact might be biased upward by ignoring 
paternal schooling. Unfortunately, I do not have the father's years of schooling, but I am 
able to measure the schooling years of the mother's spouse when one is present. Table 1.6 
presents the estimation results after also including this additional control. When they are 
both instrumented for using the same IVs, there is no evidence of endogeneity in models 
(2) and (3) (with or without income controls), so only the non-IV estimates are reported.
15
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Including schooling from both parents makes the sample size smaller and I also apply the 
same regression specification as model (3) in Table 1.2. The results from models (1) and 
(2) in Table 1.6 show that maternal schooling has an impact similar to estimates in Table 
1.2 on the child's college attendance when either income or paternal schooling is 
controlled for. When both income and paternal schooling are included, as in model (3), 
the maternal education has a lower impact but remains positive and strong. The effect 
from these two sources of education on child's college attendance probability are quite 
similar: around 2~3 percentage points. Therefore, not all of the maternal schooling effect 
can be attributed to assortative mating. I also generate a total parental education term by 
summing up schooling years from both parents, and the coefficient estimate is found to 
be between the maternal and paternal effect on determining child's probability of 
attending a college. The test that mother's schooling effect is no different from that of 
mother's spousal schooling is not rejected at the 5% significance level, so parents' 




The above results show that, although college attendance of child is a decision 
made at a later stage of life, parental factors are important determinants of a child's 
outcome (as with grade repetition in Carneiro, Meghir and Parey 2007). I next consider 
the effect of maternal schooling when there are added controls for the childhood 
environment. Family income is also included to correct for endogeneity in maternal 
                                                                                                                                                                             
income and spousal schooling years are included, the test of endogeneity has a p-value of 
0.86 and still shows no evidence of endogeneity. 
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 The test of equal coefficients of mother's schooling and mother's spousal schooling has 





schooling, so IV estimation is not used. Table 1.7 present results with these additional 
factors. I first estimate the model controlling for the cognitive-stimulation activities in 
childhood in specification (1), emotional-support activities in childhood in specification 
(2), and both measures in specification (3). In specifications (1)-(3), we see that the 
maternal schooling effect remains positive and significant with these additional controls 
for the childhood environment, although it is slightly smaller than the estimates for the 
similar model (3) of Table 1.2. The magnitude ranges around 2 percentage points in 
specifications (1) - (6), and the coefficient is slightly larger in specification (2) and (5) 
when only emotional support measurements are used as additional controls. Conditional 
on mother's schooling years, family income, cognitive-stimulation and emotional-
support , the gender of the child and family size no longer play a significant role in 
determining child's college attendance, although the signs are similar. This might be 
caused by the much smaller sample size: out of 3768 children, 1579 (42.3%) have their 
childhood activities scores for all ages. On this smaller sample, I find only cognitive 
stimulation between ages 10-14 and emotional support between ages 0-2 are significant 
and positive, and they continue to be significant when all eight measures of childhood 
environment are included in specifications (3) and (5).  
1.7. Alternative approaches and robustness  
The equations estimated for Table 1.2 control for mother's ability and family income, so 
the impact of maternal schooling can move through both initial endowment channel and 
efficiency of investment. To isolate the efficiency component, I now try to control for the 
the other two channels: income and initial endowment. That is, instead of controlling for 




That is, I use    to replace              in equation (15), so that it can be written 
as equation (15)' as follows:  
  
   (  )   
    (  )
    (  ) (   )
  (  )                            (15)’ 
From equation (15)', we can see the first term, when   is a constant rather than a 
function of    , will be a constant too and thus the marginal efficiency effect will be 0. 
Table 1.8 presents the results when the child's cognitive ability is included. The 
subsample will be smaller here, reduced to 2306 observations. In the specification (2) in 
Table 1.8A, where the linear probability models are estimated, without income and 
child's cognition controls, the marginal effect of maternal schooling is 2.5 percentage 
points. When income is controlled for, the maternal schooling impact decreased to 2 
points in specification (3). When child's cognitive ability is controlled for in specification 
(4), however, the maternal schooling effect does not go away, indicating that when the 
two channels- income and initial endowment- are controlled for, maternal schooling 
remains significant, indicating the existence of an efficiency channel according to the 
theory. In specification (5), where both mother's cognitive and child's cognitive abilities 
are controlled for, however, mother's cognitive ability is not significant and the 
coefficient of child's cognitive ability is similar to the one in specification (4). Therefore, 
the mother's initial endowment appears to have a direct impact on the child's initial 
endowment formation, but does not have a direct effect on child's college attendance. I 
also conduct a similar regression as in Table 1.2 on this subsample in specification (1), 
and found that the marginal maternal education has a slightly greater impact than in 
specification (4). This is reasonable, considering that the maternal schooling effect in 




endowment, while the effect in specification (4) is transmitted only through the channel 
of investment efficiency. In specifications (6) and (7), I generated interaction terms with 
income or with child's PIAT scores. It is found that the maternal schooling impact does 
not differ in different families with different income levels, but there is evidence that the 
maternal schooling transmitted through efficiency has a lower impact on smarter children. 
Table 1.8B presents the probit estimation results for this sample and the maternal 
schooling impact is slightly greater than with the linear estimates. Similar to the linear 
models, adding additional controls of income and child's PIAT scores does not erase all 
of the maternal schooling effect on child's college attendance outcome. However, with 
the probit there is evidence that maternal schooling plays a bigger role in lower income 
families and for children with lower cognitive ability.
17
 The positive effect of maternal 
schooling suggests an efficiency channel when family income and child’s cognitive 
ability are controlled for. However, the negative interaction between family income and 
maternal schooling shows that better educated mothers do not have a higher marginal 
effect of income, which does not support the efficiency channel hypothesis. The idea that 
mother’s education enhances the efficiency of human capital investment is thus not 
clearly supported in the data.
18
  
I have also explored the effects of changing the set of instrumental variables to 
examine the robustness of the endogeneity results. Table 1.9 shows new results for the 
linear probability model with different instrumental variables. With only mother's family 
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studies: when family income is included, maternal schooling does not appear to be an 
endogenous variable. Therefore, I only report non-IV estimates. 
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are not fully considered and controlled for in the model, for example, mother’s preference 




background used as instruments, the results do not differ much from the estimates in 
Table 1.3. When family income is controlled for, we again cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that maternal schooling is exogenous. The joint significance of all instruments 
in this case, however, is larger than in Table 1.4, which is reasonable considering only 
family background variables show significance in Table 1.3. I next keep the family 
background but change the location-related instruments to be measured in the county 
where the mother turns age 17. The results are still similar. Location-related instruments 
are not significant in the first stage and the maternal schooling effect remains similar as 
in the other IV estimations. I also want to examine the results if non family background 
variables are used as the only instrumental variables. The results are presented in the last 
three columns using the location-related instruments measured in the county where the 
mother is 14. The coefficient for maternal schooling does not change much, but the 
standard errors are so large that the significance of the coefficients is removed. The tests 
of endogeneity are also small and one cannot reject the null hypothesis that mother's 
education is exogenous in this case. The F-stat also plummets, indicating that the location 
variables are weak instruments and the estimates are problematic. This is not surprising 
considering the low significance of these location variables estimates in the first stage in 
Table 1.3. 
In earlier estimations, mother's education is measured in the target year. However, 
this measure might be different from the education attained when the child is born and 
the maternal schooling begins to take effect. Therefore, I also changed the mother's 
schooling-years measure to when the child is born, and the results are reported in Table 




probability and probit probability models. However, when mother's cognitive ability and 
family income are controlled for, the estimate of maternal schooling coefficient is very 
close to the results in Table 1.2. The interaction effect between maternal schooling and 
family income has a negative coefficient and significant at the 10 percent level in linear 
probability estimations, and at the 5 percent level in probit estimations.  
1.8. Conclusion and future research 
While several studies have suggested the importance of maternal schooling to the 
schooling outcomes of a child at young ages, less is known about whether this impact still 
plays a role when the child is older. In this paper I develop a theoretical model that 
establishes three channels for educational transmission between generations: endowment, 
income, and efficiency of investment. I then use the NLSY79 Children and Young Adults 
survey to estimate the relationship between maternal education and children's college 
attendance, a decision made at the later stages of a child's life cycle. Holding child's race, 
gender and other family variables equal, an additional year of maternal schooling is found 
to increase one's chances of attending a college by 2-3 percentage points, while the 
impact is slightly greater when IV is used ( up to 4-5 percentage points). Once family 
income is controlled for, however, there is no evidence of endogeneity in maternal 
schooling. The impact is greater for a child who has a mother with lower cognitive ability 
or is from a poorer family, but does not differ between sons and daughters. While the 
empirical evidence is supportive of the endowment and income channels, it does not 
clearly support the investment efficiency channel.  
The paper also investigates the importance of early childhood home environments 




stimulation and emotional support, and are measured when the child is less than 14 years 
old. The results show the importance of later cognitive stimulation (age 10-14) and early 
emotional support (age 0-3). Maternal schooling remains significantly positive even 
when these environment measures are controlled.  
One potential policy implication of the results is that intergenerational 
transmission of education needs to be considered to understand the effect of an 
educational policy in the long run. My results show that intergenerational benefits should 
be kept in mind when evaluating the programs that aim to increase female education. 
Besides benefiting mothers, these programs also work through the channels of 
educational transmission and help accumulate human capital in the next generation. The 
increased education level of the next generation will possibly lead to other positive 
outcomes such as higher earnings and lower crime rates. Another policy implication is 
that children may make different college attendance choices simply because they have 
different maternal schooling. Therefore, if a government wants to devise programs to 
increase college attendance rates for the state, they might target students with less-
educated mothers and provide those students with more aid for college attendance.   
A potential drawback of this paper is the quality of the instruments used. 
Although Hoogerheide, Block and Thurik (2011) support the use of family background 
variables as instruments, I will try other suggested instruments in future research, such as 
changes in compulsory schooling laws. Another interesting question arises from 
educational outcome measurement. The outcome that I examined in this paper is college 




children are younger and less exposed to the outside world? I will explore this in the 










Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Attend College Indicator for whether child attends college 3768 0.424 0.494
Children's Characteristics
Female Child is a female 3768 0.486 0.500
Black Child is black 3768 0.311 0.463
Hispanic Child is hispanic 3768 0.190 0.392
Age Child's age in the last round of observed schooling 3768 21.415 3.458
Child's PIAT Scores Child's PIAT scores of reading cognition and math 2306 0.047 0.997
Mothers' Characteristics
Mother's Education Mother's schooling years 3768 12.681 2.361
Mother's ASVAB Scores
Mother's ASVAB total scores of ten substests corrected for age and schooling 3768 -0.208 0.922
Mother's Age at Birth Mother's age at birth 3768 22.920 4.032
Mother's Spouse Education Mother's spouse schooling years 3466 12.830 2.397
Family Size Number of children in the family 3768 2.895 1.286
Net Family Income Log average composite income of the household when the child is 12-15 3768 10.644 0.888
Instruments
Grandmother's Education Mothers' mother schooling years 3768 10.411 3.176
Grandfather's Education Mothers' father schooling years 3768 10.108 3.863
Two-parent Home Indicator for whether mother lives with parents before 18 3768 0.607 0.488
College Access Indicator for whether a public college is in mother's county of residence 3768 0.782 0.413
Tuition Log weighted average tuition in mother's county of residence 3768 7.565 0.457
Unemployment Rate Unemployment rate in mother's state of residence 3768 6.932 1.800
Local Income Log personal income in mother's county of residence 3768 10.098 0.222
Table 1.1 Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables







(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME
Female 0.078** 0.080** 0.081** 0.081** 0.294** 0.113** 0.303** 0.116** 0.316** 0.121** 0.316** 0.121**
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.049] [0.019] [0.049] [0.019] [0.049] [0.019] [0.049] [0.019]
Black -0.109** -0.061** -0.042* -0.042* -0.381** -0.143** -0.202** -0.077** -0.119 -0.045+ -0.118 -0.045
[0.016] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.063] [0.023] [0.072] [0.027] [0.072] [0.027] [0.073] [0.027]
Hispanic -0.025 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.084 -0.032 0.017 0.007 0.022 0.009 0.027 0.01
[0.019] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.072] [0.027] [0.076] [0.029] [0.075] [0.029] [0.075] [0.029]
Age 0.085** 0.084** 0.083** 0.083** 0.291** 0.112** 0.292** 0.112** 0.293** 0.112** 0.294** 0.113**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.013] [0.005] [0.013] [0.005] [0.014] [0.005] [0.014] [0.005]
Mother's Education 0.029** 0.027** 0.021** 0.022** 0.103** 0.040** 0.095** 0.037** 0.073** 0.028** 0.079** 0.030**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.013] [0.005] [0.013] [0.005] [0.013] [0.005] [0.014] [0.005]
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.043** 0.031** 0.031** 0.163** 0.063** 0.120** 0.046** 0.124** 0.048**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.035] [0.014] [0.036] [0.014] [0.036] [0.014]
Mother's Age at Birth 0.013** 0.012** 0.010** 0.011** 0.050** 0.019** 0.050** 0.019** 0.042** 0.016** 0.044** 0.017**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.007] [0.003] [0.007] [0.003] [0.008] [0.003] [0.008] [0.003]
Family Size -0.022** -0.022** -0.020** -0.019** -0.099** -0.038** -0.101** -0.039** -0.095** -0.037** -0.092** -0.035**
[0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.024] [0.009] [0.024] [0.009] [0.023] [0.009] [0.024] [0.009]
Net Family Income 0.058** 0.133** 0.248** 0.095** 0.633** 0.242**
[0.009] [0.040] [0.038] [0.015] [0.187] [0.072]
-0.006+ -0.031* -0.012*
[0.003] [0.014] [0.005]
Observations 3,768 3,768 3,768 3,768 3,768 3,768 3,768 3,768 3,768 3,768 3,768 3,768
R-squared 0.361 0.365 0.373 0.374
Table 1.2 Estimated Models for Child's College Attendance: Linear Probability and Probit
Mother's Edcuation*(Net 
Family Income-Mean)
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mother are in brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
ProbitLinear Probability
(5) (6) (7) (8)


































** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 1.3 First-Stage Estimates for Instruments 
for Maternal Schooling
Dependent variables: Mother Education
The estimates are obtained from the first stage in 












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mother's  Education 0.058** 0.052** 0.040** 0.041** 0.216** 0.184** 0.131* 0.155*
[0.010] [0.011] [0.013] [0.013] [0.046] [0.048] [0.052] [0.061]
0.083 0.071 0.051 0.060
Female 0.081** 0.082** 0.082** 0.082** 0.309** 0.308** 0.313** 0.315**
[0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.055] [0.053] [0.051] [0.052]
0.120 0.119 0.121 0.122
Black -0.107** -0.071** -0.053** -0.053** -0.402** -0.252** -0.164* -0.169*
[0.017] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.069] [0.083] [0.083] [0.085]
-0.156 -0.098 -0.063 -0.065
Hispanic -0.009 0.009 0.007 0.008 -0.042 0.033 0.033 0.04
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.081] [0.081] [0.077] [0.078]
-0.016 0.013 0.013 0.015
Age 0.081** 0.082** 0.082** 0.082** 0.319** 0.319** 0.317** 0.321**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.016]
0.124 0.123 0.122 0.124
Mother's  ASVAB Scores 0.033** 0.027** 0.027** 0.131** 0.103** 0.107**
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.041] [0.039] [0.038]
0.051 0.040 0.041
Mother's  Age at Birth 0.006+ 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.027* 0.032* 0.032** 0.034**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.012] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012]
0.010 0.012 0.012 0.013
Family Size -0.013* -0.015* -0.015* -0.014* -0.079** -0.084** -0.086** -0.081**
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.028] [0.027] [0.026] [0.027]
-0.030 -0.032 -0.033 -0.031
Net Family Income 0.045** 0.150** 0.210** 0.961**





Observations 3,768 3,768 3,768 3,768 3,768 3,768 3,768 3,768
Test for endogeneity 9.34 5.91 2.45 2.42
p-value 0.002 0.015 0.118 0.120
Test for overidentifying restriction 7.18 9.10 8.87 9.08
p-value 0.30 0.17 0.18 0.17
F-Stat for all IV's joint significance 22.73 18.79 13.84 13.16
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 1.4 Estimated Models for Child's College Attendance: Treating Mother's Education as Endogenous
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mother are in brackets
The third rows in the GMM specifications are the marginal effects
Mother's  Edcuation*(Net Family 
Income-Mean)















Coeff. ME Coeff. ME
Female 0.044 0.082** 0.31 0.118 0.320** 0.122**
[0.073] [0.013] [0.294] [0.112] [0.049] [0.019]
Black -0.042* -0.044* -0.119 -0.045+ -0.127+ -0.048+
[0.019] [0.019] [0.072] [0.027] [0.073] [0.027]
Hispanic 0.002 -0.001 0.022 0.009 0.009 0.003
[0.019] [0.019] [0.075] [0.029] [0.075] [0.029]
Age 0.083** 0.083** 0.293** 0.112** 0.293** 0.112**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.014] [0.005] [0.014] [0.005]
Mother's Education 0.020** 0.024** 0.073** 0.028** 0.088** 0.034**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.017] [0.006] [0.014] [0.005]
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.031** 0.168** 0.120** 0.046** 0.714** 0.274**
[0.009] [0.047] [0.036] [0.014] [0.181] [0.069]
Mother's Age at Birth 0.010** 0.010** 0.042** 0.016** 0.041** 0.016**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.008] [0.003] [0.008] [0.003]
Family Size -0.020** -0.018** -0.095** -0.037** -0.090** -0.035**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.023] [0.009] [0.024] [0.009]
Net Family Income 0.058** 0.057** 0.248** 0.095** 0.243** 0.093**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.038] [0.015] [0.038] [0.015]




Observations 3,768 3,768 3,768 3,768 3,768 3,768
R-squared 0.373 0.375




Table 1.5 Estimated Models for Child's College Attendance: Additional Interactions 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female 0.069** 0.071** 0.071** 0.071** 0.071**
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
Black -0.036+ -0.052** -0.040* -0.052** -0.040*
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
Hispanic -0.002 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.006
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
Age 0.087** 0.086** 0.086** 0.086** 0.086**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.028** 0.036** 0.026** 0.036** 0.026**
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Mother's Age at Birth 0.010** 0.011** 0.009** 0.011** 0.009**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Family Size -0.018** -0.019** -0.018** -0.019** -0.018**
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Net Family Income 0.058** 0.052** 0.052**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Mother's Education 0.021** 0.020** 0.016**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Mother's Spouse Education 0.017** 0.013**
[0.003] [0.003]
Total Education 0.018** 0.015**
[0.002] [0.002]
Observations 3466 3,466 3,466 3,466 3,466
R-squared 0.380 0.377 0.383 0.377 0.383
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mother are in brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Linear ProbabilityDependent Variable:                    
Attend College
Table 1.6 Estimated Models for Child's College Attendance:                                                   







Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME
Female 0.271** 0.105** 0.269** 0.104** 0.280** 0.109** 0.269** 0.105** 0.280** 0.109**
[0.051] [0.020] [0.051] [0.020] [0.051] [0.020] [0.051] [0.020] [0.051] [0.020]
Black -0.087 -0.034 -0.151* -0.058* -0.1 -0.039 -0.151* -0.058 -0.099 -0.038
[0.077] [0.029] [0.076] [0.029] [0.077] [0.029] [0.076] [0.029] [0.077] [0.029]
Hispanic 0.006 0.002 0.035 0.013 0.031 0.012 0.035 0.014 0.032 0.012
[0.078] [0.030] [0.078] [0.030] [0.078] [0.030] [0.078] [0.030] [0.077] [0.030]
Age 0.308** 0.120** 0.305** 0.119** 0.306** 0.119** 0.305** 0.119** 0.306** 0.119**
[0.015] [0.006] [0.014] [0.006] [0.015] [0.006] [0.014] [0.006] [0.015] [0.006]
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.111** 0.043** 0.139** 0.054** 0.103** 0.040** 0.139** 0.054** 0.102** 0.040**
[0.038] [0.015] [0.037] [0.015] [0.038] [0.015] [0.037] [0.015] [0.038] [0.015]
Mother's Age at Birth 0.041** 0.016** 0.044** 0.017** 0.038** 0.015** 0.044** 0.017** 0.038** 0.015**
[0.008] [0.003] [0.008] [0.003] [0.008] [0.003] [0.008] [0.003] [0.008] [0.003]
Family Size -0.088** -0.034** -0.090** -0.035** -0.087** -0.034** -0.090** -0.035** -0.087** -0.034**
[0.025] [0.010] [0.025] [0.010] [0.024] [0.009] [0.024] [0.009] [0.024] [0.009]
Net Family Income 0.246** 0.095** 0.220** 0.085** 0.220** 0.085**
[0.040] [0.016] [0.041] [0.016] [0.041] [0.016]
Mother's Education 0.072** 0.028** 0.070** 0.027** 0.056** 0.022**
[0.014] [0.005] [0.014] [0.006] [0.015] [0.006]
Mother's Spouse Education 0.064** 0.025** 0.050** 0.019**
[0.013] [0.005] [0.013] [0.005]
Total Education 0.067** 0.026** 0.053** 0.021**
[0.008] [0.003] [0.008] [0.003]
Observations 3,466 3,466 3,466 3,466 3,466 3,466 3,466 3,466 3,466 3,466
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mother are in brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 1.6 Estimated Models for Child's College Attendance:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Controlling for the Schooling of the Mother's Spouse  (Cont.)
Probit
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)











Attend College (1) (2) (3)
Female 0.021 0.022 0.019
[0.018] [0.018] [0.018]
Black -0.021 -0.021 -0.021
[0.026] [0.027] [0.027]
Hispanic -0.003 -0.013 -0.003
[0.024] [0.025] [0.024]
Age 0.149** 0.150** 0.149**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Mother's Education 0.013** 0.016** 0.013**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Mother'sASVAB Scores 0.012 0.016 0.011
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Mother's Age at Birth 0.002 0.002 0.001
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Family Size -0.009 -0.01 -0.008
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Net Family Income 0.026* 0.035** 0.026*
[0.012] [0.012] [0.013]
Cognitive Stimulation 0-2 -0.003 -0.005
[0.007] [0.007]
Cognitive Stimulation 3-5 0.007 0.007
[0.005] [0.006]
Cognitive Stimulation 6-9 -0.002 -0.001
[0.006] [0.006]
Cognitive Stimulation 10-14 0.017** 0.017**
[0.006] [0.006]
Emotional Support 0-2 0.017* 0.016*
[0.007] [0.007]
Emotional Support 3-5 0 -0.003
[0.005] [0.005]
Emotional Support 6-9 -0.004 -0.006
[0.006] [0.006]
Emotional Support 10-14 0.004 0.001
[0.006] [0.006]
Observations 1,593 1,593 1,593
R-squared 0.503 0.5 0.504
Robust standard errors in brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Linear Probability
Table 1.7 Estimated Models for Child's College Attendance: 









Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME
Female 0.08 0.029 0.091 0.033 0.081 0.029
[0.086] [0.031] [0.086] [0.031] [0.087] [0.031]
Black 0.014 0.005 -0.035 -0.013 -0.012 -0.004
[0.129] [0.047] [0.133] [0.047] [0.135] [0.048]
Hispanic 0.017 0.006 -0.043 -0.015 0.028 0.01
[0.129] [0.047] [0.128] [0.046] [0.129] [0.047]
Age 0.670** 0.242** 0.672** 0.242** 0.673** 0.242**
[0.035] [0.013] [0.035] [0.013] [0.035] [0.013]
Mother's Education 0.055** 0.020** 0.070** 0.025** 0.056** 0.020**
[0.020] [0.007] [0.020] [0.007] [0.020] [0.007]
Mother'sASVAB Scores 0.071 0.026 0.098+ 0.035+ 0.071 0.025
[0.060] [0.022] [0.059] [0.021] [0.060] [0.022]
Mother's Age at Birth 0.040* 0.014* 0.041* 0.015* 0.037* 0.013*
[0.017] [0.006] [0.017] [0.006] [0.017] [0.006]
Family Size -0.046 -0.017 -0.057 -0.021 -0.044 -0.016
[0.038] [0.014] [0.037] [0.013] [0.038] [0.014]
Net Family Income 0.209** 0.075** 0.265** 0.096** 0.221** 0.080**
[0.067] [0.024] [0.066] [0.024] [0.068] [0.024]
Cognitive Stimulation 0-2 0.01 0.004 0.005 0.002
[0.035] [0.012] [0.036] [0.013]
Cognitive Stimulation 3-5 0.033 0.012 0.033 0.012
[0.029] [0.010] [0.030] [0.011]
Cognitive Stimulation 6-9 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.001
[0.029] [0.010] [0.029] [0.011]
Cognitive Stimulation 10-14 0.072* 0.026* 0.072* 0.026*
[0.033] [0.012] [0.033] [0.012]
Emotional Support 0-2 0.077* 0.028* 0.068+ 0.025+
[0.034] [0.012] [0.035] [0.013]
Emotional Support 3-5 -0.001 0 -0.019 -0.007
[0.027] [0.010] [0.028] [0.010]
Emotional Support 6-9 -0.016 -0.006 -0.022 -0.008
[0.033] [0.012] [0.034] [0.012]
Emotional Support 10-14 0 0 -0.013 -0.005
[0.030] [0.011] [0.031] [0.011]
Observations 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593
R-squared
Robust standard errors in brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Probit
(6)(4) (5)
Table 1.7 Estimated Models for Child's College Attendance:                                                               







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female 0.058** 0.055** 0.057** 0.049** 0.050** 0.049** 0.049**
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
Black -0.023 -0.078** -0.053** -0.041* -0.024 -0.042* -0.043*
[0.022] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.022] [0.019] [0.019]
Hispanic -0.012 -0.038+ -0.032 -0.011 0.000 -0.011 -0.009
[0.023] [0.022] [0.022] [0.021] [0.022] [0.021] [0.021]
Age 0.112** 0.113** 0.112** 0.110** 0.110** 0.110** 0.110**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Mother Age at Birth 0.008** 0.009** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Family Size -0.015* -0.017** -0.015* -0.010+ -0.011+ -0.009 -0.008
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Mother's Education 0.019** 0.025** 0.020** 0.016** 0.015** 0.016** 0.016**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Net Family Income 0.043** 0.049** 0.039** 0.036** 0.105* 0.039**
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.046] [0.010]
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.030** 0.018
[0.011] [0.011]
Child's PIAT Scores 0.062** 0.060** 0.063** 0.148**





Observations 2,306 2,306 2,306 2,306 2,306 2,306 2,306
R-squared 0.442 0.434 0.439 0.453 0.454 0.454 0.454
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mother are in brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 1.8A Estimated Models for Child's College Attendance with Children's PPVT Scores:    Linear Probability
















Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME
Female 0.255** 0.097** 0.225** 0.086** 0.246** 0.094**
[0.066] [0.025] [0.066] [0.025] [0.066] [0.025]
Black -0.051 -0.019 -0.304** -0.113** -0.189* -0.071*
[0.095] [0.036] [0.081] [0.029] [0.084] [0.031]
Hispanic -0.014 -0.005 -0.142 -0.054 -0.108 -0.041
[0.098] [0.037] [0.095] [0.035] [0.094] [0.035]
Age 0.437** 0.166** 0.432** 0.165** 0.434** 0.165**
[0.021] [0.008] [0.021] [0.008] [0.021] [0.008]
Mother's Age at Birth 0.040** 0.015** 0.047** 0.018** 0.038** 0.014**
[0.011] [0.004] [0.011] [0.004] [0.011] [0.004]
Family Size -0.098** -0.037** -0.103** -0.039** -0.095** -0.036**
[0.029] [0.011] [0.029] [0.011] [0.029] [0.011]
Mother's Education 0.077** 0.029** 0.105** 0.040** 0.082** 0.031**
[0.017] [0.006] [0.016] [0.006] [0.017] [0.006]
Net Family Income 0.207** 0.079** 0.231** 0.088**
[0.048] [0.018] [0.047] [0.018]
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.141** 0.054**
[0.047] [0.018]
Child's PIAT Scores
Observations 2,306 2,306 2,306 2,306 2,306 2,306
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mother are in brackets




















Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME
Female 0.216** 0.082** 0.223** 0.085** 0.213** 0.081** 0.215** 0.082**
[0.067] [0.025] [0.067] [0.025] [0.067] [0.025] [0.067] [0.025]
Black -0.144+ -0.054+ -0.054 -0.02 -0.146+ -0.055+ -0.152+ -0.057+
[0.086] [0.032] [0.097] [0.037] [0.086] [0.032] [0.086] [0.032]
Hispanic -0.015 -0.006 0.043 0.017 -0.011 -0.004 -0.008 -0.003
[0.095] [0.036] [0.098] [0.038] [0.095] [0.036] [0.095] [0.036]
Age 0.435** 0.165** 0.437** 0.166** 0.436** 0.166** 0.436** 0.166**
[0.022] [0.009] [0.022] [0.009] [0.022] [0.009] [0.022] [0.009]
Mother's Age at Birth 0.037** 0.014** 0.038** 0.015** 0.039** 0.015** 0.038** 0.015**
[0.011] [0.004] [0.011] [0.004] [0.011] [0.004] [0.012] [0.004]
Family Size -0.079** -0.030** -0.081** -0.031** -0.073* -0.028* -0.070* -0.026*
[0.030] [0.011] [0.030] [0.011] [0.030] [0.011] [0.030] [0.011]
Mother's Education 0.064** 0.025** 0.062** 0.024** 0.069** 0.026** 0.066** 0.025**
[0.017] [0.006] [0.017] [0.006] [0.018] [0.007] [0.018] [0.007]
Net Family Income 0.198** 0.076** 0.184** 0.070** 0.638** 0.243** 0.201** 0.076**
[0.048] [0.018] [0.049] [0.018] [0.228] [0.086] [0.048] [0.018]
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.093+ 0.035+
[0.049] [0.019]
Child's PIAT Scores 0.266** 0.101** 0.255** 0.097** 0.272** 0.103** 0.820** 0.311**





Observations 2,306 2,306 2,306 2,306 2,306 2,306 2,306 2,306
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mother are in brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mother's Education 0.059** 0.051** 0.040** 0.058** 0.052** 0.040** 0.059 0.073 0.051
[0.010] [0.011] [0.013] [0.010] [0.011] [0.013] [0.046] [0.048] [0.067]
Female 0.081** 0.082** 0.082** 0.081** 0.082** 0.082** 0.081** 0.084** 0.083**
[0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
Black -0.107** -0.070** -0.052** -0.106** -0.069** -0.051* -0.107** -0.078** -0.059
[0.017] [0.020] [0.020] [0.017] [0.020] [0.020] [0.017] [0.026] [0.042]
Hispanic -0.009 0.009 0.007 -0.008 0.01 0.008 -0.009 0.016 0.01
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.033] [0.027] [0.029]
Age 0.081** 0.082** 0.082** 0.081** 0.082** 0.082** 0.081** 0.079** 0.081**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007]
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.033** 0.027** 0.033** 0.027** 0.025 0.024
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.021] [0.017]
Mother's Age at Birth 0.006+ 0.007* 0.007* 0.006+ 0.007* 0.007* 0.006 0.002 0.005
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.011] [0.011] [0.013]
Family Size -0.013* -0.015* -0.015* -0.013* -0.015* -0.015* -0.013 -0.008 -0.012
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.015] [0.015] [0.018]
Net Family Income 0.046** 0.045** 0.038
[0.012] [0.012] [0.047]
Observations 3,768 3,768 3,768 3763 3763 3763 3,768 3,768 3,768
Test of endogeneity 9.48 5.70 2.40 9.41 5.89 2.42 0.45 1.04 0.21
p-value 0.002 0.017 0.122 0.002 0.015 0.120 0.504 0.308 0.647
Test for overidentifiying restriction 0.18 0.12 0.09 7.19 8.98 8.61 6.97 8.27 8.47
p-value 0.915 0.943 0.955 0.304 0.175 0.197 0.073 0.041 0.037
F-Stat for all IV's joint significance 50.12 40.91 30.59 22.71 18.76 13.81 2.56 2.43 1.25
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.046 0.289
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mother are in brackets
Test for overidentifiying restriction are shown in p-value
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Family Background Location at Age 17
Table 1.9 Estimated Models for Child's College Attendance: Varying the Set of Instruments









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.077** 0.079** 0.081** 0.081**
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Black -0.111** -0.056** -0.038* -0.038*
[0.016] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
Hispanic -0.021 0.01 0.008 0.009
[0.019] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019]
Age 0.085** 0.085** 0.084** 0.084**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Mother's Education at Child's Birth 0.033** 0.032** 0.024** 0.026**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.049** 0.037** 0.038**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Mother's Age at Birth 0.010** 0.010** 0.009** 0.009**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Family Size -0.020** -0.020** -0.019** -0.018**
[0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]




Observations 3,748 3,748 3,748 3,748
R-squared 0.36 0.366 0.373 0.374
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mother are in brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Linear Probability
Mother's Edcuation*(Net Family 
Income-Mean)
Dependent Variable: Attend 
College
Table 1.10 Estimated Models for Child's College Attendance with Mother's 







Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME
Female 0.291** 0.112** 0.301** 0.115** 0.315** 0.120** 0.314** 0.120**
[0.048] [0.018] [0.049] [0.018] [0.049] [0.019] [0.049] [0.019]
Black -0.391** -0.146** -0.189** -0.072** -0.11 -0.042 -0.109 -0.041
[0.063] [0.023] [0.072] [0.027] [0.072] [0.027] [0.073] [0.028]
Hispanic -0.065 -0.025 0.051 0.02 0.046 0.018 0.056 0.021
[0.071] [0.027] [0.075] [0.029] [0.074] [0.029] [0.074] [0.029]
Age 0.292** 0.112** 0.294** 0.113** 0.295** 0.113** 0.296** 0.113**
[0.013] [0.005] [0.014] [0.005] [0.014] [0.005] [0.014] [0.006]
Mother's Education at Child's Birth 0.119** 0.046** 0.113** 0.043** 0.082** 0.031** 0.093** 0.035**
[0.015] [0.006] [0.015] [0.006] [0.016] [0.006] [0.018] [0.007]
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.185** 0.071** 0.141** 0.054** 0.147** 0.056**
[0.035] [0.014] [0.036] [0.014] [0.036] [0.014]
Mother's Age at Birth 0.040** 0.015** 0.041** 0.016** 0.037** 0.014** 0.038** 0.015**
[0.008] [0.003] [0.008] [0.003] [0.008] [0.003] [0.008] [0.003]
Family Size -0.093** -0.036** -0.095** -0.036** -0.092** -0.035** -0.087** -0.033**
[0.024] [0.009] [0.024] [0.009] [0.023] [0.009] [0.024] [0.009]
Net Family Income 0.240** 0.092** 0.695** 0.266**
[0.039] [0.015] [0.193] [0.074]
-0.038* -0.015*
[0.015] [0.006]
Observations 3,748 3,748 3,748 3,748 3,748 3,748 3,748 3,748
R-squared
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mother are in brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Probit
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable: Attend 
College
Mother's Edcuation*(Net Family 
Income-Mean)
Table 1.10 Estimated Models for Child's College Attendance with Mother's Education Measured at Child's Birth:   




                  
            Figure 1.1 The Marginal Effect of Parental Education (    ) on Child’s Education 
(    )  
 











In the previous chapter, the relationship between maternal schooling and children’s 
college attendance was investigated. I set up a model and discussed three channels 
through which mother's education can be transmitted to her children: the initial 
endowment, the investment, and the efficiency of investment. In that chapter, I focused 
on one particular educational outcome: college attendance. Controlling for the children's 
characteristics and family income, an additional year of maternal schooling was estimated 
to increase the child's college attendance by 2-3 percentage points. However, one related 
question is how maternal schooling affects the youth's earlier educational outcomes. Do 
mothers impose a stronger effect on the children when they are younger?  How does 
maternal schooling affect the different stages of a child’s human capital accumulation 
process? To answer these questions, I will examine the relationship between maternal 
schooling and high school outcomes in this chapter.   
Most of the literature regarding outcomes observed when children are in high 
school are related to discussions of health status (obesity, drinking) or immigrant status 
(for example: Chatterji and DeSimone 2005, Bleakley and Chin 2008, and Kaestner, 
Grossman and Yarnoff 2011), while maternal influences in this period are less addressed. 




schooling and maternal employment on children’s outcomes during adolescence. Case, 
Fertig and Paxson (2005) found that maternal schooling has a pronounced impact on 
children’s health status while they grow up, while Baum (2004) found that early maternal 
employment did not have a lasting impact on children’s high school grades. Parental 
effects are also discussed in the human capital accumulation literature. Cunha and 
Heckman (2008) categorized outcomes in human capital accumulation as cognitive skills 
and non-cognitive skills. They examined parental effects on the formation of these skills 
for children under age 14 and found it had different effects at different stages: the 
cognitive skills of children (measured by the scores of Peabody Individual Achievement 
Test (PIAT)) were more affected at early ages, while noncognitive skills (measured by 
the Behavior Problem Index (BPI)) were more affected at later ages. However, some 
educational outcomes can be affected by both skills (Heckman, Hsse and Rubinstein 
2000). Carneiro, Meghir and Parey (2010) investigate maternal schooling impacts on 
different children’s outcomes, and their results are mixed dependent on the specific 
outcome and gender: for the test outcomes measured by PIAT math and reading scores, 
the maternal schooling impact is stronger at early ages (7-8) than later (12-14) for white 
children, but the opposite is true for black children; For the grade repetition outcome, the 
effect of mother’s schooling is almost the same in these two stages for white children, but 
greater in later years for black children.  
In this paper, I study the same group of children as in my first chapter, but at an 
earlier age when they are in high school. Like college attendance, high school outcomes 
are at a later stage of a child’s life cycle, and they may be more affected by the non-




mating and potential transmitted ability still raise the potential question of causality in 
estimation of maternal schooling effects. However, high school attendance does differ 
from college attendance. First, the choice is made when children are younger. Second, 
high school is less expensive than college, so the income effect might be less important 
than for the college attendance decision. In the first chapter, when family income is 
included most of the endogeneity of maternal schooling is addressed, but this might not 
the same here. Third, high school education may be included as part of compulsory 
education in some states.
1
 Although Angrist and Krueger (1991) argue that 25% of 
potential dropouts are compelled to stay in school because of compulsory schooling 
attendance laws, a recent study by Landis and Reschly (2011) suggests compulsory 
schooling attendance does not affect one’s high school completion probability. I will 
study the impact of compulsory schooling laws here, in addition to maternal schooling, in 
this paper. 
The next section will be a description of the data construction and empirical 
strategy. In section 2.3 I present the results and check the robustness in section 2.4. 
Concluding remarks are in section 2.5.  
2.2. Data and method 
 
The main data I utilize in this paper is the NLSY79 Child and Young Adult (NLSCYA) 
data, which contains longitudinal surveys of biological children of women in the 
NLSY79 starting in 1994. Since children are included in the survey when they turn age 
15, and grade 9 is usually considered as the first grade year in high school, I choose to 
look at children who are between ages 15-18, with a highest completed grade between 1 
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 States may have different age ranges for compulsory education. From 2000-2010, the 




and 12 (as in Baum (2004)). I use data from 1994 up to 2010, and the youngest children 
who are less than 18 years old in 2010 are dropped from the sample.  Like in Carneiro, 




In the surveys from 1994-2010, children older than 15 are asked “Do you have a 
high school diploma or have you ever passed a high school equivalency or G.E.D test?” 
The measurement of high school completion is then obtained from “yes/no” answers. 
Besides the general high school completion, I can also consider the particular type of 
completion: children who confirmed a high school completion are also asked to define 
whether they receive a diploma or a GED. Therefore, two types of graduation can be 
measured: a high school diploma and a GED, and one can compare the difference.
3
 
Heckman and Lafontaine (2006) found that the returns to a GED and a diploma are 
different in terms of wages. A GED is more like a cognitive ability exam, and receiving a 
GED is a signal of a mixed quality of skills on children (Heckman, Hsee, Yona 2000). 
GED recipients are characterized as smart children lacking perseverance and self-
discipline and the effect of maternal schooling on this outcome might be different from 
its effect on ordinary high school completion. 
Besides these high school completion outcomes, I am also interested in 
investigating the quality of completion. Zax and Rees (2002) found that one’s earnings at 
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 The exclusion ensures the mothers are not drawn from pre-determined occupations or 
economic status. Moreover, 441 women from the military oversample are dropped from 
the interview process after 1985; while the poor white oversample is dropped after 
1990(CHRR 2002). The exclusion of these two oversamples will allow us to construct a 
comparable dataset.  
3
 A few children (59 out of 3359) claim both graduation types (diploma and a GED). To 
focus on the comparison between receiving a high school diploma and GED, I drop these 




different ages (35 and 53) can be significantly raised by an increase in academic 
performance in high school (as measured by the rank in one’s high school), suggesting 
higher grades in high school do reflect an increased productivity in the labor market. I 
have information on grades in high school in the NSLYCYA data, which allows me to 
examine whether the quality of performance in high school is affected by the factors 
discussed in the first chapter: endowment, income, and efficiency of investment? I will 
study this by looking at children’s average grades in the last available year of high school. 
In the NLSYCYA, children in grade 9-12 are asked “what was the average grade you got 
in your classes (in your) last year (of high school)”. Since the children are surveyed 




 grade, and 
can be used as a measure of the quality of the child’s high school performance. These 
grades are reported as letter grades, and I convert them into a grade point ratio on a 4.0 
scale. As the grades for those who do not complete high school or complete high school 
with a GED may be from before 11
th
 grade, these equations are estimated only for the 
sample of individuals who completed high school with a diploma. 
One advantage of using the NLSCYA is that mothers can be linked to a detailed 
survey of NLSY79, which provides rich information on mothers’ education, employment 
and attitudes. Maternal schooling is then obtained from the NLSY79
4
 and merged to the 
main data set when the child turns 15 years old, the first year of high school.
5
 Since this 
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 Like in the first chapter, maternal schooling is obtained from the records of highest 
completed years of schooling in the NLSY79. In the occasional years of missing 
observation, highest grade ever completed up to that point is used.  
5
 Since children in my sample are born between 1970 and 1993, maternal schooling 
measured at child’s birth may make me lose observations before 1979, the earliest survey 
year in the NLSY79. Assuming maternal schooling generally does not vary too much 




paper focuses more on degree outcomes, I will mainly use mother’s high school 
completion as the independent variable, which is a dummy equaling 1 if a mother has 
completed 12 years of schooling. Like in chapter 1, I use the corrected ASVAB scores as 
a measure of the mother’s cognitive ability to control for the endowment impact. Family 
size is also obtained from the NLSY79 and merged to the data in the year when the child 
turns 15, while family income is measured by averaging total family income when the 
child is between 10-14 years.  
Like in the first chapter, I will utilize the instrument variable (IV) method to 
correct for the potential endogeneity in estimating the effect of maternal schooling on 
high school outcomes. The instruments of college proximity and college characteristics, 
however, will be changed to the state compulsory schooling laws created by Acemoglu 
and Angrist (2000), considering the weakness of the instruments in the first chapter. Law 
changes have been used in other recent studies on intergenerational effects on education, 
such as Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005), Oreopuoulos, Page and Stevens (2006), 
and Maurin and McNally (2008). Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) collect both laws of 
compulsory attendance (CA) and child labor (CL) from 1914-1978 for 49 states
6
 and the 
data cover all years needed to instrument mother’s schooling when they are 14 years old. 
Mother’s location at 14 years is obtained from the Geocode supplement to the  NLSY79. 
As in Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), both compulsory attendance laws and child labor 
laws are used as instruments in this paper. On the other hand, Hoogerheide, Block and 
Thurik (2011) support the validity of family background variables as instruments for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
when the child turned 15 years old. Sensitivity analysis will use a measure of maternal 
schooling when the child is born and run the regressions on the smaller sample size.  
6




one’s education, so I will also use them in this paper. These family background variables 
will include all significant instruments in the first stage used in the first chapter: 
grandmother’s education, grandfather’s education and “two-parent home” status. These 
mother’s family background variables are gathered from the NLSY79. 
Besides data on compulsory schooling laws provided by Acemoglu and Angrist 
(2000), I also collect the age for compulsory school attendance in each state from 1979 to 
2010 so that I can control for the direct effect of law changes on children’s high school 
outcomes. The ages are collected from the Digest of Education Statistics.
7
 I then generate 
the length of compulsory schooling by taking the difference between the minimum age 
and the maximum age that a child is required to attend school for each state, and further 
categorize it into groups of 9, 10, 11, and 12. 
8
 These measures of compulsory schooling 
length are then merged with the main data set based on the state when the child is 15. The 
residential location of the child is obtained from the Geocode of the NLSCYA. These 
records were not collected until 1994, which means that, if a child is 15 in any year 
earlier than 1994, they cannot be tracked with the Geocode supplement. To minimize the 
missing observations for this reason, I use mother’s location from the Geocode data as a 
proxy for their children’s location. Out of 778 children born before 1994, 762(98%) then 
must be tracked by mothers’ locations.  
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 The data from 1978-1994 are obtained from the Digest of Education Statistics, while 
years of 1995-2010 are available on line under state regulation at 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/index.asp. In the years when the ages are not reported, 
I use the year closest to the missing year.  
8
 As in Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), over 95% of the sample have the compulsory 
schooling length (CSL) concentrated in 8-12, so compulsory schooling is divided into age 
groups to capture the distribution. More specifically, the dummies are CSL9 for CSL<=9, 




Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the main variables of this paper. Out 
of 4096 children, 82% report a high school completion.  Among those who graduate from 
high school, most (88.8%) complete with a high school diploma while only a few (11.2%) 




 grade is 3.03 for 
those who complete high school and receive a diploma. Most mothers (78.8%) surveyed 
in the sample have completed at least 12 years of schooling and on average have 2.8 
children in their families. Most children live in a state with either 10 years of compulsory 
schooling (30.5%) or 12 years of compulsory schooling (32.7%) when they are 15 or 16.
9
 
From the model developed in the first chapter, parental education is transmitted to 
a child through three channels: endowment, investment, and efficiency of investment. 
The same consideration should also be applied to the high school outcomes in this article. 
Besides these three channels, compulsory attendance laws should also be added as 
another factor determining high school completion. The legally required age for leaving 
school is usually set between 16 and 18 in states. High school education therefore can be 
incorporated as part of compulsory schooling and different states compulsory attendance 
laws can affect one’s high school outcomes. 
Thus, the estimation equation for a high school graduate mother (   on her child 
(  ’s outcome for high school is:  
                         
 
where     is a dummy variable in the form       for mothers completing at least 12 
years of schooling, and zero otherwise,       for children completing high school, and 
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 According to a study by Landis and Reschly (2011), most states require students to 
legally leave school at 16 or 18. Less than 10 states allow students to legally leave at 17. 
Assuming 6 as a regular age for starting school enrollment, there are also fewer states 




zero otherwise.     is the compulsory schooling length in the state   when the child is 
15.   consists of the child’s characteristics, and all other things that determine one’s high 
school completion except local compulsory schooling laws and maternal schooling. As 
discussed in the first chapter, if we cannot observe all relevant     and they are 
correlated with   , estimates will be biased. On the other hand, the results can also be 
biased by measurement error in    .
10
 To check how this potential endogeneity affects 
estimating child’s high school completion, I use IV estimation. The first stage is: 
                   
where the instruments    consists of changes in compulsory schooling laws constructed 
by Acemoglu and Angrist (2000). Specifically,    are dummies variables CL7, CL8, 
CL9, CA9, CA10, and CA11. The CL variables denote required years of schooling to get 
a work permit in the state when mother is 14 years. The CA variables denote the required 
years of schooling before dropping out of school in the state when the mother is 14 years 
old. In some estimations, I also use mother’s family background variables as instruments.  
2.3. Results 
 
The estimates are first reported in Table 2.2 by regressing the child’s high school 
completion on child’s characteristics and maternal schooling. Since children in my data 
set are often from the same family, the standard errors are obtained by clustering with 
respect to mothers. Linear probability estimates are shown in specifications (1) - (5). In 
all of these specifications, the mother having at least a high school education appears to 
significantly increase her child’s probability of completing high school. In specification 
(1) when family income and mother’s cognitive ability are not controlled, the mother’s 
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high school education increases the chances of her child also completing high school by 
10.7 percentage points. Controlling mother’s cognitive ability, measured by her ASVAB 
scores, the coefficient decreases to 10.3 percentage points in specification (2). With 
additional control for family income before entering high school in specification (3), the 
coefficient estimate for a mother with at least a high school education drops to 0.085. 
Mother’s cognitive ability, however, does not appear to have a significant effect on high 
school completion outcome. Although an increase in the mother’s ASVAB scores tends 
to help her child’s high school completion in specification (2), the significance of the 
coefficient disappears when controls such as family income and compulsory schooling 
length are included. This is not similar to the result in my first chapter, where mother’s 
cognitive ability is a consistently significant determinant of the child’s choice of 
attending college. Although high school is not as expensive as college education, family 
income is found to have a significant positive effect in determining the child’s probability 
of completing high school. 
In specification (4), state compulsory schooling years are controlled for in 
addition to mother’s cognitive ability and family income to estimate the effect from 
compulsory school attendance. Compared to 9 years of compulsory schooling, a child 
living in a state requiring 11 years of compulsory schooling will be more likely to 
complete high school. The results are somewhat surprising for the observations that are 
required to complete 10 and 12 years of schooling: more years of compulsory schooling 
do not necessarily make children more likely to complete high school. In specification (4), 
the compulsory school is measured by the difference of age requirements in the state 




high school, the ending age of compulsory schooling might be more important than the 
starting age in that state. I do additional analysis in checking the robustness in section 2.4.  
Besides linear probability, I also estimated models for the child’s high school 
completion probability using a probit model. That is,     (        ( 
     where 
 (   is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of standard normal distribution and   is 
a vector of            . I estimate the same models as in specifications (1) – (5) using 
probit and the results are reported in the columns (5) – (8) of Table 2.2. The general 
pattern is quite similar to the linear probability estimates. Having a mother with at least a 
high school education increases her child’s probability of completing high school by 8-10 
percentage points, significant at the 1% level.  Mother’s cognitive ability does not 
significantly affect the child’s chances of completing high school when family income 
and state compulsory schooling years are controlled for. While the effect of family 
income stays significantly positive in probit estimations, the mystery of compulsory 
schooling remains unsolved and more analysis needs to be done.  
In addition to the general outcome of high school completion, the NLSY79 also 
allows me to examine the type of high school degree. An individual can either complete 
high school with a diploma or GED. Table 2.3 reports estimates of equations for the 
probability of obtaining a diploma for the subsample of high school completers. Among 
those who complete high school, females are more likely to graduate with a diploma and 
males are more likely to receive a GED. While mother’s schooling increases the child’s 
probability of receiving a high school diploma, mother’s cognitive ability is not a 
significant determinant. A one percent increase in family income increases a child’s 




same level when local compulsory schooling laws variables are introduced. Surprisingly, 
compulsory schooling length does not have a significant effect in determining the type of 
high school graduation. The length of compulsory schooling tends to have an effect on 
the child’s decision to drop out of school, but does not seem to enhance the chances of 
receiving a GED certificate after dropping out. The probit estimates are quite similar to 
the results of linear probability models.  
I have also examined the effect of the mother’s high school completion on the 
child’s grades for high school graduates with a diploma. The models for grades are 
similar to previous models                             and are estimated by 
OLS. The results are presented in Table 2.4. Females are more likely to get a higher grade 
in the last year. Compared to whites, blacks have lower grades while hispanics do not 
have a significantly lower score holding all other independent variables constant. Unlike 
the effect on high school completion, more kids in the family does not have a significant 
effect on grades received in the last year. Having a mother with at least a high school 
education increases the child’s grades by 0.146 in model (1). The coefficient for mother’s 
schooling decreased to 0.121 in model (2) when mother’s cognitive ability is controlled 
for, and further to 0.098 in model (3) when family income is also held constant. Unlike 
the high school completion equations, the mother’s test scores has a significantly positive 
effect on grades. For example, a one standard deviation increase in mother’s ASVAB 
scores is estimated to increase the child’s GPA by 0.088 in model (2). When family 
income and compulsory schooling length are included in models (3) and (4), mother’s 
cognitive ability continues to be a significant independent variables and the coefficient is 




significant effect from compulsory schooling at the 5 percent level. Therefore, if grades 
in the last year of high school is treated as a measure of the quality of completing high 
school for the child, higher maternal schooling, cognitive ability and family income all 
help improve quality. Compulsory schooling, however, does not have a significant effect.  
Considering the potential endogeneity in the estimations of high school outcomes, 
I also used instrumental variables to estimate model (4) in Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. The 
results are reported in Table 2.5. Two sets of instruments are used. The first instruments 
are dummy variables based on CA and CL, which represent the compulsory schooling 
years prior to dropping out of school (CA) and getting a work permit (CL). The second 
instruments are child’s family background variables including grandparental education 
and two-parent home status. For all three outcomes, CA and CL instruments are not 
jointly significant in the first stage, while family background variables are jointly 
significant instruments.
11
 Endogeniety tests have different results based on different 
outcomes. In the models for the probability for a child to complete high school, and to 
receive a high school diploma conditional on completing high school, the mother’s high 
school completion is not an endogenous variable at the 5% significance level, no matter 
which instruments are used. As such, IV estimation does not appear necessary in these 
models. For the high school grades equation, however, results are different. If the 
compulsory schooling instruments are used, the test for exogeneity is rejected, mother’s 
schooling appears endogenous and the IV estimates are much higher than OLS results 
(2.600 vs. 0.100). However, the F-stat in the first stage is not significant (p-value=0.431), 
so compulsory schooling years are weak instruments and the IV estimates might not be 
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preferable. If family background variables are used, mother’s schooling seems exogenous 
according to the test for endogeneity (p-value=0.218), and IV estimates are again higher 
than OLS estimates (0.334 vs. 0.100). In all these estimations, mother’s schooling is 
evaluated with a measure of completing at least a high school education, and I will check 




Table 2.6 presents the results of estimation including schooling from both parents. 
For the outcome of high school completion, the coefficient of mother’s schooling in 
specification (1) is 0.084, similar to the estimate in specification (4) in Table 2.2, 
showing mother’s schooling effect is not different when the sample is restricted to the 
children who are affected by both parents. In specification (2), when paternal schooling is 
controlled for, the coefficient of mother’s schooling is 0.077 and is significant at the 1% 
level. Mother’s spousal schooling increases the child’s high school completion by an 
estimated 4 percentage points and is significant at the 10% level. The test for the 
coefficient for mother’s schooling equals that of mother’s spousal schooling is not 
rejected with a p-value 0.2851, so mothers and fathers do not appear to have different 
effects on the child’s probability of completing high school. For the models of receiving a 
high school diploma conditional on completing high school, having a mother with at least 
a high school education increases her child’s probability of getting a high school diploma 
by 8.9 percentage points in model (3). Mother’s spousal schooling does not appear to 
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 Both compulsory schooling instruments and family background instruments were also 
applied as instruments in the same equation. The results are similar to the ones using only 
family background instruments. Considering the joint significance is mainly from family 
background variables, this is not surprising. To address the difference between these two 




have an effect on this outcome in model (4). The test of equal coefficients for education 
is now rejected at the 1% significance level (p-value= 0.0179), so maternal schooling and 
paternal schooling have significantly different effects in determining the child’s type of 
graduation. For high school grades, mother’s schooling continues to have a significantly 
positive effect in models (5) and (6), while mother’s spousal schooling is not a significant 
determinant. The test of equal coefficients, however, is not rejected (p-value 0.3874). 
Mother’s cognitive ability continues to be insignificant for the outcomes of high school 
completion and receiving a high school diploma, but not for grades. In this smaller 
sample where both parental education attainment are available, the significance of local 
law changes is no longer present for the outcome of high school completion, leaving 
more uncertainty in explaining the direct effect of compulsory schooling.  
I also extend this analysis by examining interactions between mother’s schooling 
and other independent variables. For example, is the effect of mother’s schooling 
different between sons and daughters? Is the effect of mother’s schooling dependent on 
mother’s cognitive ability and family income? The results are reported in Table 2.7. All 
these interaction terms are not significant for all three high school outcomes at the 5% 
level, indicating having a mother with at least high school education does not have 
different effect across these dimensions. The effect of mother’s schooling also does not 
appear to vary with family income and her cognitive ability.  
Based on the above discussions, a few results are suggested: (1) Maternal 
schooling has a significant positive effect in determining a child’s high school outcomes. 
If a mother has at least a high school education, her child is also more likely to complete 




high school; (2) mother’s cognitive ability does not increase her child’s chances of 
completing high school and getting a high school diploma, but improves grades received 
when the child graduates from high school; and (3) family income has a significant 
positive effect on all these three high school outcomes. In the next section, I’ll check the 
robustness of these results. 
2.4. Robustness Analysis  
 
In the previous section, maternal schooling was measured by a dummy for having 
completed high school. How would the results change if continuous years of schooling 
instead were used in the models? Table 2.8A presents linear probability estimates when 
maternal schooling years are used as an independent variable. An additional year of 
mother’s schooling increases her child’s probability of completing high school by 1.1 
percentage points in specification (1). It also increases a child’s probability of receiving a 
high school diploma by 0.7 percentage points in specification (3) and high school grades 
by 0.034 in specification (5). When both measures of mother’s schooling are included in 
specifications (2), (4) and (6), mother’s high school completion remains significant for 
outcomes of the child’s high school completion and high school diploma, but not for high 
school grades. Mother’s school years, on the other hand, is not significant for the 
outcomes of high school completion and high school diploma, but continues to be 
significant in determining the child’s high school grades. Similar to the results presented 
in previous tables, mother’s cognitive ability does not have a significant effect on the 
child’s probability of completing high school and receiving a high school diploma, but 
does have a significantly positive effect on child’s high school grades. The significance 




and it remains positive in all estimations for all three high school outcomes. Therefore, 
the channel of endowment does not seem to exist in intergenerational education 
transmission regarding high school outcomes, except for high school grades. 11 years of 
compulsory schooling has a significant effect determining child’s probability of 
completing high school, but the effect is not significant at the 5% level for the other two 
high school outcomes. For the outcome of child’s high school completion, the length of 
compulsory schooling does not have a clear effect: while 11 years of compulsory 
schooling increases a child’s opportunity of attaining a full high school education, 12 
years of compulsory schooling does not significantly increase this chance.  
The IV estimates for models (1), (3) and (5) in Table 2.8A are reported in Table 
2.8B. For the outcomes of high school completion and high school diploma, the results 
are similar to the ones in Table 2.5.
13
 While the instruments related to compulsory 
schooling years are not jointly significant, family background instruments are. Mother’s 
schooling does not appear to be endogenous for all outcomes at the 5 percent level, so IV 
estimation appears unnecessary. The potential endogeneity appears less important, as was 
the case for the child’s college attendance in the first chapter.  
Mother’s schooling impact is measured when the child is 15, although the effect 
of mother’s schooling may also be present at earlier ages. Now I examine the robustness 
of the results if mother’s education is measured when the child is born. Table 2.9 shows 
these estimates. The pattern is quite similar as earlier results. The Hausman test suggests 
that the coefficient for mother’s high school completion does not significantly differ 
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between models (1) and (2) (p-value=0.1254), models (3) and (4) (p-value=0.6323), and 
models (5) and (6) (p-value=0.100).  
If mother’s education is transmitted to her child through the three channels of 
endowment, income, and investment efficiency, the coefficient for mother’s schooling 
should reflect the efficiency transmission when child’s endowment and family income 
are controlled for. By using child’s cognitive ability test scores (PIAT) as a measure of 
child’s endowment, the results are reported in Table 2.10. For the outcome of high school 
education, in specification (1), a mother with at least a high school education increases 
her child’s chances of completing high school by 6.8%, quite similar to coefficients in 
specification (2) where child’s cognitive ability is used, and in specification (3) where 
both cognitive abilities are used. Cognitive abilities are not significant in specifications 
(1)-(3), the evidence therefore suggests the channel of investment efficiency but not the 
channel of endowment in the transmission of high school completion. On the other hand, 
the interaction between mother’s high school completion and family income is negative 
and insignificant in model (4), which does not support the transmission channel of 
efficiency. As discussed in the first chapter, this contradictory evidence may be caused by 
omitted variables such as preference and culture, so the efficiency channel is not clear for 
the child’s high school completion. For the outcome of receiving a high school diploma 
conditional on high school graduation, mother’s schooling is not significant when child’s 
cognitive ability is used in specifications (6) and (7). The interaction between family 
income and mother’s schooling is positive but insignificant in specification (8), so the 
efficiency channel is again not fully supported by the evidence. For the quality of high 




specifications (10) and (11) when child’s endowment is controlled for. Cognitive abilities 
from mother and child are also showed to be significant for better high school grades. 
The interaction term in specification (12) is positive but not significant, therefore the 
channels of endowment and income seem to function in the transmission of educational 
quality, but there is not clear evidence for the efficiency channel. In brief, the channels of 
intergenerational transmission of education might vary with the particular outcomes. 
Although high school is not as expensive as college, the income channel is present for all 
high school outcomes. The endowment channel is only suggested for the high school 
grades outcome. The evidence for the efficiency channel is not clear.  
I also use an alternative measure of the child's cognitive ability -- the Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) -- to check the robustness of the estimates to the 
measure of ability. The estimates are reported in Table 2.11. The findings are quite 
similar to the previous results except for the endowment. Although mother’s cognitive 
ability is not significant for child’s high school completion in specification (1), child’s 
cognitive ability is significant in specifications (2) and (3), which are insignificant in 
specifications (2) and (3) in Table 2.10. Unlike PIAT, PPVT is a test focusing on 
vocabulary ability and the children are younger when taking the test.
14
 
Next I change the measure of compulsory schooling laws to check the robustness 
of compulsory schooling laws in Table 2.12. In previous tables, more years of 
compulsory schooling does not necessarily make a child more likely to finish high school, 
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children 4-5 years old, and 10-11 year old from 1998), while PIAT is administered to 






receive a high school diploma, or have better grades. This result however might be 
caused by measurement error in compulsory schooling years. Since the decision of high 
school completion is made when the child is older, the required age of leaving school 
may be more relevant to this decision. In model (1), I use the minimum age required to 
leave school in each state when the child is 15 years to estimate the effect of compulsory 
schooling. These age dummies are not significant, indicating that the end point of the 
compulsory schooling does not matter in the child’s decision of completing school. This 
is consistent with the results in Landis and Reschly (2011), who also find the compulsory 
school attendance ages of 16, 17, and 18 have no meaningful relationship with high 
school graduation. In model (2), when compulsory starting ages are included, compulsory 
schooling laws still have no significant effect on the child’s high school completion. In 
model (3), I use the measure of compulsory schooling length as before, and also estimate 
the regression with state fixed effects. The compulsory schooling lengths of 11 years are 
no longer significant. In the models for receiving a diploma, a compulsory attendance age 
of 18 does appear to increase the child’s probability of getting a diploma (by 2.6 
percentage points in model (4)).The significance remains when starting ages for 
compulsory schooling are controlled for in model (5). In model (6), none of the 
compulsory schooling variables have an apparent effect on receiving a diploma once state 
fixed effects are included. For the GPA model, compulsory attendance age is not 
significant when a starting age is not included (in model (7)). The compulsory attendance 
age of 17, however, is significant at the 10% level when starting ages are included (in 
model (9)). When states dummies are introduced in model (9), the length of compulsory 




schooling, family income and mother’s cognitive ability are robust: while maternal 
schooling and family income are significant in all outcomes and models, mother’s 
cognitive ability has no significant impact on high school completion but is meaningful 
for the child’s grades.  
2.5. Conclusion 
In the first chapter, maternal schooling was found to have a significantly positive effect 
on child’s college attendance through three channels: endowment, investment, and 
efficiency of investments. However, we do not know whether this is the case for other 
child’s outcomes measured at a similar stage. In this paper, I considered three high school 
outcomes: high school completion, high school diploma receipt, and high school grades. 
While the first two outcomes are about the level of one’s education, the third outcome 
will tell us the quality of high school completion. Since most states set up compulsory 
attendance laws ending at ages 16, 17, and 18, models for high school education also 
consider compulsory schooling. Because maternal schooling might be endogenous as 
discussed in the first chapter, I use compulsory schooling years and family background 
for the mother as instrumental variables.  
Using data from the NLSCYA, a number of interesting findings are summaries as 
uncovered. First, maternal schooling has a significantly positive effect for all three 
outcomes. A mother having at least a high school education tends to increase the child’s 
probability of completing high school by 8.5 percentage points, the probability of getting 
a high school diploma instead of a GED by 8.5 percentage points, and graduation grades 
by 0.100. Second, the mother’s cognitive ability has no significant effect on high school 
completion and high school diploma receipt, but its effect on grades is significantly 




impact on the child’s college attendance, but this is not the case for high school outcomes 
except for the quality measures. Third, one’s family income still has a significantly 
positive effect on all high school outcomes, even though high school is less expensive 
than college. Therefore, estimates ignoring family income might overestimate the effect 
of maternal schooling on these outcomes.  
The results carry some policy implications. Since mother’s high school 
completion can be transmitted to the next generation, an additional reason teenage 
mothers should be helped and encouraged to complete high school is so this will enhance 
the educational attainment of their children. On the other hand, if the government wants 
to devise programs to prevent children from dropping out of high school, policies should 
target students whose mothers have less than a high school education and provide them 
more assistance. The same consideration should also be taken into account if programs 
aim to increase the probability of receiving a high school diploma and to improve 
students’ high school academic performance. 
Although maternal schooling is found to be meaningful for high school outcomes, 
the effect of compulsory schooling laws is not so clear. Requiring more years of 
compulsory schooling does not necessarily make a child more likely to complete high 
school, and its effect on diploma and grades are not significant. Having an additional year 
for the earliest school-leaving age does make a child more likely to finish high school or 
get better grades, but a requirement of leaving school at age 18 makes a child more likely 
to get a diploma conditional on high school completion. The mixed results can be 










Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev.
High School Completion Indicator for whether child completes high school 4096 0.820 0.384
HS Diploma Child receives a High School diploma when completes high school 3300 0.888 0.316
GED Child receives a GED when completes high school 3300 0.112 0.316
Grades GPA received in the 11th/12th grade conditional on receiving a HS diploma 2891 3.039 0.675
Grade 12th The GPA is measured in the 12th grade 2891 0.674 0.469
Children's characteristics
Female Child is a female 4096 0.487 0.500
Black Child is black 4096 0.306 0.461
Hispanic Child is Hispanic 4096 0.179 0.383
Age Child's age in the last round of observed schooling 4096 21.928 3.744
Child's PIAT scores Child's PIAT scores of reading cognition and math 2524 0.072 0.997
Mothers' characteristics
Mother with at least a HS education Mother's schooling years>=12 4096 0.788 0.409
Mother's ASVAB Scores Mother's ASVAB total scores of ten substests corrected for age and schooling 4096 -0.169 0.921
Mother's Age at Birth Mother's age at birth 4096 23.707 4.507
Family Size Number of children in the family 4096 2.853 1.254
Net Family Income Log average composite income of the household when the child is 10-14 4096 10.694 0.862
Compulsory schooling in child's state at 15
CSL10 Indicator for state compulsory schooling length is 10 years 4096 0.305 0.460
CSL11 Indicator for state compulsory schooling length is 11 years 4096 0.100 0.300
CSL12 Indicator for state compulsory schooling length is 12 or more years 4096 0.327 0.469
Instruments when mother is 14
CL7 7 years in school are required before work permit in the state 4096 0.064 0.244
CL8 8 years in school are required before work permit in the state 4096 0.370 0.483
CL9 9 or more years in school are required before work permit in the state 4096 0.552 0.497
CA9 9 years are required before leaving school in the state 4096 0.280 0.449
CA10 10 years are required before leaving school in the state 4096 0.184 0.387
CA11 11 or more years are required before leaving school in the state 4096 0.394 0.489
Grandmother's Education Schooling yeas of mother's mother 4096 10.525 3.134
Grandfather's Edcuation Schooling years of mother's father 4096 10.240 3.912
Two-Parent Home Indicator for whether mother lives with parents before 18 4096 0.618 0.486








(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME
Female 0.020+ 0.021+ 0.020+ 0.021* 0.087+ 0.016+ 0.090+ 0.017+ 0.087+ 0.016+ 0.091+ 0.017+
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.053] [0.010] [0.053] [0.010] [0.053] [0.010] [0.053] [0.010]
Black -0.023+ -0.005 0.007 0.006 -0.112+ -0.021 -0.025 -0.005 0.024 0.004 0.02 0.004
[0.014] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.068] [0.013] [0.083] [0.015] [0.083] [0.015] [0.083] [0.015]
Hispanic -0.018 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.091 -0.017 -0.042 -0.008 -0.034 -0.006 -0.041 -0.008
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.082] [0.016] [0.085] [0.016] [0.085] [0.016] [0.086] [0.016]
Age 0.037** 0.037** 0.036** 0.036** 0.222** 0.041** 0.222** 0.041** 0.219** 0.040** 0.220** 0.040**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.016] [0.002] [0.016] [0.002] [0.016] [0.002] [0.016] [0.002]
Mother's Age at Birth -0.005** -0.005** -0.006** -0.006** -0.024** -0.004** -0.024** -0.004** -0.030** -0.006** -0.030** -0.005**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.007] [0.001] [0.007] [0.001] [0.007] [0.001] [0.007] [0.001]
Family Size -0.022** -0.022** -0.021** -0.020** -0.094** -0.017** -0.094** -0.017** -0.088** -0.016** -0.086** -0.016**
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.024] [0.005] [0.024] [0.005] [0.024] [0.005] [0.024] [0.005]
Mother with at least a HS education 0.107** 0.103** 0.085** 0.085** 0.477** 0.104** 0.458** 0.099** 0.393** 0.083** 0.394** 0.082**
[0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.079] [0.020] [0.079] [0.020] [0.082] [0.020] [0.081] [0.019]
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.015+ 0.005 0.006 0.077* 0.014* 0.031 0.006 0.032 0.006
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.037] [0.007] [0.038] [0.007] [0.038] [0.007]
Net Family Income 0.043** 0.042** 0.171** 0.031** 0.170** 0.031**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.040] [0.008] [0.040] [0.008]
CSL10 -0.002 -0.031 -0.006
[0.015] [0.076] [0.014]
CSL11 0.050* 0.237* 0.038*
[0.020] [0.106] [0.015]
CSL12 -0.001 -0.008 -0.001
[0.015] [0.074] [0.014]
Observations 4,096 4,096 4,096 4,096 4,096 4,096 4,096 4,096 4,096 4,096 4,096 4,096
R-squared 0.171 0.172 0.178 0.180
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mothers are in brackets.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
Table 2.2 Estimated Models for Child's High School Completion:    Linear Probability and Probit
(5) (6) (7) (8)








(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME
Female 0.028* 0.028* 0.028** 0.029** 0.148* 0.025* 0.149* 0.025* 0.147* 0.024* 0.149* 0.024*
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.063] [0.010] [0.063] [0.010] [0.063] [0.010] [0.064] [0.010]
Black -0.029* -0.026 -0.016 -0.016 -0.146+ -0.025+ -0.133 -0.023 -0.064 -0.011 -0.066 -0.011
[0.014] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.076] [0.014] [0.092] [0.017] [0.094] [0.016] [0.094] [0.016]
Hispanic -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.011 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.000
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.090] [0.015] [0.093] [0.016] [0.095] [0.015] [0.097] [0.016]
Age 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.048** 0.008** 0.048** 0.008** 0.047** 0.008** 0.048** 0.008**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.010] [0.002] [0.010] [0.002] [0.010] [0.002] [0.010] [0.002]
Mother's Age at Birth 0.014** 0.014** 0.012** 0.012** 0.077** 0.013** 0.076** 0.013** 0.071** 0.011** 0.070** 0.011**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.009] [0.001] [0.009] [0.001] [0.009] [0.001] [0.009] [0.001]
Family Size -0.010+ -0.010+ -0.009 -0.009 -0.055* -0.009* -0.055* -0.009* -0.052+ -0.008+ -0.049+ -0.008+
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.027] [0.005] [0.027] [0.005] [0.028] [0.004] [0.028] [0.004]
Mother with at least a HS education 0.103** 0.102** 0.087** 0.085** 0.422** 0.084** 0.419** 0.083** 0.337** 0.063** 0.331** 0.061**
[0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.020] [0.076] [0.017] [0.076] [0.017] [0.079] [0.017] [0.079] [0.017]
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.002 -0.006 -0.005 0.012 0.002 -0.039 -0.006 -0.032 -0.005
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.044] [0.007] [0.045] [0.007] [0.045] [0.007]
Net Family Income 0.038** 0.037** 0.238** 0.039** 0.234** 0.038**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.047] [0.008] [0.047] [0.008]
CSL10 -0.021 -0.122 -0.02
[0.016] [0.084] [0.015]
CSL11 0.007 0.036 0.006
[0.019] [0.114] [0.018]
CSL12 0.015 0.07 0.011
[0.015] [0.088] [0.014]
Observations 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.077 0.08
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mothers are in brackets.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
(8)
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Dependent Variable: HS Diploma














Dependent Variable: Grades (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.245** 0.246** 0.247** 0.249**
[0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
Black -0.229** -0.127** -0.113** -0.113**
[0.029] [0.035] [0.036] [0.035]
Hispanic -0.082* -0.026 -0.025 -0.021
[0.036] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038]
Age 0.025** 0.024** 0.024** 0.023**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Mother's Age at Birth 0.029** 0.029** 0.027** 0.026**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Family Size 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.016
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Grade 12th -0.074** -0.072** -0.072** -0.072**
[0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
Mother with at least a HS education 0.146** 0.121** 0.098* 0.100*
[0.039] [0.039] [0.040] [0.039]
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.088** 0.077** 0.078**
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017]








Observations 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891
R-squared 0.109 0.118 0.122 0.124
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mothers are in brackets.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.


















Depedent Variable: HS Completion
Using CA & CL Instruments 0.085** -0.241 4,096 1.03 0.90
[0.019] [0.342] p=0.309 p=0.497
Using Family Background Instruments 0.085** 0.078 4,096 0.01 22.85
[0.019] [0.080] p=0.927 p=0.000
Depedent Variable: HS Diploma
Using CA & CL Instruments 0.085** 0.560+ 3,300 3.02 1.12
[0.020] [0.331] p=0.082 p=0.349
Using Family Background Instruments 0.085** 0.187* 3,300 1.52 19.50
[0.020] [0.085] p=0.218 p=0.000
Depedent Variales: Grades 
Using CA & CL Instruments 0.100* 2.600* 2,891 14.91 0.99
[0.039] [1.239] p=0.000 p=0.431
Using Family Background Instruments 0.100* 0.334+ 2,891 1.52 16.62
[0.039] [0.196] p = 0.218 p=0.000
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mothers are in brackets.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
Table 2.5 OLS and IV Estimates of Effect of Having a Mother with at Least a HS education
Estimations also include female, black, hispanic, age, mother's age at birth, family size, mother's ASVAB Scores, net 












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.003 0.003 -0.006 -0.006 0.078** 0.078**
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.018] [0.018]
CSL10 -0.005 -0.005 -0.019 -0.019 0.047 0.047
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.036] [0.036]
CSL11 0.032 0.033 0.008 0.008 0.067 0.067
[0.021] [0.021] [0.019] [0.019] [0.043] [0.043]
CSL12 0.001 0.000 0.019 0.019 -0.023 -0.024
[0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.036] [0.036]
Net Family Income 0.040** 0.037** 0.037** 0.037** 0.054** 0.052**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.019] [0.019]
Mother with at least a HS education 0.084** 0.077** 0.089** 0.088** 0.101* 0.096*
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.022] [0.043] [0.043]
Mother's Spouse with at least a HS education 0.040+ 0.004 0.037
[0.024] [0.023] [0.048]
Observations 3,552 3,552 2,893 2,893 2,578 2,578
R-squared 0.179 0.181 0.075 0.075 0.116 0.116
Estimations also include female, black, hispanic, age, mother's age at birth, and family size.
For grades, estimations also include a dummy of grade 12th. 
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mothers are in brackets.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
HS Diploma Grades 
Table 2.6 Estimated Models for Child's High School Outcomes:                                                                            










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Female 0.043 0.021* 0.022* 0.062+ 0.029** 0.029** 0.292** 0.249** 0.249**
[0.028] [0.011] [0.011] [0.034] [0.011] [0.011] [0.063] [0.023] [0.024]
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.006 0.006 0.025 -0.005 -0.005 0.013 0.078** 0.076** 0.066
[0.008] [0.008] [0.018] [0.008] [0.008] [0.019] [0.017] [0.017] [0.041]
Net Family Income 0.042** 0.048** 0.042** 0.037** 0.023 0.037** 0.054** -0.01 0.054**
[0.009] [0.019] [0.009] [0.009] [0.019] [0.009] [0.017] [0.039] [0.017]
Mother with at least a HS education 0.098** 0.081** 0.079** 0.107** 0.092** 0.080** -0.018 -0.02 -0.018
[0.025] [0.020] [0.018] [0.028] [0.021] [0.020] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034]
Mother with at least a HS education -0.027 -0.041 -0.052
*Female [0.030] [0.036] [0.068]
Mother with at least a HS education -0.008 0.018 0.082+
*(Net Family Income - mean) [0.020] [0.021] [0.043]
Mother with at least a HS education -0.024 -0.021 0.014
*(Mother's ASVAB Scores - mean) [0.018] [0.020] [0.042]
Observations 4,096 4,096 4,096 3,300 3,300 3,300 2,891 2,891 2,891
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.181 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.124 0.125 0.124
Estimations also include black, hispanic, age, mother's age at birth, family size, and CSLs
For grades, estimations also include a dummy of grade 12th. 
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mothers are in brackets.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
High School Completion HS Diploma Grades 










(1) (2) (4) (5) (7) (8)
Mother's Schooling Years 0.011** 0.004 0.007** -0.001 0.034** 0.035**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.007] [0.008]
Mother with at least a HS education 0.073** 0.088** -0.008
[0.022] [0.022] [0.044]
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.006 0.005 -0.004 -0.005 0.072** 0.072**
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.017] [0.017]
Net Family Income 0.042** 0.040** 0.040** 0.037** 0.037* 0.037*
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.018] [0.018]
CSL10 -0.002 -0.002 -0.021 -0.021 0.043 0.043
[0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016] [0.034] [0.034]
CSL11 0.049* 0.049* 0.007 0.007 0.080+ 0.080+
[0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.042] [0.042]
CSL12 0.000 -0.001 0.017 0.015 -0.017 -0.017
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.034] [0.034]
Observations 4,096 4,096 3,300 3,300 2,891 2,891
R-squared 0.177 0.18 0.073 0.08 0.132 0.132
Estimations also include female, black, hispanic, age, mother's age at birth, and family size.
For grades, estimations also include a dummy of grade 12th. 
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mothers are in brackets.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
Table 2.8A OLS Estimated Models for Child's High School Outcomes Using Maternal Schooling Years                                                                             














Depedent Variable: HS Completion
Using CA & CL Instruments 0.011** -0.026 4,096 0.69 1.68
[0.003] [0.047] p=0.407 p=0.123
Using Family Background Instruments 0.011** 0.006 4,096 0.34 42.36
[0.003] [0.010] p=0.560 p=0.000
Depedent Variable: HS Diploma
Using CA & CL Instruments 0.007** 0.037 3,300 0.62 1.51
[0.003] [0.039] p=0.430 p=0.172
Using Family Background Instruments 0.007** 0.018+ 3,300 1.16 35.91
[0.003] [0.010] p=0.283 p=0.000
Dependent Variable: Grades 
Using CA & CL Instruments 0.034** 0.190+ 2,891 3.15 1.31
[0.007] [0.106] p = 0.076 p=0.251
Using Family Background Instruments 0.034** 0.045* 2,891 0.25 30.990
[0.007] [0.023] p = 0.620 p=0.000
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mothers are in brackets.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
Table 2.8B OLS and IV Estimates of Effect of Maternal Schooling Years
Estimations also include female, black, hispanic, age, mother's age at birth, family size, mother's ASVAB Scores, net 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.009 0.009 -0.004 -0.002 0.078** 0.080**
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.018] [0.018]
Net Family Income 0.045** 0.042** 0.039** 0.039** 0.049** 0.052**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.018] [0.019]
CSL10 0.003 0.004 -0.016 -0.015 0.033 0.033
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.037] [0.037]
CSL11 0.042* 0.045* 0.007 0.009 0.090* 0.092*
[0.020] [0.021] [0.019] [0.019] [0.043] [0.044]
CSL12 -0.003 -0.003 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.008
[0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.036] [0.036]
Mother with at least a HS education 0.068** 0.065** 0.113*
[0.021] [0.022] [0.045]
Mother with at least a HS education at birth 0.088** 0.059** 0.069+
[0.018] [0.019] [0.039]
Observations 3,608 3,608 2,890 2,890 2,579 2,579
R-squared 0.201 0.205 0.073 0.073 0.121 0.119
Estimations also include female, black, hispanic, age, mother's age at birth, and family size.
For grades, estimations also include a dummy of grade 12th. 
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mothers are in brackets.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
Table 2.9 OLS Estimated Models for Child's High School Outcomes Using Mother's Education at Child's Birth









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Mother with at least a HS education 0.068** 0.068** 0.067** 0.058* 0.044+ 0.043 0.043 0.055* 0.118* 0.119* 0.105* 0.135*
[0.024] [0.025] [0.024] [0.026] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.052] [0.052] [0.052] [0.054]
Net Family Income 0.048** 0.048** 0.047** 0.068** 0.031** 0.029** 0.030** 0.003 0.044* 0.046* 0.032 0.007
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.026] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.026] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.059]
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.005 0.004 -0.002 -0.003 0.075** 0.063**
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.021] [0.022]
Child's PIAT scores 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.076** 0.069** 0.076**
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
Mother with at least a HS education -0.024 0.032 0.046
*(Net Family Income - mean) [0.028] [0.028] [0.064]
Observations 2,524 2,524 2,524 2,524 2,046 2,046 2,046 2,046 1,841 1,841 1,841 1,841
R-squared 0.203 0.203 0.203 0.203 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.06 0.13 0.134 0.139 0.135
Estimations also include female, black, hispanic, age, mother's age at birth, family size, and CSLs.
For grades, estimations also include a dummy of grade 12th. 
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mothers are in brackets.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
HS Completion HS Diploma Grades








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Mother with at least a HS education 0.073** 0.071* 0.068* 0.052+ 0.060* 0.056* 0.057* 0.055+ 0.137* 0.128* 0.121* 0.156*
[0.027] [0.028] [0.028] [0.031] [0.027] [0.028] [0.028] [0.029] [0.058] [0.059] [0.059] [0.064]
Net Family Income 0.046** 0.046** 0.044** 0.079* 0.045** 0.042** 0.044** 0.043 0.075** 0.076** 0.067** 0.016
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.032] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.028] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.068]
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.015 0.012 -0.007 -0.008 0.050* 0.041+
[0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.022] [0.022]
Child's PPVT Scores 0.019* 0.017+ 0.019* 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.054** 0.049* 0.054**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
Mother with at least a HS education -0.039 -0.001 0.071
*(Net Family Income - mean) [0.034] [0.030] [0.072]
Observations 2,210 2,210 2,210 2,210 1,817 1,817 1,817 1,817 1,636 1,636 1,636 1,636
R-squared 0.203 0.204 0.205 0.205 0.083 0.083 0.084 0.083 0.114 0.115 0.117 0.116
Estimations also include female, black, hispanic, age, mother's age at birth, family size, and CSLs.
For grades, estimations also include a dummy of grade 12th. 
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mothers are in brackets.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
HS Completion HS Diploma Grades








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mother with at least a HS education 0.085** 0.085** 0.088** 0.085** 0.086** 0.086** 0.097* 0.097* 0.089*
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.040] [0.040] [0.039]
Mother's ASVAB Scores 0.005 0.006 0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 0.078** 0.078** 0.078**
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
Net Family Income 0.042** 0.042** 0.041** 0.037** 0.038** 0.037** 0.053** 0.054** 0.054**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018]
Leave School at Age17 0.022 0.022 0.009 0.011 0.051 0.064+
[0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] [0.035] [0.035]
Leave School at Age18 -0.006 -0.011 0.026* 0.027* -0.026 -0.029
[0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.029] [0.030]
Start School at Age 6 -0.005 0.013 0.091*
[0.019] [0.019] [0.044]
Start School at Age7 -0.018 0.013 0.054
[0.019] [0.020] [0.046]
CSL10 -0.021 -0.024 0.037
[0.032] [0.032] [0.063]
CSL11 0.025 0.030 -0.016
[0.039] [0.038] [0.080]
CSL12 -0.026 0.067 -0.098
[0.042] [0.044] [0.086]
State Fixed Effect Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
F-test: All compulsory variables=0 1.34 0.97 1.14 2.19 1.33 1.81 2.05 2.21 1.5
p-value 0.263 0.425 0.330 0.113 0.255 0.143 0.129 0.065 0.214
Observations 4,096 4,096 4,096 3300 3300 3300 2,891 2,891 2,891
R-squared 0.179 0.179 0.189 0.079 0.079 0.102 0.123 0.125 0.154
Estimations also include female, black, hispanic, age, mother's age at birth, family size 
For grades, estimations also include a dummy of grade 12th. 
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mothers are in brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 2.12 OLS Estimated Models for Child's High School Outcomes Using Alternative Measures of Compulsory Schooling








3.1. Introduction and Literature Review 
Some of the most interesting research on promotion focuses on factors that can affect 
one’s promotion possibilities besides competence, such as one’s gender. Previous work 
on gender differences in promotion has mixed results. Some found that women are less 
likely to be promoted than men (Olson and Becker, 1983; Cannings 1988; Spurr 1990; 
McCue 1996; Ransom and Oaxaca 2005; Acosta 2005) while others provide evidence to 
the contrary (Gerhart and Milkovich, 1989; Hersch and Viscusi, 1996; Spilerman and 
Petersen, 1999; and Barnett, Baron, and Stuart, 2000). Yet there are others showing no 
gender difference in promotion (Diprete and Soule 1988; Jones and Makepeace, 1996; 
McDowell et al 1999; Pekkarinen and Vartiainen, 2006; Blau and Devaro, 2007). All of 
the above mentioned works concentrate on promotion outcomes in a single occupation 
and this fact seems to be the reason for the lack of consensus in their results. Since 1980s, 
gender differences in promotion is studied for managers (Cannings 1988), lawyers (Spurr 
and Sueyoshi 1994), economists (McDowell, Singell and Ziliak 1999), metalworkers 
(Pekkarinen and Vartiainen 2006) etc. However, each occupation require different set of 
skills, and promotion can be defined differently for each occupation therefore it is hard to 
draw generalizable conclusions from this literature (Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller, 1997;
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 McCue, 1996; Booth et al, 2001). These studies also to a large extent ignore the dynamic 
nature of the labor market with regards to gender issues and only look at a snapshot of 
occupational data. Females have entered labor market in increasing numbers since 1970s, 
not only to traditional female jobs but jobs where they were historically not present. 
Ignoring these changes in participation and career choice decisions of females impedes 
the ability to generalize estimates of determinants of incidence and returns to promotions. 
In this paper, we produce a general analysis of gender as a factor in promotion by 
incorporating gender concentration of occupations as well as workers’ gender to our 
analysis. Since men and women choose occupations differently (Altonji & Blank 1999), 
the “femaleness” of occupations, measured by the proportion of females, can be used as a 
proxy of occupational characteristics reflecting female attachment.  Even though there are 
a few studies showing that the wage is negatively related to occupational feminization 
(for example, Groshen 1991, Gerhart and El Cheikh 1991, Macpherson and Hirsch 1995),  
the relationship between promotion probability and occupational feminization is not well 
studied.  In this paper we try to answer three important questions: (1) Do workers have 
fewer promotion opportunities in feminized jobs? (2) Are there gender differences in 
promotion opportunities in “female” and “male” jobs? (3) How do we explain any gender 
differences?  
These questions, though studied by some sociologists, for example Budig (2002), 
are mostly ignored by economists. Paulin and Mellor (1996) use firm-level data to test 
the relationship between gender composition and likelihood of promotion. They find the 
concentration of white females negatively affect promotion probability, but only for 
themselves and other minorities in the occupation. Guided by Kanter’s tokenism theory 
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(1977) and William and Acker’s gendered organizations theory (1992, 1995), Budig 
(2002) looks at how men and women differ in promotion in male-dominated jobs and 
female-dominated jobs. Kanter’s theory implies as the number of woman in an 
occupation increases so will their ability to advance in that occupation. William and 
Acker’s theory on the other hand argues the structure of male and female jobs have 
inherent differences in promotion probabilities, where female jobs have more security 
and defined career ladders, which do not have high return to promotions. Budig (2002) 
finds that men earn more and are more likely to experience wage growth in all jobs, 
regardless of gender composition of the job, but neither men nor women are more likely 
to be promoted in jobs that they are the dominant gender. Our work complements hers in 
that we study promotion with a more general measure of feminization over a panel of 
years, not a cross-section with occupations grouped as male/female/balanced jobs. 
Furthermore, Budig (2002) uses wage data only from 1982-1993 rounds of NLSY 1979.  
We map occupation codes across all the classifications NLSY 1979 has (1970, 1980, 
1990, 2002 and 2010 codes) and occupation codes used in Current Population 
Survey(CPS) and Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) codes which not only enables 
us to analyze data from more rounds of the survey but also link in data on detailed 
occupational characteristics. This will enable us to tease out effects of gender (both of the 
worker and the occupation) that is not explained by differences in skill requirement and 
career structure of the occupations.  We also analyze the relationship between gender 
indicators (both of the worker and the occupation) and wages to study implications of 
promotions for gender differences in wage levels.   
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Our multi-dimensional treatment of promotion is similar to Cobb-Clark and 
Dunlop (1999), and Cobb-Clark (2001). Both of these papers look at promotions not only 
as proxied by wage increase but also as changing of job description or changing of the 
supervisor that one reports to. Cobb-Clark and Dunlop (1999) find that although women 
are less likely to be promoted than men in 1990 data, the gap is reduced by 1996. This 
paper is a descriptive study and does not attempt to model determinants of promotion 
probability. In her 2001 paper, however, Cobb-Clark models and estimates gender 
differences in promotion using a short panel (1988-1990). She reports that women are 
less likely to be promoted, but when promoted they experience faster wage growth 
compared to men. Addison, Ozturk and Wang (2013) extend Cobb-Clark and Dunlop 
(1999) and show that females with no more than high school education are the least likely 
to be promoted in early career in private sector. However, these females are much more 
likely to be promoted in later career years not only compared to their early career selves 
but also compared to the workers with higher educational attainment. We believe 
understanding role of gender in later career promotions is more informative in discussion 
of "glass ceilings” as these are the years where promotions are rare but likely to be for the 
highest positions in the organizations.   
In the next section we describe theoretical background.  Section 3.2 describes 
sample construction and variables used in the analysis.  We introduce our econometric 
approach in section 3.4 and report our results in section 3.5. We conclude with discussion 
of our findings and future extensions to our analysis in section 3.6. 
3.2. Conceptual Framework 
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The occupational feminization may affect ones promotion prospects in two ways. First, 
the gender composition may be an indicator of “match” quality. That is, in female-
dominant jobs there may be more women who are better prepared by attaining 
required/matched education and training. If this is the case, then men in these occupations 
will be disadvantaged (Williams 1992, England et al. 1994), women will be more likely 
to be promoted in these jobs, if a promotion is determined by job performance. Second, 
since the occupational feminization is found to be negatively related to the wage 
(Sorenson 1990, Macpherson and Hirsch 1995, Cohen and Huffman 2003), the 
feminization can be regarded as the degree of devaluation of women’s work. In a job that 
is dominated by females, one would expect the wage to be the lowest. Rewards to 
women’s work are the lowest, and they may be less likely to be promoted. However, if 
the employer hires a man on this job, he is expected to take on leadership responsibilities 
and is therefore more likely to be promoted than his female workmates.  
Promotion probabilities are expected to be dependent on an individual’s 
acquisition of human capital, opportunities provided by the job, and the competition 
among qualified workers. The latter two factors can be captured by the occupational 
controls. Occupational feminization may also reflect bundles of skills men and women 
prefer. Therefore, when the skills related occupational characteristics are controlled for, 
the feminization should not play a role determining the likelihood of promotion, if all 
segregation is attributed to the skills difference. With the recent task/skill measures 
constructed by Acemoglu and Autor (2011) using DOT data, we can test this hypothesis.    
3.3. The Empirical Model 
We do not structurally model promotion probability and its consequences but instead 
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follow the same theoretical framework as Cobb-Clark (2001) in modeling our empirical 
approximations. In this approach, the probability that worker   of gender g (g = male or 
female) will obtain a promotion at time    on the then current job (            is 
determined as a function of index Y – let us call it an index of promotability after Cobb-
Clark – which is defined as follows:                                                                                                                               
                                                          (1) 
where     is a vector of the worker’s demographic, human capital and job related 
characteristics, such as education, (the unexplained portion of the) ASVAB score, marital 
status, number of children, tenure with the current employer, labor market experience 
prior to the current employer, the local unemployment rate, and the occupation, sector 
and industry of the occupation. Feminization is the percentage of employees that are 
female in worker’s occupation at time   . In our estimations we allow the effects of 
individual and job characteristics to differ by gender, and therefore estimate separate 
vectors of β for each gender.  Moreover, we allow the intercept, α, to vary by gender.  In 
addition, for each outcome indicator we estimate versions of the model in which we 
alternately constrain β to be the same for everyone but allow α to vary by gender. Finally, 
     is the unobserved factor that determine the promotion probability at time t for worker 
i of gender g. 
2
 
We first estimated the promotion model treating the data as pooled cross-section 
using logistic regression and then the preferred panel version using conditional logistic 
regression with fixed effects. All the estimations were undertaken using STATA 11. We 
note parenthetically previous studies (Booth, Francesconi, and Frank, 1998; Cobb-Clark, 
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approach consistent with a previous study by Cobb-Clark (2001). 
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2001) used a random-effect (RE) model to estimate the gender gap in promotion. 
In modeling wage levels we will estimate not only the effect of occupational 
feminization but also the proportion of wage growth that is attributable to promotion. The 
underlying log wage (level) equation is: 
                        (                   )                               (2)            
where        is the dummy indicator if individual i is promoted at the current job, and 
feminization is the percentage of female employees in worker’s occupation as defined in 
the promotion equation. The error term in this equation comprises an individual fixed 
effect and a random component where the former is allowed to be correlated with all 
covariates. We estimate models of the log wage equation for each gender, separately, 
allowing parameters 𝝀, γ, θ,  ,  and    to vary across models. We also estimate models 
with constraints on these parameters similar to those described above for the promotion 
models.  We also estimate both promotion and log wage models by ignoring the panel 
nature of our data to show how ignoring unobserved heterogeneity biases our estimates. 
3.4. Data 
We use the core cohort of the NLSY79 that provides a nationally representative panel of 
data for the cohort of individuals aged 14 to 22 years in 1979 and who have been 
interviewed regularly since that year. The core data exclude the oversample of hispanic, 
black and low income youth and also the military.
3
 In addition, we do not consider 
individuals who are self-employed or who work for no pay. Having also excluded those 
with missing information on any of the variables used in the analysis, or having no data 
on hourly wages (or reporting hourly wages of over $1,000 or less than $1.00), our main 
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sample comprises 24526 person-year observations over 8 waves of the survey –1996, 
1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010.   
The NLSY79 has a number of advantages over other data sets. One is that we can 
obtain the individual’s actual labor market experience from the number of weeks worked 
since the last interview. This corrects for the potential measurement error in the standard 
experience variable based on age and education, since women may work more 
discontinuously than men. Another is that it contains detailed information on promotions 
beginning in 1984, then annually between 1988 and 1990 and finally biennially from 
1996 onwards (the survey itself became biennial in 1994). Nevertheless, the promotion 
question has changed over time, requiring adjustments in our data selection and analysis. 
In the 1988, 1989, and 1990 surveys, the promotion question relates to promotion on the 
current job in circumstances in which the respondent has worked with the current 
employee for at least 9 weeks. However, this tenure condition is no longer attached to the 
promotion questions in surveys conducted starting in 1996. Regardless of the tenure 
condition, the promotion question always concerns in-house promotions, namely with the 
current employer. In this treatment, therefore, all promotions are internal in nature.
4
 But 
we shall also include a dummy for changing employers since the last interview because 
individuals who are new at their jobs may be less likely to be promoted to the extent that 
they may not have accrued enough time on the job to demonstrate performance, or to 
have built up enough tenure to qualify for promotions that are automatic in nature. 
Conversely, they may be more likely to be promoted; for example, a woman who changes 
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as our promotion outcome. Addison, Ozturk, Wang (2013) show that response this covers 
more than 90 percent of all recorded promotions.  
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jobs by reason of her husband’s relocation may accept a job for which she is 
overqualified, and thereby rise quickly in the new job hierarchy.  
There have also occurred changes in the type of promotions that respondents are 
asked to report. Most notably, since 1996 the promotion question asks about promotions 
that are position changes, whereas earlier surveys did not impose this restriction. 
However, even though position change is a requirement for the promotion questions, not 





Although labor market activity has been surveyed in great detail in the NLSY79 
since its inception, the occupational codes are not recorded consistently across each wave 
of the survey. Between 1979 and 2000, the occupations are coded according to both the 
1970 and 1980 census codes. Since 2002, however, jobs are exclusively identified using 
the 2000 codes
7
 to capture the new and emerging occupations. We mapped these 
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question that asks respondents to report events “since the date of last interview” now 
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year period compared to a single year we may be underestimating promotions in early 
career or overestimating them in later years when we do not make adjustments. As we do 
not compare the actual estimates by gender across career stages but are only concerned 
about the relative role of gender and feminization for each stage we do not worry about 
this change in data collection process. 
7
More precisely, according to NLSY79 attachment 3: Industrial and Occupational 
Classification Codes (https://www.nlsinfo.org/sites/nlsinfo.org/files/attachments /121217 
/att300.pdf),  jobs are coded by 3-digit 2000 Census Codes in the 2002 survey, by 4-digit 
2002 Census Codes in 2004 survey, and by 4-digit 2003 Census Codes in 2006-2010 
surveys. Based on the codes in Attachment 3, there is an implied “0” in the 4-digit codes, 
so dividing it by 10 gives us the same 3-digit codes as in 2000 Census Codes, except for 
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occupational codes so as to be able to study the full extent of the promotion data panel 
available to us. Specifically, we used the crosswalks provided by David Dorn (2009) and 
Autor and Dorn (2013), giving 3-digit occupation codes—or 1990 David Dorn (1990dd) 
—that can serve as a link between occupation codes of 1970, 1990, and 2000 census. We 
first use their crosswalk linking 1970 and 1990dd and then the crosswalk linking 2000 
and 1990dd, so that all occupations in our sample will be measured by 1990dd codes in a 
consistent fashion.
8
 To compare the effect of different occupations as previous studies, 
we also utilized Autor and Dorn’s aggregation to group all occupations to the 1-digit 
level as follows: “management/professional/technical/financial/sales/publicsecurity,    
administrative support and retail sales, low-skill service, precision production and craft, 
machine operators, assemblers and inspectors, and transportation/construction 
/mechanics/mining/agricultural.” 
After successfully converting the occupational codes to 1990dd, we can merge in 
characteristics of jobs using skills and task measures embedded in each job. The 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the unemployed, military, those not in the labor market, and occupations that are in 
practice “uncodable,” none of which are included in our sample.  
8
These occupational codes were downloaded from David Dorn’s website 
http://www.cemfi.es /~dorn/data.htm on May 4, 2013. In the mapping of occ1970 to 
occ1990dd, there were 27 occupations not observed in the NLSY79, and 22 occupations 
that could not be directly mapped. For one of these occupations, namely occupation “274” 
from occ1990dd, we assigned code 280 of occ1970, guided by the occupation definitions 
contained in Meyer and Osborne (2005) and in Dorn (2009). For the rest of the cases, the 
codes could not be found in the Census 1970 codes 
(https://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/97occup.shtml). Similar problems were encountered in 
mapping occ2000 to occ1990dd. Specifically, 20 occupations were not observed in the 
NLSY79, while 18 occupations could not be mapped. To minimize observation loss after 
mapping (viz. 10 or fewer observations), again using the above sources, we assigned the 
approximate occ1990dd codes for 16 occ2000 occupations. Details of the procedure are 
available upon request. 
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measures were developed by series of studies on skills of jobs by Autor, Levy and 
Murnane (2003), Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011), 
making effort to define the “task content” for different occupations. A task is “a unit of 
work activity that can produce either goods or service or both”, and workers are regarded 
to allocate their skills on different tasks required on different jobs.
9
 Once tasks are 
measurable, jobs can be categorized and measured by tasks and skills. There are three big 
categories in this task and skill measurement: non-routine cognitive, routine, and non-
routine manual, which can be further decomposed into six skills: non-routine cognitive 
analytical, non-routine cognitive interpersonal, routine cognitive, routine manual, non-
routine manual physical and non-routine manual interpersonal. Non-routine cognitive 
task is also inferred as “abstract”, requiring skills of “problem-solving, intuition, 
persuasion and creativity.” These tasks are often found in jobs with high levels of 
education and analytical capability, such as law, medicine, science, engineering, design 
and management occupations. Routine tasks are characteristics of many middle-skill jobs, 
requiring ability of “following precise, well-understood procedures”, such as book-
keeping, clerical work, repetitive production, and monitoring. Non-routine manual tasks 
are activities requiring “situation adaptability, visual and language recognition, and in-
person interaction”, often intensively needed in numerous jobs in securing and protective 
services, such as such as truck driving, food preparing, carpet installing and grounds 
cleaning and maintenance. All task measures are standardized to have a mean of zero and 
                                                          
9
 Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles(DOT) is originally used by 
Autor, Levy and Murnane(2003) to impute to workers the task measures associated with 
their occupations, and then it is also verified and merged with Occupational Information 






For each occupation we observe in NLSY79 we merge in the measure of 
occupational feminization generated from the annual Current Population Survey (CPS) in 
March. The data is downloaded from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). 
Based on the micro-level data of gender and occupation from CPS, we can calculate 
annual occupational feminization across occupations as in Macpherson and Hirsch (1995). 
The occupations are obtained in a simplified version of occ1990 codes used by IPUMS 
and we use the crosswalk provided by IPUMs to map them into the standard occ1990 
codes. 
11
 Then we use Dorn’s crosswalk to obtain the occupational feminization 
measured by 1990dd codes and merge them to the main data set created from NLSY79. 
Finally, just as is the case with occupations, industries are not coded consistently 
in the NLSY79. In the 1979 through 2000 surveys, industries are classified according to 
1970 codes. Beginning in 2002, the 2000 census codes are used. To match the industry 
codes, we first used the mapping provided in the Census Bureau’s Technical Report #59 
to link industry 1970 codes to 1980 codes. Between 1980 and 1990, there are slight 
changes of the industry codes and we used the information provided by Unionstats
12
 to 
make the requisite changes and mapped 1980 codes to 1990 codes. Finally, we merged in 
the 2000 industry codes using the crosswalks between the 1990 and 2000 census.
13
 When 
all industries are measured by 3-digit 2000 Census Industry Codes, we followed Pergamit 
                                                          
10 
See definitions for particular skills in the Appendix C.  
11
 The simplified version of occ1990 is the only standard used by IPUMS to consistently 
record occupations across years.  The crosswalk between IPUMS occ1990 and standard 
occ1990 is obtained from https://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/occ_ind.shtml on June 5, 2013. 
12
 The changes are obtained from http://unionstats.gsu.edu/IndOcc_80-90.htm on June 5, 
2013.  
13
 The crosswalk is available from http://www.census.gov/people/io/files/indcswk2k.pdf. 
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and Veum’s (1999) methodology to generate 10 industry groups. 
Table 3.1 gives the means and standard deviations as well as the description of the 
variables we use in our analysis. From 1996-2010, the individuals are 42 on average, 
earning $23 per hour and 13.5 percent of them got a promotion. On average, the 
occupational feminization is 46.7 percent. Mean educational attainment is over 13 years, 
indicating most workers gets at least some college; the work experience is about 19 years, 
which consists of  7 years of tenure in the current job and 12 years prior experience.  
Table 3.2 next reports the individual characteristics by occupational feminization 
tertiles in our sample.  The first tertile has the lowest occupational feminization so it’s 
basically dominated by male workers. We name these jobs “Male Jobs”.
14
 Similarly, we 
have “Mixed Jobs” for the second tertile, which have balanced size of female and male 
workers, and “Female Jobs” for the last tertile, which are dominated by female workers.  
The first three rows in Table 3.2 show the statistics for the whole sample. On average, 
workers in “female jobs” earn significantly less than those in “male jobs” ($19.040 vs. 
$23.556), while the promotion difference between these two groups are not significant. 
The last three rows in Table 3.2 show the statistics for males and females in each job 
group, and there are several interesting patterns here. Men earn more than women in all 
jobs and the differences are significant. Even in the “female jobs”, men earn more 
compared to female coworkers. When comparing male workers across jobs of different 
“gender”, we see men working in “female jobs” earn more than the men in “male jobs”. 
On the other hand, female workers in “male jobs” get a higher wage compared to females 
in “female jobs”. We find similar patterns for promotion outcomes. While men in 
                                                          
14
 The examples of these jobs can be found in the Appendix C.  
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“female jobs” are more likely to be promoted than men in “male jobs”, women in “male 
jobs” are more likely to the promoted than women in “female jobs”. The promotion rate 
difference between male workers and female worker is found to be significant both in 
“male jobs” and “female jobs”. Women are more likely to be promoted than male 
coworkers in “male jobs”, while men are more likely to be promoted than female 
coworkers in “female jobs”. The gender difference in “mixed jobs” is not significant. Do 
these patterns hold when we control for more job/employer characteristics and individual 
characteristics? We will explore this through empirical analysis. 
Table 3.3 provides descriptive statistics for skills/task measures by occupational 
feminization tertiles. The last row of this table suggests there are significantly skills/task 
activity differences between “male jobs” and “female jobs”. “Female jobs” are 
characterized by more intensive skills of non-routine cognitive personal, routine 
cognitive, and non-routine manual personal, while “male jobs” are more embedded by 
non-routine cognitive analytical, routine manual, and non-routine manual physical skills. 
The significant difference of skills/task measures between “male jobs” and “female jobs” 
suggest that the occupational feminization may be associated with the skills/task activity 
in the job. No matter whether this reflects female/male worker’s preference of jobs or 
inherent ability to do such tasks in the job, when the skills/task measures are not 
controlled for, estimates of the effect of occupational feminization will be biased. We 
will also explore this bias in our empirical analysis. 
3.5. Results 
(a) The determination of promotion 
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We first investigate the promotion probability. Table 3.4 reports the coefficient 
estimates for pooled cross section and Table 3.5 reports estimates for the panel fixed 
effects models. In both tables, we shall report the estimates for all workers in our sample 
and then for female and male workers, to see whether the intercepts differ by genders. An 
interaction term between gender and feminization is also included in the pooled sample to 
check for the evidence of interaction effect. Multiple observations for an individual are 
often observed in my data set, so the standard errors are obtained by assuming clustering 
with respect to the individual. The models in Table 3.4A report the estimates for the 
pooled individuals. In model (1), when occupational feminization increases by 10 
percentage points, a male worker’ promotion rate increases by 0.6 percentage points, 
however, a female worker’s promotion rate decreases by 0.78 percentage points,  holding 
all else constant. At the mean level of occupational feminization, females do not differ 
from males in promotion. Compared to males, females are less likely to be promoted as 
occupational feminization increases and the occupation is becoming more “female”.  
Considering the occupational feminization might have U-shape effect, we include a 
quadratic term in model (2). Without controls for industries, we find that an increase will 
make a male worker more likely to be promoted at a decreasing rate. When the 
occupational feminization is more than 46.8% (0.312/2*0.333), an increase in 
occupational feminization will make male worker less likely to be promoted. The U-
shape is not changed for females. We also find females are less likely to be promoted 
with the increase of occupational feminization, but only at the 10 percent significance 
level. With addition of industry controls in model (3), the occupational feminization 
continues to have a U-shape effect on promotion probability, and female workers in more 
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“female jobs” are less likely to be promoted. Then we want to associate occupational 
feminization with other occupational controls to examine what captures the variation of 
occupational feminization for one’s promotion probability. In model (4), we add both 
controls of industry and occupation group dummies. Occupational feminization remains a 
U shape, but the quadratic term is now significant at the 10 percent level. The interaction 
between female and occupational feminization is not significant, indicating the promotion 
probability does not differ across genders with an increase in occupational feminization. 
Based on the above discussions for Table 3.3, we add additional control for skills 
measurements in model (5). Occupational feminization and its interaction with female 
dummy are not significant. Therefore, the role of feminization is not significant as long as 
skills are controlled for. Then we do similar analysis for females and males workers and 
the results are reported in Table 3.4B. Likewise, when skills are not controlled for, female 
workers in jobs with more than 43.2% (0.145/2*0.168) are less likely to be promoted 
with an additional increase in occupational feminization, but not the case when industry 
and occupational dummies are controlled for. When the skills measures are included, 
occupational feminization does not have a significant effect on female worker’s 
promotion probability. For male workers, the pattern is similar. Male workers are less 
likely to be promoted in jobs with more than 51.6% of females (0.315/2*0.305 in model 
(4)) or 56% of females (0.167/2*0.149 in model (5)), but occupational feminization is no 
longer significant once skills are controlled for. 
Considering the potential unobserved heterogeneity, we use fixed effect logit for 
these models and the results are reported in Table 3.5. Since estimates are not obtained in 
fixed effect models for variables not changing with time, the marginal effect cannot be 
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estimated by STATA and we only report coefficients here to compare the significance.  
The intensity of females in a job does not have a significant effect for promotion 
probability when the U shape of occupational feminization is not considered in model (1). 
In model (2), the quadratic term is not significant. When skills are controlled for, 
occupational feminization does not have a significant effect on worker’s promotion 
probability. The pattern is similar for female and male workers. As long as skills are 
controlled for, occupational feminization does not have a significant effect for promotion 
receipt.  Among all skills, non-routine cognitive personal skill is the one that can 
significantly induce a promotion, both for females and males.  
 (b) The determination of wage 
Then we consider the role of promotion, occupational feminization and skills in 
wage determination. Table 3.6 reports estimates for the pooled sample while Table 3.7 
reports estimates with fixed effect. Similar to promotion tables, we shall first report the 
estimates for all workers and then for female and male workers in both tables. The first 
four columns in Table 3.6 present the results for wage with different controls. From 
models (1) – (4), in jobs with mean level of occupational feminization, female workers 
have lower wages than males, and the effect is significant at the 1 percent level for all 
estimations. Occupational feminization also has a significant negative interaction with 
female dummies for wages, indicating female wages decrease with an increase in 
occupational feminization. The U shape is found to be significant and interacted with 
gender. For females, the quadratic term is negative, and remains significant even when 
both industry and occupations are controlled for. At the mean level of occupational 
feminization, a promotion for a male worker makes him earn 7.6 percent more than those 
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males who do not get a promotion, but the return to promotion in terms of wages does not 
differ for females and males. With additional controls for industry, occupations, and 
skills, we still find females earn less with the increase of occupational feminization at a 
decreasing rate. The pattern here is different from what we found earlier for promotion 
probabilities, where the occupational feminization effect is no longer significant when 
skills are controlled for. The skills then seem to be more related to occupational 
feminization for one’s probability of promotion, but not for wages. Female workers in 
“female jobs” earn less than all other workers. Then we did a similar analysis for female 
and male workers. While the effect of occupational feminization has a U shape for 
females, the quadratic term is not significant for males when industry and occupations are 
controlled for. In highly female jobs with occupational feminization more than 70% 
(0.514/2*0.367), females have lower wages with an increase in feminization when 
occupations and skills are controlled for.  
Then we estimate the effect of promotion, occupational feminization, and skills 
with fixed effect models. The results are reported in Table 3.7. The first three columns 
present the estimates for all workers and they show a similar patter to OLS estimates. At 
the mean level of occupational feminization, a promoted male worker will earn more than 
non-promoted males, but the return to promotion does not differ by gender. When the 
quadratic term is used in model (1), we do not find the significance for occupational 
feminization. However, this may be caused by the change of U shape once unobserved 
heterogeneity is controlled for. Then we do not use quadratic term in model (2) and (3), 
and we find the occupational feminization decreases one’s earnings.  When the analysis is 
restricted to females and males, males do not differ in earnings across jobs with different 
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feminization once skills are controlled for, but females working in female jobs do earn 
less than her counterparts in “male jobs”. Therefore, when unobservable heterogeneity is 
controlled for along with the job skills, workers in “female jobs” have lower wages and 
this is mainly caused by a difference for female workers. Promotion has a significant 
effect to increase the wages for males, but only at the 10 percent significance level.  
3.6. Conclusions and Future Work 
More and more women are joining the labor force and working in “male jobs”, while 
more men are employed in “female jobs”. In this paper, we try to answer the question 
whether women are more or less likely to be promoted in jobs where they are majority or 
minority. Is there a “glass ceiling” for female workers in “female jobs” or is this only a 
possible issue in jobs where they are tokens? Previous studies were restricted by 
inconsistent census occupational codes in NLSY79. With the recent crosswalk developed 
by David Dorn (2009) and Autor and Dorn (2013), we constructed the consistent 
measures of occupations to study the promotion in a panel. While there is abundance of 
research showing the wage is negatively related to occupational feminization, the 
evidence we find in promotion is slim.  
We find that in their mid-career, occupational feminization has a U-shape effect 
on promotion and females are less likely to be promoted with an increase in occupational 
feminization, thus females are less likely to be promoted in “female jobs” while males in 
these jobs are more likely to be promoted than their male counterparts in “male jobs”, but 
the effect is not significant once skills are controlled for. When individual effects are 
considered along with skills controls, there’s no significant effect of occupational 
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feminization on promotions, neither for males or females. Our findings show no evidence 
of “glass ceiling” for females or males when they are the minority gender.  
Although the effect of feminization is explained away with skills or unobserved 
heterogeneity for promotion, its effect on wages remains significant even after these 
controls. Overall wages are lower for all workers in jobs dominated by females. While 
male wages do not differ across highly female jobs and highly male jobs, the wage gap 
for females due to feminization persist even when we consider individual unobserved 
heterogeneity. However, there seems to be no significant difference in the return to a 
promotion by gender once occupation controls are included in the model.  
These findings regarding promotions and wages show different implications of 
occupational feminization. Its insignificant effect for promotion probability in the 
presence of occupational controls suggests that it may reflect differences in occupational 
tasks and skills. However, task/skill differences do not explain the wage discrepancy 
between “female jobs” and “male jobs”. This may indicate presence of other factors 
determining distribution of females across jobs. Our findings may have implications for 
policies encouraging balanced employment of both genders. Since occupational groups 
and skills do not account for the wage gap due to occupational feminization for female 
workers, we plan to control for additional job characteristics, such as occupational and 
training requirements and median earnings from Occupational Projections and Training 








Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Age * Age of the individual at the interview date 24526 41.877 4.967
Woman Gender dummy =1 if female, 0 otherwise 24526 0.506 0.500
Black Race dummy =1 if black, 0 otherwise 24526 0.117 0.322
Hispanic Ethnicity dummy=1 if Hispanic, 0 otherwise 24526 0.066 0.249
Married Marital Status dummy=1 if married, 0 otherwise 24526 0.630 0.483
Number of children Number of children in the family 24526 1.741 1.332
Corrected ASVAB Scores Total ASVAB scores after correcting age and schooling 24526 0.283 0.944
Education Maximum schooling years reported 24526 13.918 2.616
Tenure years Number of years with the employer on current job (total weeks/52) 24526 7.228 6.864
Prior labor market experience Number of working years prior to current job (total weeks/52) 24526 12.086 6.870
New employer New employer dummy=1 if has a new employer since last interview 24526 0.179 0.383
Private sector * Individual is working in a private sector 24526 0.842 0.365
Public sector Individual is working in a public sector 24526 0.158 0.365
Full time Individual is working for more than 35 hours a week 24526 0.857 0.350
Small firm * Firms with less than 100 employees 24526 0.589 0.492
Medium firm Firms with more than 100 but less than 500 employees 24526 0.236 0.424
Large firm Firms with more than 500 employees 24526 0.176 0.381
State unemployment rate State level unemployment rate in the interview year 24526 6.000 2.745
Agriculture and Mining 24526 0.013 0.115
Construction 24526 0.066 0.248
Manufacturing* 24526 0.164 0.370
Wholesale and Retail Trade 24526 0.127 0.332
Transportation, Information and Communications and 
Utilities 24526 0.097 0.297
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Rental and Leasing 24526 0.057 0.233
Professional, Scientific, Management, Administrative, 
and Waste Management Services 24526 0.084 0.278
Educational, Health and Social Services 24526 0.191 0.393
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommodations, and 
Food Services 24526 0.072 0.259
Other Services and Public Administration 24526 0.108 0.310
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics for main variables from 1996-2010














Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Percent Female Female proportion in the occupation in each year 24526 0.467 0.292
Non-routine cognitive analytical 24526 0.234 0.918
Non-routine cognitive personal 24526 0.258 1.057
Routine cognitive 24526 -0.013 0.854
Routine manual 24526 -0.083 0.954
Non-routine manual physical 24526 -0.084 1.011
Non-routine manual personal 24526 0.049 0.970
Management, professional, technical, financial, sales 
and public security 24526 0.418 0.493
Administrative support and retail sales 24526 0.201 0.401
Low-skill service* 24526 0.100 0.300
Precision production and craft 24526 0.036 0.186
Machine operators, assemblers and inspectors 24526 0.063 0.243
Transportation/construction/mechanics/mining/agricult
ural 24526 0.158 0.365
Wage Hourly real wage earned on the current job in 2010 dollars 24526 22.659 21.537
Log-wage Log of hourly real wage on the current job 24526 2.913 0.610
Promoted Promotion dummy=1 if promoted at the job with the current employer since 
last interview 24526 0.135 0.342
 *  variables are the excluded categories
Task and skill measures from Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006)
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics for main variables from 1996-2010 (Cont.)













All N Mean Std N Mean Std N Mean Std
Wage 8205 23.556 19.986 8151 25.382 25.932 8170 19.040 17.296
Log-wage 8205 2.980 0.569 8151 2.989 0.664 8170 2.771 0.567
Promoted 8205 0.121 0.326 8151 0.169 0.375 8170 0.115 0.319
Male vs. Female Male Female |t|-stats Male Female |t|-stats Male Female |t|-stats Male Female
(N=6751) (N= 1454 ) (N= 4205) (N= 3946) (N=  1169 ) (N=7001 )
Wage 24.024 21.386 4.57 30.829 19.578 20.05 25.394 17.979 13.72 1.96 8.06
Log-wage 3.003 2.869 8.22 3.185 2.779 28.99 3.037 2.727 17.67 1.89 8.82
Promoted 0.116 0.144 3.00 0.171 0.168 0.36 0.154 0.108 4.53 3.66 3.93
Table 3.2 Individual Characteristics by Occupational Feminization
Male Jobs Mixed Jobs








Skill/Task Measure Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Non-routine cognitive analytical 0.149 0.906 0.433 0.885 0.120 0.929
Non-routine cognitive personal -0.083 0.940 0.648 1.103 0.210 0.991
Routine cognitive 0.044 0.713 -0.300 0.701 0.217 1.025
Routine manual 0.470 0.934 -0.406 0.904 -0.317 0.758
Non-routine manual physical 0.744 1.057 -0.452 0.732 -0.549 0.610
Non-routine manual personal -0.606 0.863 0.294 0.804 0.462 0.877
N
Table 3.3 Skills/Task Measures by Occupational Feminization

















Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME
Female 0.046 0.005 0.095 0.01 0.113+ 0.012+ 0.047 0.005 0.031 0.003
[0.052] [0.006] [0.060] [0.006] [0.061] [0.006] [0.061] [0.006] [0.061] [0.006]
Percent Female 0.561** 0.061** 2.917** 0.312** 2.932** 0.311** 1.188* 0.124* 0.226 0.023
[0.126] [0.014] [0.410] [0.044] [0.432] [0.046] [0.515] [0.053] [0.578] [0.059]
Female*(Percent Female-Mean) -1.290** -0.139** -1.249+ -0.134+ -1.315+ -0.140+ -0.691 -0.072 -0.334 -0.034
[0.171] [0.018] [0.731] [0.078] [0.733] [0.078] [0.753] [0.078] [0.775] [0.079]
Percent Female squared -3.107** -0.333** -2.883** -0.306** -1.138+ -0.118+ -0.257 -0.026
[0.506] [0.054] [0.530] [0.056] [0.584] [0.061] [0.616] [0.063]
Female*(Percent Female squared -Mean) 1.048 0.112 1.125 0.119 0.475 0.049 0.142 0.014
[0.719] [0.077] [0.727] [0.077] [0.740] [0.077] [0.752] [0.077]
Industry Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Dummies No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Task/Skills Measures No No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Regressions also include controls for worker characteristics and employer characteristics as well as labor market characteristics.  
For full set of estimates please see Tables in the Appendix.  Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 3.4A Promotion Probability by Gender in Mid Career: Role of Occupational Feminization and Skills/Task Performed  
Logistic Regression Estimates not Controlling for Fixed Effects for All 









Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME
Percent Female squared -1.630** -0.168** -0.269 -0.027 -0.187 -0.018 -2.823** -0.305** -1.396* -0.149* -0.247 -0.026
[0.522] [0.054] [0.578] [0.058] [0.617] [0.061] [0.552] [0.059] [0.637] [0.068] [0.697] [0.072]
Percent Female 1.411* 0.145* -0.082 -0.008 0.053 0.005 2.910** 0.315** 1.568** 0.167** 0.141 0.015
[0.623] [0.064] [0.697] [0.070] [0.766] [0.075] [0.452] [0.048] [0.570] [0.061] [0.669] [0.069]
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Task/Skills Measures No No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Regressions also include controls for worker characteristics and employer characteristics as well as labor market characteristics.  
For full set of estimates please see Tables in the Appendix.  Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 3.4B Promotion Probability by Gender in Mid Career: Role of Occupational Feminization and Skills/Task Performed  
Logistic Regression Estimates not Controlling for Fixed Effects for Females and Males
Females Males








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Percent Female 0.367 1.310+ 0.799 -0.204 -0.671 -0.554 0.499+ 1.730* 0.866
[0.278] [0.782] [0.830] [0.246] [1.038] [1.083] [0.302] [0.846] [0.938]
Female*(Percent Female-Mean) -0.497 -1.437 -1.398
[0.329] [1.112] [1.136]
Percent Female squared -1.108 -0.574 0.396 0.553 -1.425 -0.712
[0.855] [0.884] [0.857] [0.886] [0.916] [0.973]
Female*(Percent Female squared -Mean) 1.102 1.089
[1.071] [1.093]
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Task/Skills Measures No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Table 3.5 Promotion Probability by Gender in Mid Career: Role of Occupational Feminization and Skills/Task Performed  
Logistic Regression with Fixed Effects Estimates with Panel Data 
Note: Regressions also include controls for worker characteristics and employer characteristics as well as labor market characteristics.  For full set of 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Female -0.141** -0.136** -0.153** -0.156**
[0.016] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014]
Promoted*Female -0.012 0.001 -0.019 -0.02
[0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
Promoted 0.076** 0.061** 0.041* 0.032+ 0.066** 0.026+ 0.018 0.049** 0.029 0.019
[0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018]
Percent Female 0.190* 0.531** -0.126 -0.186+ -0.137 -0.591** -0.514** 0.434** -0.263* -0.504**
[0.095] [0.096] [0.106] [0.111] [0.125] [0.138] [0.145] [0.095] [0.111] [0.125]
Percent Female squared -0.509** -0.798** -0.131 -0.121 -0.019 0.430** 0.367** -0.650** 0.031 0.159
[0.121] [0.119] [0.121] [0.124] [0.104] [0.112] [0.113] [0.120] [0.126] [0.135]
Promoted*(Percent Female-Mean) 0.006 -0.018 -0.012 -0.002 -0.039 0.046 0.045 -0.034 -0.028 -0.015
[0.063] [0.063] [0.061] [0.061] [0.049] [0.049] [0.048] [0.064] [0.062] [0.062]
Promoted*Female*(Percent Female-Mean) -0.013 -0.02 0.061 0.057
[0.081] [0.080] [0.078] [0.078]
Female*(Percent Female squared -Mean) 0.783** 0.873** 0.650** 0.650**
[0.162] [0.157] [0.150] [0.152]
Female*(Percent Female-Mean) -0.675** -0.748** -0.545** -0.539**
[0.160] [0.156] [0.151] [0.152]
Industry Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Dummies No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Occupational Task/Skills Measures No No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
For full set of estimates please see Tables in the Appendix.  Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in brackets. . ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Regressions also include controls for worker characteristics and employer characteristics as well as labor market characteristics.  
All Females Males
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates not Controlling for Fixed Effects













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Promoted*Female -0.021 -0.022 -0.023
[0.027] [0.027] [0.027]
Promoted 0.040+ 0.040* 0.036+ 0.019 0.016 0.011 0.044+ 0.042+ 0.039+
[0.024] [0.020] [0.020] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024]
Percent Female squared -0.028 -0.018 -0.072
[0.145] [0.125] [0.129]
Female*(Percent Female squared -Mean) 0.139
[0.181]
Percent Female -0.099 -0.118* -0.097+ -0.127 -0.134** -0.100* -0.032 -0.078 -0.088
[0.117] [0.050] [0.052] [0.145] [0.040] [0.047] [0.094] [0.053] [0.057]
Promoted*(Percent Female-Mean) 0.072 0.071 0.066 0.048 0.052 0.054 0.068 0.077 0.071
[0.084] [0.076] [0.076] [0.053] [0.053] [0.054] [0.084] [0.084] [0.084]
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Task/Skills Measures No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Regressions also include controls for worker characteristics and employer characteristics as well as labor market characteristics.  
For full set of estimates please see Tables in the Appendix. Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in brackets.. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 3.7 Log Real Earnings by Gender in Mid Career: Role of Promotion, Occupational Feminization and Skills/Task Performed  
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Appendix A: Full Solution in Chapter 1
The family is assumed to maximize the utility function
U=1−  logC0 logY 1 (1)
 
subject to: 
Y 0=C0I 0 (2)
logY 0= 0 0h0 (3)
logY 1= 1 1h1 (4)
h1= h0 log I 0e1 (5)
e1=e0h0v1 . (6)
Rewrite conditions (2) and (3) as
C0=Y 0−I 0=e
 0 0h0−I 0  . (7)
Rewrite conditions (5) and (6) as
h1= h0 logI 0e0h0v1  . (8)
Substituting h1 from (4) in (8), 
logY 1= 1 1[ h0logI 0e0h0v1]  (9)
With (7) and (9), one can simplify the utility function with the choice variable of
I 0 ,
U=1−log e 0 0h0−I 0 {1 1[ h0logI 0e0h0v1]}  (10)
The first-order condition for a maximum of the new utility function (10)  with 






















The second-order condition is that:
1− −1





We can see  the second-order condition is automatically satisfied because
1− −1




2≥0 , so I 0
∗=
1h0e
 0 0h0 
1h01−
is the optimal 




 0 0h0 
1h01−






h0 logY 0e0h0v1  (14)
From (14), we can see that h0 affects h1 in three ways: first, h0 , the efficiency 
of investment affected by h0 ; second, logY 0 the income affected by h0 ; and third, h0 , 
the effect of h0 on e1 .
To find ∂ h1




















 0 0h0 is  just  the  investment I 0
∗ .  From  (5)  ,  if 
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logI 0
∗0 ,  based  on  other   assumptions  that   ' h0 >0,  01 ,  00 ,  10 , 
∂ h1
∗/∂ h0 is positive too. 
Noticing that the investment can be written as I 0=
 1 h0Y 0







 1 h01− 
.









Case1:  If the investment efficiency is not affected by h0 and  is a parameter not a 
function of h0 , ∂ h1
∗/∂ h0=0 . 
In this case, ∂ h1
∗/∂ h0 is not affected by the level of parental education h0 and  the 
altruism parameter  , but only determined by  , 0 , and  .  Holding parental human 
capital constant, if  is higher, the investment is more efficient in accumulating child's 
human capital  and leads to a higher h1 ;  if 0 is higher,  the returns to parental  human 
capital is higher, thus the family has more income available to assign to investment I 0 and 
form child's human capital h1 ; if  is higher, the child will be smarter and accumulate 
more human capital h1 .
Case2: In the extreme case of =1，the utility function contains no consumption 
C0  and  a  family  will  invest  all  income  as I 0 ,  the  child's  human  capital
h1
∗=h0 logY 0e0h0v1 and 
∂ h1
∗/∂ h0= ' h000h0h00= ' h0 logY 0h00 . 
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In this case,  ∂ h1
∗/∂ h0 is not only determined by  ,  0 , and  as in case 1, but 
also affected by the function h0 and income Y 0 . With the increase of the efficiency of
I 0 by h0 , ∂ h1
∗/∂ h0 is also increased; With wealthier parents, ∂ h1
∗/∂ h0 becomes greater. 
In the extreme case of =0 , the utility function contains no concern about the child's 
earnings Y 1 so  there's  no  incentive  to  invest  and I 0 =0.  The  child's  human  capital  is 
h1
∗=e1=e0h0v1 and ∂ h1
∗/∂ h0= .  In this  case,  ∂ h1
∗/∂ h0 is  only determined 
by the impact of parental education on forming child's initial endowment  . Income and 
efficiency will not play a role here. 













=h0h00 so when the returns to parental education  0 increases, the 








0 so when the returns to child's education  1
increases, there will be more incentive to make investments thus increasing the child's 





=h00 so  when  the  impact  from  parental  education  on  forming  child's 
initial endowment  increases, the child's optimal human capital also increases as a result 







Appendix B: First Stage Results for Instruments for Mother’s Schooling 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CA9 -0.001 -0.003 -0.022
[0.037] [0.036] [0.035]
CA10 0.029 0.035 0.022
[0.034] [0.034] [0.033]
CA11 0.02 0.024 0.003
[0.034] [0.033] [0.032]
CL7 0.056 -0.027 -0.022
[0.094] [0.083] [0.079]
CL8 0.04 -0.035 -0.04
[0.085] [0.074] [0.068]
CL9 0.01 -0.068 -0.062
[0.087] [0.076] [0.071]
Grandmother's Education 0.017** 0.017** 0.015**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Grandfather's Edcuation 0.009** 0.008* 0.008*
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Two-Parent Home 0.081** 0.072** 0.071**
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
Observations 4,096 4,096 3,300 3,300 2,891 2,891
R-squared 0.215 0.246 0.195 0.224 0.173 0.202
F-stat for all IV's joint significance 0.90 22.85 1.12 19.50 0.99 16.62
p-value 0.50 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.43 0.000
Estimations also include female, black, hispanic, age, mother's age at birth, family size, mother's ASVAB Scores, 
net Family income, and CSLs. For grades, estimations also include a dummy of grade 12th. 
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mothers are in brackets.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
Table B.1 First Stage Results for Instruments for Mother's Schooling: Mother with at Least a HS Education







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CA9 0.053 0.156 0.133
[0.204] [0.214] [0.227]
CA10 -0.034 0.02 0.01
[0.195] [0.206] [0.215]
CA11 0.023 0.032 -0.007
[0.192] [0.204] [0.216]
CL7 0.597 0.215 0.286
[0.447] [0.484] [0.469]
CL8 0.493 0.105 0.156
[0.365] [0.418] [0.400]
CL9 0.214 -0.166 -0.081
[0.382] [0.434] [0.419]
Grandmother's Education 0.127** 0.117** 0.111**
[0.022] [0.022] [0.024]
Grandfather's Edcuation 0.100** 0.098** 0.102**
[0.017] [0.018] [0.020]
Two-Parent Home 0.254** 0.201* 0.236*
[0.098] [0.102] [0.108]
Observations 4,096 4,096 3,300 3,300 2,891 2,891
R-squared 0.304 0.361 0.28 0.333 0.268 0.321
F-stat for all IV's joint significance 1.68 42.36 1.51 35.91 1.31 30.99
p-value 0.12 0.00 0.17 0.000 0.25 0.000
Estimations also include female, black, hispanic, age, mother's age at birth, family size, mother's ASVAB Scores, 
net family income, and CSLs. For grades, estimations also include a dummy of grade 12th. 
Robust standard errors clustered by birth mothers are in brackets.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.
Table B.2 First Stage Results for Instruments for Mother's Schooling: Mother's Schooling Years
HS Completion HS Diploma Grades
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Appendix C: Examples of Jobs and Task/Skills in the Work Activities   
 
 
Examples of Jobs Characterized by the Varying Occupational Feminization 
“Female job”, has a high proportion of women in the job. A few examples are listed as 
follows (the percentage in the parenthesis is the occupational feminization):  
Kindergarten and earlier school teachers (98% ) 
Dental hygienists (98%) 
Dental assistants (97%) 
Secretaries (97%) 
Child care workers (94%) 
Licensed practical nurses (94%) 
“Male job”, has a low proportion of women in the job. A few examples are listed as 
follows: (the percentage in the parenthesis is the occupational feminization): 
Heavy equipment and farm equipment mechanics (1%) 
Drillers of oil wells (1%) 
Elevator installers and repairers (1%) 
Bus, truck, and stationary engine mechanics (1%) 
Plasterers (1%) 




















Tasks and Skills in the Work Activities Defined by Autor and Acemoglu (2010): 
 
Non-routine cognitive: Analytical 
Analyzing data/information 
Thinking creatively 
Interpreting information for others 
Examples of jobs with intensive non-routine cognitive analytical tasks: actuaries, 
physicists and astronomers, economists, market researcher and survey researcher 
 
Non-routine cognitive: Interpersonal 
Establishing and maintaining personal relationships 
Guiding, directing and motivating subordinates 
Coaching/Developing others 
Examples of jobs with intensive non-routine cognitive interpersonal tasks: clergy 
and religious workers, athletes, sports instructors, and officials 
 
Routine cognitive 
Importance of repeating the same task 
Importance of being exact or accurate 
Structured v. Unstructured work (reverse)  
Examples of jobs with intensive routine cognitive tasks: telephone operators, 
transportation ticket and reservation agents, cashiers 
 
Routine manual 
Pace determined by speed of equipment 
Controlling machines and processes 
Spend time making repetitive motions 
Examples of jobs with intensive routine manual tasks: machine operators, 
winding and twisting textile/apparel operatives, crane, derrick, winch and hoist 
operators 
 
Non-routine manual physical 
Operating vehicles, mechanized devices, or equipment 
Spend time using hands to handle, control or feel objects, tools, or controls 
Manual dexterity 
Spatial orientation 
Examples of jobs with intensive non-routine manual physical tasks: airplane pilots 
and navigators, excavating and loading machine operators, millwrights, taxi 
drivers and chauffeurs 
 
Non-routine manual interpersonal 
Performing for or working directly with the public 
Provide consultation and advice to others 
Examples of jobs with intensive non-routine manual interpersonal tasks: 
psychologists, managers of food-serving and lodging establishments, actors, 







Appendix D: Full Tables in Chapter 3 
 
Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME
Female 0.046 0.005 0.095 0.01 0.113+ 0.012+ 0.047 0.005 0.031 0.003
[0.052] [0.006] [0.060] [0.006] [0.061] [0.006] [0.061] [0.006] [0.061] [0.006]
Percent Female 0.561** 0.061** 2.917** 0.312** 2.932** 0.311** 1.188* 0.124* 0.226 0.023
[0.126] [0.014] [0.410] [0.044] [0.432] [0.046] [0.515] [0.053] [0.578] [0.059]
Female*(Percent Female-Mean) -1.290** -0.139** -1.249+ -0.134+ -1.315+ -0.140+ -0.691 -0.072 -0.334 -0.034
[0.171] [0.018] [0.731] [0.078] [0.733] [0.078] [0.753] [0.078] [0.775] [0.079]
Percent Female squared -3.107** -0.333** -2.883** -0.306** -1.138+ -0.118+ -0.257 -0.026
[0.506] [0.054] [0.530] [0.056] [0.584] [0.061] [0.616] [0.063]
Female*(Percent Female squared -Mean) 1.048 0.112 1.125 0.119 0.475 0.049 0.142 0.014
[0.719] [0.077] [0.727] [0.077] [0.740] [0.077] [0.752] [0.077]
Black -0.112 -0.012 -0.115 -0.012 -0.118 -0.012 -0.089 -0.009 -0.078 -0.008
[0.082] [0.008] [0.082] [0.008] [0.082] [0.008] [0.083] [0.008] [0.083] [0.008]
Hispanic 0.137 0.016 0.134 0.015 0.141 0.016 0.141 0.015 0.134 0.014
[0.093] [0.011] [0.093] [0.011] [0.092] [0.011] [0.093] [0.011] [0.092] [0.010]
Married 0.042 0.004 0.036 0.004 0.034 0.004 -0.005 -0.001 -0.016 -0.002
[0.047] [0.005] [0.047] [0.005] [0.047] [0.005] [0.047] [0.005] [0.047] [0.005]
Number of children -0.005 -0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000
[0.018] [0.002] [0.018] [0.002] [0.018] [0.002] [0.018] [0.002] [0.018] [0.002]
Corrected ASVAB Scores 0.155** 0.017** 0.149** 0.016** 0.138** 0.015** 0.087** 0.009** 0.076** 0.008**
[0.029] [0.003] [0.029] [0.003] [0.029] [0.003] [0.029] [0.003] [0.029] [0.003]
Education 0.415** 0.045** 0.402** 0.043** 0.349** 0.037** 0.239** 0.025** 0.220* 0.022*
[0.093] [0.010] [0.092] [0.010] [0.091] [0.010] [0.089] [0.009] [0.089] [0.009]
Education squared /100 -1.304** -0.141** -1.283** -0.137** -1.061** -0.113** -0.831** -0.086** -0.796** -0.081**
[0.309] [0.033] [0.308] [0.033] [0.305] [0.032] [0.299] [0.031] [0.300] [0.031]
Tenure years -0.047** -0.005** -0.048** -0.005** -0.046** -0.005** -0.056** -0.006** -0.061** -0.006**
[0.011] [0.001] [0.011] [0.001] [0.011] [0.001] [0.011] [0.001] [0.011] [0.001]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Table D.1 Promotion Probability by Gender in Mid Career: Role of Occupational Feminization and Skills/Task Performed  








Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME
Tenure years squared /100 -0.023 -0.003 -0.022 -0.002 -0.032 -0.003 -0.021 -0.002 -0.014 -0.001
[0.048] [0.005] [0.048] [0.005] [0.049] [0.005] [0.049] [0.005] [0.049] [0.005]
Prior labor market experience 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
[0.012] [0.001] [0.012] [0.001] [0.012] [0.001] [0.013] [0.001] [0.013] [0.001]
Prior labor market experience /100 -0.146** -0.016** -0.157** -0.017** -0.155** -0.016** -0.155** -0.016** -0.163** -0.017**
[0.046] [0.005] [0.046] [0.005] [0.046] [0.005] [0.046] [0.005] [0.047] [0.005]
New employer -0.379** -0.037** -0.377** -0.037** -0.378** -0.037** -0.382** -0.036** -0.385** -0.036**
[0.065] [0.006] [0.065] [0.006] [0.065] [0.006] [0.065] [0.006] [0.066] [0.005]
Public sector -0.046 -0.005 -0.015 -0.002 0.135+ 0.015+ 0.11 0.012 0.159* 0.017*
[0.065] [0.007] [0.064] [0.007] [0.075] [0.009] [0.075] [0.008] [0.075] [0.008]
Full time 0.951** 0.080** 0.945** 0.079** 0.917** 0.076** 0.863** 0.071** 0.779** 0.064**
[0.080] [0.005] [0.080] [0.005] [0.081] [0.005] [0.081] [0.005] [0.082] [0.005]
Medium firm 0.161** 0.018** 0.152** 0.017** 0.154** 0.017** 0.182** 0.020** 0.187** 0.020**
[0.051] [0.006] [0.051] [0.006] [0.053] [0.006] [0.053] [0.006] [0.053] [0.006]
Large firm 0.409** 0.049** 0.411** 0.049** 0.422** 0.050** 0.437** 0.051** 0.464** 0.053**
[0.057] [0.008] [0.057] [0.007] [0.059] [0.008] [0.059] [0.008] [0.060] [0.008]
State unemployement rate -0.036** -0.004** -0.035** -0.004** -0.033** -0.003** -0.029** -0.003** -0.028** -0.003**
[0.008] [0.001] [0.008] [0.001] [0.008] [0.001] [0.008] [0.001] [0.008] [0.001]
Agriculture and Mining -0.601** -0.051** -0.528* -0.045** -0.525* -0.044**
[0.201] [0.013] [0.208] [0.014] [0.208] [0.014]
Construction 0.128 0.014 0.040 0.004 -0.124 -0.012
[0.108] [0.012] [0.109] [0.012] [0.110] [0.010]
Wholesale and Retail Trade -0.114 -0.012 -0.239** -0.023** -0.212* -0.020**
[0.077] [0.008] [0.083] [0.007] [0.083] [0.008]
Transportation, Information and 
Communications and Utilities
-0.079 -0.008 -0.156+ -0.015+ -0.104 -0.010
[0.081] [0.008] [0.085] [0.008] [0.084] [0.008]
Logistic Regression Estimates not Controlling for Fixed Effects for All (Full Table Cont.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)








Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Rental and 0.040 0.004 -0.148 -0.015 -0.095 -0.009
Leasing [0.093] [0.010] [0.096] [0.009] [0.097] [0.009]
Professional, Scientific, Management, Admin-
istrative, and Waste Management Services -0.076 -0.008 -0.247** -0.024** -0.258** -0.024**
[0.086] [0.009] [0.090] [0.008] [0.089] [0.008]
Educational, Health and Social Services -0.574** -0.053** -0.769** -0.067** -0.793** -0.067**
[0.088] [0.007] [0.095] [0.007] [0.101] [0.007]
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, 
Accommodations, and Food Services
-0.077 -0.008 -0.141 -0.014 -0.157 -0.015
[0.096] [0.010] [0.104] [0.010] [0.104] [0.010]
Other Services and Public Administration -0.197* -0.020* -0.383** -0.036** -0.371** -0.034**
[0.091] [0.009] [0.096] [0.008] [0.097] [0.008]
Management, professional, technical, financial, 
sales and public security 0.618** 0.067** -0.107 -0.011
[0.087] [0.010] [0.118] [0.012]
Administrative support and retail sales 0.178+ 0.019+ 0.087 0.009
[0.098] [0.011] [0.106] [0.011]
Precision production and craft 0.403** 0.048** -0.247 -0.023+
[0.133] [0.018] [0.162] [0.014]
Machine operators, assemblers and inspectors -0.456** -0.041** -0.592** -0.049**
[0.134] [0.010] [0.149] [0.010]
Transportation/construction/mechanics/ 
mining/agricultural -0.239* -0.023* -0.312* -0.029*
[0.122] [0.011] [0.134] [0.012]
Non-routine cognitive analytical 0.133* 0.014*
[0.053] [0.005]
Non-routine cognitive personal 0.343** 0.035**
[0.040] [0.004]
Table D.1 Promotion Probability by Gender in Mid Career: Role of Occupational Feminization and Skills/Task Performed  
Logistic Regression Estimates not Controlling for Fixed Effects for All (Full Table Cont.)

















Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME
Routine cognitive -0.031 -0.003
[0.033] [0.003]
Routine manual -0.01 -0.001
[0.057] [0.006]
Non-routine manual physical -0.109+ -0.011+
[0.057] [0.006]
Non-routine manual personal -0.146** -0.015**
[0.044] [0.004]
Observations 24,526 24,526 24,526 24,526 24,526 24,526 24,526 24,526 24,526 24,526
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table D.1 Promotion Probability by Gender in Mid Career: Role of Occupational Feminization and Skills/Task Performed  
Logistic Regression Estimates not Controlling for Fixed Effects for All (Full Table Cont.)








Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME
Percent Female squared -1.630** -0.168** -0.269 -0.027 -0.187 -0.018 -2.823** -0.305** -1.396* -0.149* -0.247 -0.026
[0.522] [0.054] [0.578] [0.058] [0.617] [0.061] [0.552] [0.059] [0.637] [0.068] [0.697] [0.072]
Percent Female 1.411* 0.145* -0.082 -0.008 0.053 0.005 2.910** 0.315** 1.568** 0.167** 0.141 0.015
[0.623] [0.064] [0.697] [0.070] [0.766] [0.075] [0.452] [0.048] [0.570] [0.061] [0.669] [0.069]
Black -0.204+ -0.020+ -0.182 -0.017+ -0.163 -0.015 -0.014 -0.002 0.011 0.001 0.013 0.001
[0.112] [0.010] [0.112] [0.010] [0.113] [0.010] [0.121] [0.013] [0.123] [0.013] [0.122] [0.013]
Hispanic 0.158 0.017 0.131 0.014 0.114 0.012 0.126 0.014 0.139 0.015 0.136 0.015
[0.123] [0.014] [0.122] [0.013] [0.123] [0.013] [0.141] [0.017] [0.142] [0.017] [0.139] [0.016]
Married -0.021 -0.002 -0.052 -0.005 -0.051 -0.005 0.082 0.009 0.042 0.004 0.023 0.002
[0.064] [0.007] [0.065] [0.007] [0.065] [0.006] [0.070] [0.007] [0.070] [0.007] [0.069] [0.007]
Number of children -0.022 -0.002 -0.018 -0.002 -0.017 -0.002 0.018 0.002 0.022 0.002 0.016 0.002
[0.026] [0.003] [0.026] [0.003] [0.026] [0.003] [0.026] [0.003] [0.026] [0.003] [0.026] [0.003]
Corrected ASVAB Scores 0.091* 0.009* 0.035 0.004 0.013 0.001 0.178** 0.019** 0.134** 0.014** 0.131** 0.014**
[0.043] [0.004] [0.043] [0.004] [0.043] [0.004] [0.039] [0.004] [0.040] [0.004] [0.040] [0.004]
Education 0.376** 0.039** 0.228+ 0.023+ 0.166 0.016 0.317* 0.034* 0.250* 0.027* 0.262* 0.027*
[0.134] [0.014] [0.132] [0.013] [0.133] [0.013] [0.128] [0.014] [0.125] [0.013] [0.122] [0.013]
Education squared /100 -1.224** -0.126** -0.880* -0.088* -0.681 -0.067 -0.888* -0.096* -0.779+ -0.083+ -0.866* -0.090*
[0.452] [0.046] [0.443] [0.044] [0.448] [0.044] [0.429] [0.046] [0.421] [0.045] [0.414] [0.043]
Tenure years -0.038* -0.004* -0.049** -0.005** -0.052** -0.005** -0.059** -0.006** -0.069** -0.007** -0.077** -0.008**
[0.017] [0.002] [0.017] [0.002] [0.017] [0.002] [0.016] [0.002] [0.016] [0.002] [0.016] [0.002]
Tenure years squared /100 -0.031 -0.003 -0.022 -0.002 -0.021 -0.002 -0.024 -0.003 -0.008 -0.001 0.003 0.000
[0.075] [0.008] [0.076] [0.008] [0.076] [0.008] [0.065] [0.007] [0.065] [0.007] [0.064] [0.007]
Prior labor market experience 0.038* 0.004* 0.031+ 0.003+ 0.031+ 0.003+ -0.033+ -0.004+ -0.035+ -0.004+ -0.036* -0.004*
[0.018] [0.002] [0.018] [0.002] [0.018] [0.002] [0.018] [0.002] [0.018] [0.002] [0.018] [0.002]
Prior labor market experience /100 -0.257** -0.027** -0.246** -0.025** -0.253** -0.025** -0.047 -0.005 -0.050 -0.005 -0.06 -0.006
[0.068] [0.007] [0.068] [0.007] [0.069] [0.007] [0.064] [0.007] [0.064] [0.007] [0.064] [0.007]
New employer -0.370** -0.035** -0.373** -0.034** -0.369** -0.033** -0.415** -0.041** -0.420** -0.040** -0.433** -0.040**
[0.093] [0.008] [0.093] [0.008] [0.093] [0.008] [0.092] [0.008] [0.093] [0.008] [0.093] [0.008]
Public sector 0.039 0.004 0.028 0.003 0.05 0.005 0.288* 0.034* 0.253* 0.029* 0.335** 0.038**
[0.097] [0.010] [0.096] [0.010] [0.097] [0.010] [0.117] [0.015] [0.120] [0.015] [0.117] [0.015]
Females Males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table D.2 Promotion Probability by Gender in Mid Career: Role of Occupational Feminization and Skills/Task Performed  








Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME
Full time 0.929** 0.080** 0.860** 0.073** 0.773** 0.065** 0.743** 0.062** 0.711** 0.059** 0.649** 0.054**
[0.092] [0.006] [0.093] [0.006] [0.094] [0.007] [0.173] [0.011] [0.172] [0.011] [0.172] [0.011]
Medium firm 0.075 0.008 0.124+ 0.013+ 0.104 0.010 0.233** 0.026** 0.248** 0.028** 0.269** 0.030**
[0.073] [0.008] [0.073] [0.008] [0.073] [0.008] [0.077] [0.009] [0.077] [0.009] [0.077] [0.009]
Large firm 0.424** 0.049** 0.448** 0.050** 0.447** 0.049** 0.404** 0.048** 0.410** 0.048** 0.470** 0.055**
[0.084] [0.011] [0.084] [0.010] [0.085] [0.010] [0.084] [0.011] [0.085] [0.011] [0.085] [0.011]
State unemployement rate -0.024* -0.002* -0.020+ -0.002+ -0.017 -0.002 -0.041** -0.004** -0.038** -0.004** -0.037** -0.004**
[0.011] [0.001] [0.011] [0.001] [0.011] [0.001] [0.011] [0.001] [0.011] [0.001] [0.011] [0.001]
Agriculture and Mining -0.313 -0.029 -0.417 -0.036 -0.476 -0.039+ -0.707** -0.059** -0.594* -0.051** -0.598* -0.050**
[0.311] [0.025] [0.339] [0.024] [0.326] [0.022] [0.258] [0.016] [0.268] [0.018] [0.271] [0.018]
Construction -0.590* -0.049** -0.814** -0.060** -0.884** -0.063** 0.260* 0.030* 0.221+ 0.025+ 0.021 0.002
[0.292] [0.019] [0.298] [0.015] [0.299] [0.014] [0.124] [0.015] [0.126] [0.015] [0.129] [0.014]
Wholesale and Retail Trade -0.025 -0.003 -0.288* -0.027* -0.206 -0.019+ -0.186+ -0.019+ -0.224* -0.022* -0.240* -0.023*
[0.117] [0.012] [0.129] [0.011] [0.130] [0.011] [0.104] [0.010] [0.109] [0.010] [0.111] [0.010]
Transportation, Information and 
Communications and Utilities 0.027 0.003 -0.162 -0.015 -0.109 -0.01 -0.149 -0.015 -0.174 -0.018+ -0.118 -0.012
[0.128] [0.013] [0.133] [0.012] [0.133] [0.012] [0.105] [0.010] [0.110] [0.011] [0.110] [0.011]
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Rental 
and Leasing 0.132 0.014 -0.193 -0.018 -0.161 -0.015 -0.110 -0.011 -0.217 -0.021 -0.098 -0.01
[0.127] [0.014] [0.134] [0.012] [0.134] [0.012] [0.145] [0.015] [0.148] [0.014] [0.148] [0.014]
Professional, Scientific, Management, Admin-
istrative, and Waste Management Services -0.094 -0.009 -0.373** -0.033** -0.376** -0.033** -0.089 -0.009 -0.202+ -0.020+ -0.203+ -0.020+
[0.131] [0.013] [0.135] [0.011] [0.134] [0.010] [0.115] [0.012] [0.121] [0.011] [0.122] [0.011]
Educational, Health and Social Services -0.452** -0.044** -0.773** -0.069** -0.759** -0.067** -0.752** -0.064** -0.853** -0.070** -0.871** -0.069**
[0.114] [0.010] [0.124] [0.010] [0.130] [0.010] [0.163] [0.011] [0.170] [0.010] [0.181] [0.010]
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, 
Accommodations, and Food Services -0.067 -0.007 -0.239 -0.022+ -0.208 -0.019 -0.053 -0.006 -0.076 -0.008 -0.128 -0.013
[0.134] [0.013] [0.146] [0.013] [0.146] [0.013] [0.142] [0.015] [0.153] [0.015] [0.153] [0.015]
Other Services and Public Administration -0.061 -0.006 -0.356** -0.032** -0.341* -0.030** -0.372** -0.036** -0.501** -0.046** -0.471** -0.042**
[0.127] [0.013] [0.132] [0.011] [0.134] [0.011] [0.139] [0.012] [0.147] [0.012] [0.149] [0.011]
Table D.2 Promotion Probability by Gender in Mid Career: Role of Occupational Feminization and Skills/Task Performed  
Logistic Regression Estimates not Controlling for Fixed Effects  for Females and Males (Full Table Cont.)
Females Males









Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME
Management, professional, technical, 
financial, sales and public security
0.696** 0.073** -0.033 -0.003 0.494** 0.055** -0.158 -0.016
[0.115] [0.012] [0.165] [0.016] [0.130] [0.015] [0.170] [0.017]
Administrative support and retail sales 0.250* 0.026+ 0.085 0.009 0.004 0 0.053 0.006
[0.125] [0.013] [0.137] [0.014] [0.157] [0.017] [0.172] [0.018]
Precision production and craft 0.413+ 0.048 0.006 0.001 0.378* 0.046* -0.414* -0.037*
[0.228] [0.030] [0.264] [0.026] [0.171] [0.023] [0.209] [0.016]
Machine operators, assemblers and 
inspectors -0.848** -0.063** -0.941** -0.067** -0.278 -0.027+ -0.377+ -0.035*
[0.225] [0.012] [0.243] [0.012] [0.173] [0.015] [0.198] [0.016]
Transportation/construction/mechanics/ 
mining/agricultural -0.500* -0.042** -0.412+ -0.035+ -0.179 -0.019 -0.281 -0.028+
[0.228] [0.016] [0.248] [0.018] [0.160] [0.016] [0.175] [0.017]
Non-routine cognitive analytical 0.159* 0.016* 0.101 0.01
[0.076] [0.008] [0.076] [0.008]
Non-routine cognitive personal 0.330** 0.032** 0.359** 0.037**
[0.060] [0.006] [0.055] [0.006]
Routine cognitive 0.027 0.003 -0.099* -0.010*
[0.048] [0.005] [0.049] [0.005]
Routine manual -0.187* -0.018* 0.112 0.012
[0.092] [0.009] [0.073] [0.008]
Non-routine manual physical 0.006 0.001 -0.161* -0.017*
[0.089] [0.009] [0.077] [0.008]
Non-routine manual personal -0.263** -0.026** -0.061 -0.006
[0.064] [0.006] [0.062] [0.006]
Observations 12,401 12,401 12,401 12,401 12,401 12,401 12,125 12,125 12,125 12,125 12,125 12,125
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table D.2 Promotion Probability by Gender in Mid Career: Role of Occupational Feminization and Skills/Task Performed  
Logistic Regression Estimates not Controlling for Fixed Effects for Females and Males (Full Table Cont.)
Females Males








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Percent Female 0.367 1.310+ 0.799 -0.204 -0.671 -0.554 0.499+ 1.730* 0.866
[0.278] [0.782] [0.830] [0.246] [1.038] [1.083] [0.302] [0.846] [0.938]
Female*(Percent Female-Mean) -0.497 -1.437 -1.398
[0.329] [1.112] [1.136]
Percent Female squared -1.108 -0.574 0.396 0.553 -1.425 -0.712
[0.855] [0.884] [0.857] [0.886] [0.916] [0.973]
Female*(Percent Female squared -Mean) 1.102 1.089
[1.071] [1.093]
Married -0.116 -0.116 -0.097 -0.166 -0.167 -0.129 -0.072 -0.072 -0.073
[0.086] [0.086] [0.086] [0.118] [0.118] [0.119] [0.126] [0.126] [0.127]
Number of children 0.039 0.039 0.031 -0.053 -0.054 -0.075 0.106 0.108 0.111
[0.086] [0.086] [0.086] [0.154] [0.154] [0.154] [0.106] [0.106] [0.107]
Tenure years -0.147** -0.147** -0.152** -0.125** -0.125** -0.129** -0.177** -0.177** -0.186**
[0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024]
Tenure years squared /100 0.104 0.104 0.112+ 0.06 0.059 0.071 0.180* 0.177* 0.002*
[0.064] [0.064] [0.064] [0.093] [0.093] [0.094] [0.089] [0.089] [0.001]
Prior labor market experience -0.058* -0.059* -0.058* 0.007 0.007 0.015 -0.139** -0.140** -0.149**
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.035] [0.035] [0.036]
Prior labor market experience /100 -0.130+ -0.130+ -0.140+ -0.356** -0.356** -0.382** 0.110 0.110 0.001
[0.076] [0.076] [0.077] [0.115] [0.115] [0.117] [0.109] [0.109] [0.001]
New employer -0.612** -0.611** -0.605** -0.604** -0.604** -0.602** -0.635** -0.632** -0.623**
[0.075] [0.075] [0.075] [0.105] [0.105] [0.106] [0.107] [0.107] [0.108]
Public sector 0.254+ 0.254+ 0.280+ 0.257 0.257 0.274 0.217 0.217 0.245
[0.141] [0.141] [0.143] [0.181] [0.181] [0.183] [0.234] [0.234] [0.235]
Full time 0.787** 0.790** 0.742** 0.815** 0.815** 0.737** 0.665** 0.669** 0.663**
[0.106] [0.106] [0.107] [0.123] [0.123] [0.125] [0.212] [0.212] [0.214]
Medium firm 0.165* 0.165* 0.152* 0.088 0.09 0.059 0.252* 0.252* 0.250*
[0.074] [0.074] [0.075] [0.107] [0.107] [0.108] [0.105] [0.105] [0.106]
Table D.3 Promotion Probability by Gender in Mid Career: Role of Occupational Feminization and Skills/Task Performed  










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Large firm 0.214* 0.215* 0.213* 0.177 0.177 0.173 0.255+ 0.253+ 0.272*
[0.094] [0.094] [0.094] [0.134] [0.134] [0.135] [0.133] [0.133] [0.134]
State unemployement rate -0.028* -0.027* -0.027* -0.014 -0.014 -0.012 -0.043** -0.042** -0.044**
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
Agriculture and Mining -0.915* -0.937** -1.014** -0.368 -0.352 -0.382 -1.142** -1.184** -1.307**
[0.359] [0.360] [0.364] [0.665] [0.665] [0.691] [0.432] [0.433] [0.439]
Construction -0.262 -0.252 -0.329+ -0.800+ -0.807+ -0.892* -0.154 -0.137 -0.192
[0.180] [0.181] [0.182] [0.420] [0.420] [0.421] [0.205] [0.205] [0.207]
Wholesale and Retail Trade -0.348** -0.356** -0.330** -0.242 -0.237 -0.175 -0.457** -0.478** -0.469**
[0.118] [0.118] [0.120] [0.170] [0.170] [0.174] [0.166] [0.167] [0.169]
Transportation, Information and Communications 
and Utilities -0.312* -0.313* -0.284* -0.159 -0.159 -0.148 -0.476** -0.477** -0.435*
[0.130] [0.130] [0.132] [0.199] [0.199] [0.200] [0.175] [0.176] [0.178]
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Rental and 
Leasing -0.587** -0.587** -0.519** -0.424* -0.423* -0.381+ -0.834** -0.831** -0.690**
[0.162] [0.162] [0.163] [0.213] [0.213] [0.214] [0.258] [0.258] [0.262]
Professional, Scientific, Management, 
Administrative, and Waste Management Services -0.502** -0.500** -0.491** -0.394* -0.397* -0.407* -0.629** -0.623** -0.581**
[0.135] [0.136] [0.136] [0.199] [0.199] [0.200] [0.189] [0.189] [0.191]
Educational, Health and Social Services -1.023** -1.017** -1.055** -0.916** -0.922** -0.950** -1.180** -1.141** -1.177**
[0.139] [0.140] [0.142] [0.173] [0.174] [0.176] [0.269] [0.269] [0.272]
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommodations, 
and Food Services -0.552** -0.557** -0.561** -0.327 -0.324 -0.296 -0.857** -0.875** -0.870**
[0.157] [0.157] [0.159] [0.208] [0.209] [0.213] [0.248] [0.249] [0.253]
Other Services and Public Administration -0.830** -0.826** -0.832** -0.794** -0.797** -0.773** -0.858** -0.845** -0.846**
[0.142] [0.142] [0.143] [0.196] [0.196] [0.198] [0.209] [0.209] [0.211]
Table D.3 Promotion Probability by Gender in Mid Career: Role of Occupational Feminization and Skills/Task Performed  









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Management, professional, technical, financial, 
sales and public security 0.617** 0.599** 0.03 0.710** 0.715** 0.081 0.463* 0.413* -0.046
[0.129] [0.130] [0.164] [0.172] [0.172] [0.219] [0.200] [0.202] [0.260]
Administrative support and retail sales 0.025 0.025 0.002 0.185 0.179 0.059 -0.278 -0.267 -0.114
[0.140] [0.141] [0.157] [0.178] [0.179] [0.196] [0.238] [0.237] [0.275]
Precision production and craft 0.494* 0.513** -0.058 0.850** 0.830** 0.544 0.22 0.252 -0.608+
[0.193] [0.195] [0.225] [0.313] [0.316] [0.353] [0.261] [0.262] [0.313]
Machine operators, assemblers and inspectors -0.383* -0.392* -0.551* -0.417 -0.413 -0.369 -0.443+ -0.468+ -0.703*
[0.189] [0.189] [0.214] [0.289] [0.289] [0.334] [0.260] [0.261] [0.300]
Transportation/construction/mechanics/ 
mining/agricultural -0.364* -0.294 -0.267 -0.483 -0.54 -0.274 -0.451+ -0.342 -0.401
[0.175] [0.186] [0.202] [0.324] [0.347] [0.367] [0.230] [0.241] [0.272]
Non-routine cognitive analytical 0.122+ 0.138 0.094
[0.072] [0.100] [0.110]
Non-routine cognitive personal 0.326** 0.317** 0.355**
[0.056] [0.084] [0.078]
Routine cognitive -0.042 0.016 -0.07
[0.050] [0.070] [0.075]
Routine manual 0.033 -0.259* 0.293*
[0.084] [0.129] [0.116]
Non-routine manual physical -0.148+ -0.063 -0.215+
[0.086] [0.125] [0.122]
Non-routine manual personal -0.173** -0.321** -0.065
[0.063] [0.091] [0.090]
Observations 12,226 12,226 12,226 6,013 6,013 6,013 6,213 6,213 6,213
Number of caseid 1,966 1,966 1,966 986 986 986 980 980 980
Standard errors in brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table D.3 Promotion Probability by Gender in Mid Career: Role of Occupational Feminization and Skills/Task Performed  









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Female -0.141** -0.136** -0.153** -0.156**
[0.016] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014]
Promoted*Female -0.012 0.001 -0.019 -0.02
[0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
Promoted 0.076** 0.061** 0.041* 0.032+ 0.066** 0.026+ 0.018 0.049** 0.029 0.019
[0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018]
Percent Female 0.190* 0.531** -0.126 -0.186+ -0.137 -0.591** -0.514** 0.434** -0.263* -0.504**
[0.095] [0.096] [0.106] [0.111] [0.125] [0.138] [0.145] [0.095] [0.111] [0.125]
Percent Female squared -0.509** -0.798** -0.131 -0.121 -0.019 0.430** 0.367** -0.650** 0.031 0.159
[0.121] [0.119] [0.121] [0.124] [0.104] [0.112] [0.113] [0.120] [0.126] [0.135]
Promoted*(Percent Female-Mean) 0.006 -0.018 -0.012 -0.002 -0.039 0.046 0.045 -0.034 -0.028 -0.015
[0.063] [0.063] [0.061] [0.061] [0.049] [0.049] [0.048] [0.064] [0.062] [0.062]
Promoted*Female*(Percent Female-Mean) -0.013 -0.02 0.061 0.057
[0.081] [0.080] [0.078] [0.078]
Female*(Percent Female squared -Mean) 0.783** 0.873** 0.650** 0.650**
[0.162] [0.157] [0.150] [0.152]
Female*(Percent Female-Mean) -0.675** -0.748** -0.545** -0.539**
[0.160] [0.156] [0.151] [0.152]
Black -0.053** -0.058** -0.044* -0.040* -0.031 -0.02 -0.011 -0.098** -0.083** -0.089**
[0.019] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.023] [0.022] [0.022] [0.028] [0.027] [0.026]
Hispanic 0.038+ 0.035 0.031 0.027 0.072** 0.064* 0.060* -0.009 -0.008 -0.013
[0.023] [0.022] [0.021] [0.020] [0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.033] [0.031] [0.031]
Married 0.075** 0.068** 0.055** 0.052** 0.014 0.003 0.003 0.129** 0.111** 0.108**
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.016] [0.016] [0.015]
Number of children 0.010* 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 0.026** 0.027** 0.027**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
Corrected ASVAB Scores 0.098** 0.091** 0.073** 0.068** 0.088** 0.071** 0.066** 0.091** 0.071** 0.065**
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
All Females Males
Table D.4 Log Wages by Gender in Mid Career: Role of  Promotion, Occupational Feminization and Skills/Task Performed  








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Education 0.084** 0.069** 0.048** 0.039* 0.072** 0.045+ 0.026 0.054+ 0.041 0.044
[0.021] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.029] [0.028] [0.028]
Education squared /100 0.000 0.044 0.053 0.072 0.005 0.037 0.092 0.118 0.096 0.069
[0.072] [0.068] [0.065] [0.066] [0.090] [0.087] [0.088] [0.102] [0.096] [0.097]
Tenure years 0.048** 0.047** 0.043** 0.043** 0.051** 0.048** 0.047** 0.040** 0.037** 0.036**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Tenure years squared /100 -0.083** -0.081** -0.077** -0.076** -0.092** -0.088** -0.087** -0.064** -0.063** -0.061**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Prior labor market experience 0.016** 0.015** 0.014** 0.014** 0.017** 0.016** 0.015** 0.014** 0.012** 0.013**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Prior labor market experience /100 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.000
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012]
New employer 0.017+ 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.009
[0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013]
Public sector -0.066** -0.062** -0.072** -0.064** -0.056** -0.057** -0.046* -0.055* -0.081** -0.069**
[0.014] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]
Full time 0.117** 0.086** 0.061** 0.049** 0.065** 0.040* 0.030+ 0.069 0.048 0.034
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.042] [0.041] [0.041]
Medium firm 0.079** 0.082** 0.088** 0.085** 0.084** 0.093** 0.085** 0.080** 0.084** 0.084**
[0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015]
Large firm 0.203** 0.209** 0.207** 0.203** 0.222** 0.218** 0.205** 0.194** 0.196** 0.195**
[0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019]
State unemployement rate -0.007** -0.006** -0.004** -0.004** -0.006** -0.005** -0.004* -0.005* -0.003+ -0.003+
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Agriculture and Mining -0.190** -0.167** -0.141** -0.019 -0.028 -0.023 -0.247** -0.210** -0.173**
[0.047] [0.042] [0.040] [0.045] [0.045] [0.047] [0.056] [0.050] [0.047]
Construction 0.204** 0.165** 0.152** 0.208** 0.159** 0.151** 0.197** 0.162** 0.144**
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.048] [0.046] [0.046] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates not Controlling for Fixed Effects (Full Table Cont.) 
All Females Males









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Wholesale and Retail Trade -0.101** -0.129** -0.113** -0.119** -0.149** -0.127** -0.073** -0.097** -0.089**
[0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.023] [0.024] [0.024] [0.026] [0.026] [0.025]
Transportation, Information and 
Communications and Utilities
0.091** 0.073** 0.072** 0.108** 0.093** 0.086** 0.084** 0.066** 0.069**
[0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.028] [0.029] [0.029] [0.023] [0.023] [0.022]
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Rental 
and Leasing 0.147** 0.083** 0.063* 0.145** 0.079* 0.069* 0.172** 0.114** 0.089*
[0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.044] [0.043] [0.043]
Professional, Scientific, Management, 
Admin-istrative, and Waste Management 
Services 0.160** 0.115** 0.101** 0.191** 0.147** 0.142** 0.135** 0.096** 0.079**
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.031] [0.030] [0.030]
Educational, Health and Social Services -0.058** -0.112** -0.121** 0.001 -0.068** -0.077** -0.163** -0.169** -0.176**
[0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.022] [0.023] [0.024] [0.034] [0.033] [0.033]
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, 
Accommodations, and Food Services -0.203** -0.180** -0.171** -0.193** -0.184** -0.163** -0.179** -0.125** -0.127**
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.028] [0.029] [0.029] [0.034] [0.034] [0.033]
Other Services and Public Administration 0.033+ -0.023 -0.035+ 0.067* 0.016 0.004 0.002 -0.057+ -0.066*
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029]
Management, professional, technical, 
financial, sales and public security 0.319** 0.125** 0.293** 0.125** 0.372** 0.165**
[0.016] [0.022] [0.020] [0.029] [0.026] [0.036]
Administrative support and retail sales 0.109** 0.016 0.084** 0.017 0.179** 0.066+
[0.018] [0.020] [0.021] [0.025] [0.033] [0.036]
Precision production and craft 0.068** -0.044 0.061 -0.049 0.104** -0.017
[0.024] [0.029] [0.039] [0.043] [0.032] [0.041]
All Females Males
Table D.4 Log Wages by Gender in Mid Career: Role of  Promotion, Occupational Feminization and Skills/Task Performed  











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Machine operators, assemblers and 
inspectors 0.022 -0.017 0.000 -0.060+ 0.080** 0.061
[0.021] [0.025] [0.030] [0.036] [0.030] [0.037]
Transportation/construction/mechanics/ 
mining/agricultural 0.017 0.005 -0.009 -0.033 0.058* 0.057+
[0.022] [0.024] [0.036] [0.038] [0.029] [0.033]
Non-routine cognitive analytical 0.071** 0.081** 0.048**
[0.010] [0.014] [0.016]
Non-routine cognitive personal 0.013 0.018 0.012
[0.009] [0.013] [0.012]
Routine cognitive 0.039** 0.037** 0.040**
[0.007] [0.009] [0.010]
Routine manual -0.014 -0.013 -0.015
[0.011] [0.016] [0.015]
Non-routine manual physical -0.027* 0.006 -0.057**
[0.011] [0.016] [0.016]
Non-routine manual personal 0.016+ -0.005 0.037**
[0.009] [0.012] [0.012]
Observations 24,526 24,526 24,526 24,526 12,401 12,401 12,401 12,125 12,125 12,125
R-squared 0.427 0.457 0.485 0.493 0.428 0.459 0.467 0.427 0.457 0.467
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table D.4 Log Wages by Gender in Mid Career: Role of  Promotion, Occupational Feminization and Skills/Task Performed  









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Promoted*Female -0.021 -0.022 -0.023
[0.027] [0.027] [0.027]
Promoted 0.040+ 0.040* 0.036+ 0.019 0.016 0.011 0.044+ 0.042+ 0.039+
[0.024] [0.020] [0.020] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024]
Percent Female squared -0.028 -0.018 -0.072
[0.145] [0.125] [0.129]
Female*(Percent Female squared -Mean) 0.139
[0.181]
Percent Female -0.099 -0.118* -0.097+ -0.127 -0.134** -0.100* -0.032 -0.078 -0.088
[0.117] [0.050] [0.052] [0.145] [0.040] [0.047] [0.094] [0.053] [0.057]
Promoted*(Percent Female-Mean) 0.072 0.071 0.066 0.048 0.052 0.054 0.068 0.077 0.071
[0.084] [0.076] [0.076] [0.053] [0.053] [0.054] [0.084] [0.084] [0.084]
Promoted*Female*(Percent Female-Mean) -0.017 -0.017 -0.007
[0.099] [0.101] [0.101]
Female*(Percent Female-Mean) -0.126 0.024 0.014
[0.175] [0.059] [0.059]
Married 0.022 0.022 0.024+ 0.010 0.008 0.013 0.032+ 0.035* 0.035*
[0.013] [0.015] [0.015] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
Number of children 0.005 0.005 0.004 -0.031 -0.033 -0.031 0.015 0.014 0.013
[0.018] [0.015] [0.015] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022]
Tenure years 0.026** 0.026** 0.026** 0.026** 0.026** 0.026** 0.027** 0.027** 0.027**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Tenure years squared /100 -0.055** -0.055** -0.055** -0.075** -0.075** -0.074** -0.040** -0.040** -0.040**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Prior labor market experience 0.018** 0.018** 0.019** 0.013** 0.013** 0.014** 0.026** 0.026** 0.026**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005]
Prior labor market experience /100 -0.036** -0.036** -0.036** -0.032+ -0.032+ -0.034* -0.048** -0.048** -0.047**
[0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
Table D.5 Log Real Earnings by Gender in Mid Career: Role of Promotion, Occupational Feminization and Skills/Task Performed  









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
New employer 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.012 0.013 0.012
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
Public sector -0.165** -0.165** -0.166** -0.150** -0.153** -0.153** -0.183** -0.188** -0.191**
[0.039] [0.022] [0.022] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.069] [0.069] [0.069]
Full time -0.010 -0.010 -0.015 0.014 0.007 -0.001 -0.061 -0.067 -0.067
[0.021] [0.015] [0.015] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.052] [0.052] [0.052]
Medium firm 0.068** 0.068** 0.065** 0.101** 0.098** 0.093** 0.034* 0.035* 0.034*
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
Large firm 0.091** 0.091** 0.088** 0.107** 0.104** 0.098** 0.078** 0.079** 0.077**
[0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027]
State unemployement rate 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.017** 0.017** 0.017** 0.002 0.003 0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Agriculture and Mining -0.064 -0.064 -0.056 0.026 0.045 0.043 -0.141* -0.130* -0.116*
[0.042] [0.053] [0.054] [0.049] [0.053] [0.056] [0.055] [0.054] [0.053]
Construction 0.123** 0.123** 0.114** 0.168** 0.181** 0.170** 0.067* 0.068* 0.063*
[0.025] [0.030] [0.030] [0.051] [0.052] [0.052] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027]
Wholesale and Retail Trade -0.049* -0.050* -0.040+ -0.031 -0.026 -0.007 -0.072** -0.063** -0.060*
[0.020] [0.022] [0.022] [0.030] [0.032] [0.032] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024]
Transportation, Information and 0.079** 0.079** 0.079** 0.156** 0.168** 0.167** 0.007 0.012 0.011
Communications and Utilities [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.044] [0.045] [0.045] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024]
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Rental 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.053 0.066 0.068+ -0.03 -0.024 -0.021
and Leasing [0.030] [0.031] [0.031] [0.039] [0.040] [0.041] [0.053] [0.052] [0.051]
Professional, Scientific, Management, 
Admin-istrative, and Waste Management 
0.039+ 0.039 0.036 0.090* 0.106** 0.100** -0.026 -0.011 -0.014
Services [0.023] [0.025] [0.025] [0.036] [0.038] [0.038] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029]
Educational, Health and Social Services 0.037 0.038 0.041+ 0.128* 0.151** 0.157** -0.178** -0.169** -0.163*
[0.041] [0.024] [0.024] [0.052] [0.055] [0.056] [0.063] [0.064] [0.064]
Ordinary Least Squares Regression with Fixed Effects Estimates with Panel Data (Full Table Cont.)
All Females Males








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, -0.065* -0.066* -0.057* -0.055 -0.014 0.009 -0.126** -0.095* -0.095*
Accommodations, and Food Services [0.029] [0.027] [0.028] [0.041] [0.043] [0.044] [0.039] [0.041] [0.041]
Other Services and Public Administration 0.043 0.043+ 0.043+ 0.162** 0.182** 0.185** -0.117** -0.109** -0.113**
[0.032] [0.025] [0.025] [0.045] [0.048] [0.048] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041]
Management, professional, technical, 0.111** 0.110** 0.021 0.096** 0.007 0.128** 0.048
financial, sales and public security [0.021] [0.021] [0.027] [0.028] [0.039] [0.030] [0.037]
Administrative support and retail sales 0.072** 0.072** 0.023 0.081** 0.031 0.053 0.002
[0.020] [0.022] [0.025] [0.024] [0.029] [0.037] [0.037]
Precision production and craft 0.117** 0.118** 0.054 0.119** 0.052 0.134** 0.079+
[0.024] [0.034] [0.039] [0.037] [0.043] [0.033] [0.043]
Machine operators, assemblers and 0.106** 0.105** 0.035 0.131** 0.039 0.102** 0.054
inspectors [0.024] [0.030] [0.035] [0.034] [0.040] [0.035] [0.042]
Transportation/construction/mechanics/ 0.056* 0.058* 0.018 0.047 0.019 0.076* 0.027
mining/agricultural [0.025] [0.027] [0.031] [0.039] [0.044] [0.032] [0.038]
Non-routine cognitive analytical 0.028* 0.048** 0.000
[0.012] [0.016] [0.018]
Non-routine cognitive personal 0.034** 0.028+ 0.037**
[0.010] [0.016] [0.012]
Routine cognitive 0.035** 0.032* 0.040**
[0.008] [0.013] [0.013]
Routine manual -0.025+ -0.023 -0.034*
[0.013] [0.019] [0.016]
Non-routine manual physical 0.009 0.007 0.018
[0.014] [0.023] [0.020]
Non-routine manual personal -0.041** -0.063** -0.017
[0.010] [0.017] [0.013]
Observations 24,526 24,526 24,526 12,401 12,401 12,401 12,125 12,125 12,125
R-squared 0.101 0.101 0.104 0.111 0.122 0.127 0.089 0.095 0.097
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
All Females Males
Table D.5 Log Real Earnings by Gender in Mid Career: Role of Promotion, Occupational Feminization and Skills/Task Performed  
Ordinary Least Squares Regression with Fixed Effects Estimates with Panel Data (Full Table Cont.)
